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The removal of the strong man in Belgrade  Slobodan Milosevic
 opens the way for new opportunities and new risks on the Balkans.
In the course of the last thirteen years Mr. Milosevic presided over the
radical revival of the Serb nationalism, claiming the formation of a
Greater Serbia, replacing the second Yugoslav federation after the end
of the Cold War in Europe. The nationalist revival in Belgrade has geared
up parallel nationalist upheavals in most other parts of what has been
former Yugoslavia. The notorious memorandum of the Serb Academy of
Sciences and Arts (SANU) in 1986, the adoption of new constitutional
amendments in Serbia in 1990, depriving Kosovo and Vojvodina of their
status of autonomy, are among the founding events for the return of radical
nationalism in the Yugoslav federation. Frightened by the rising great
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Serbian nationalism, the other constituent republics of SFRY generated
a process of public mobilization around the cause of a looser federation
 confederation, and - lately  for separation and independence.
The moderate democratic forces failed to control this process of public
mobilization and gave up to the new nationalist strong men in Zagreb and
Sarajevo  Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic. The absence of adequate
international reaction to the process of Yugoslav disintegration in the first
half of the 1990s has brought the tragedy of four wars and hundreds of
thousands people killed, tortured and displaced from their homes and
communities. The Dayton agreement has proved the first successful attempt
to stop the violence and contain the Bosnian crisis at the expense of large
international military presence and rising public expenditure on behalf of
the West to heal and rebuild Bosnia. The Kosovo crisis has closed the vicious
circle of post Yugoslav destruction: the crisis of Yugoslavia has started with
the Kosovo Albanians rebellions against Belgrade in 1980-1982. The
Kosovars then claimed equal republican status with all other nations of SFRY.
Two decades later  after a period of strong authoritarian oppression from
Belgrade, the Albanians denied any potential resolution, short of independence
for Kosovo. The NATO action against the Belgrade regime, the establishment
of an international protectorate in Kosovo, and the inability of Milosevic
to compensate for the immense impoverishment and isolation of Serbia from
its neighbors and the world have shaken the iron grip on power of the strong
man of Serbia. All those consequent events have brought the victory of
the Democratic opposition in Belgrade both on the Yugoslav, and the Serb
elections in September and December 2000.
Congratulating the long expected changes in Belgrade, it will be
irrelevantly optimistic to consider the political end of Milosevic as a happy
end of the decade long Balkan crises. The removal of the initial cause does
not automatically disable its multiple consequences. The complexities of the
Balkan post-Yugoslav and post-communist development hold series of future
challenges for Serbia and the Balkans as a whole. The realistic assessment
of those challenges is the sole factor to promote adequate strategies for
irreversible healing and resolution of the Balkan crises of the last decade.
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A New Security Environment on the Balkans
For almost a decade, the Balkans have functioned as a cordon sanitaire
around the troubled spots of inter-ethnic violence in former Yugoslavia.
The international community has expected all countries in SEE to act
responsibly in containing the conflicts of the region, to avoid possible
spillover effects, involving larger areas and communities into the bitter
post-Yugoslav disputes. The neighbors of Yugoslavia suffered and bared
all negative consequences both of the ex-Yugoslav crises and of the
international efforts to stop and resolve them. The UN embargo over
the Belgrade regime has effectively served as an embargo upon all other
countries in the region, and in particular  upon the southern and eastern
tiers of the Serb neighborhood (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and
Albania). The traditional trade routes of those countries to Europe have
been effectively cut off  both on surface and on the river Danube.
The region saw an outburst of flourishing mafia networks, filling the gap
of the legally banned official trade and economic exchange. The gray
and black economy of the embargo period effectively penetrated the
business institutions and the political system, amplifying immensely the
corruption processes in the post communist countries of the region1. The
fragile institutions of post communist democracies have additionally lost
potential to carry out the reform processes in the economy and the society.
The malfunctioning of the institutions coincided with the dramatic
collapse of the regions credit ratings and the ability of the SEE countries
to attract decent foreign investment in supporting their economic reforms
and privatization.
The Kosovo crisis has brought a heavy international military
involvement of NATO against the regime in Belgrade. The international
community relied upon the support of the Balkan neighbors of Serbia
in order to effectively isolate Milosevic and force him to give up control
1 See also Stephen Holmes, Crime and Corruption after Communism, East European
Constitutional Review, Vol. 6 Number 4; New York University Law School and Central
European University, Fall 1997.
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over Kosovo. Macedonia and Albania had to host a huge number of
Kosovar refugees, equal to 15  30 per cent of their own population.
Bulgaria and Romania had to provide access to their air space for the
NATO operation. All those activities of the local governments had to
be performed in an environment of public opinion scare and hostility
towards the mass scale bombing attacks. People were not against restoring
the rights of the Kosovars and against punishing Milosevic, but the
majority of them were scared of the potential devastating consequences
of this major military effort in the region. The democratic governments
of the Balkan countries have served their duty at the expense of their
own popularity and public reliability.
The cordon sanitaire around Belgrade has substantively worsened
the environment of post-communist democratic change on the Balkans
and has delayed the effective economic and social reforms in the region
for almost a decade. The first major consequence of the recent democratic
change in Serbia is the partial removal of the cordon sanitaire as an
international security system from some of the neighbors of todays
Yugoslavia. Today Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia and
Albania remain  entirely or to a certain extent  under the security
restrictions, encompassing the concept of a cordon sanitaire. The
dangerous region has been narrowed and the crisis spillover risk has been
reduced to the territory where those countries border with each other.
The new democratic government in Serbia is expected to serve as the
major contributor to the containment of further conflicts in the region,
compensating for the decade, in which the Milosevic regime has served
as the major trouble-maker. The new situation represents a number of
security challenges that the Balkan region may witness in short term and
mid-term future.
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The Future of Ethnic Conflicts on the Balkans
All major conflicts in the Balkan region have been caused by attempts
to control larger territories and hold it for the future by a forceful ethnic
homogenization, involving ethnic cleansing, in order to reach the status
of a greater nation state and regional super power. Historically, all
Balkan nationalisms have tried this model to a particular extent and most
of them have failed - partially or entirely. Serbia has been historically
successful to turn its small nation statehood into a powerful Yugoslav
(Southern Slav) state and to maintain the lion share of political control
over Yugoslavia throughout the 20 century. Such a historical success has
boosted the self-confidence of the Belgrade regime in the late 1980s in
adopting and promoting the strategy of a post-Yugoslav Greater Serbia
as a hegemon of the Balkans. This strategy has caused the greatest tragedy
of the Serb nation in the modern times, inflicting a decade of destruction,
violence and poverty over the people of Serbia.
The Balkans represent an inseparable variety of ethnic groups,
intermixed on the territories of all nation states in the region. Any attempt
to remake the state borders, in order to receive an ethnically homogeneous
nation is doomed to failure. After the collapse of most great national
ideas on the Balkans, the attempt of the Albanian communities to pursue
an irredentist strategy of national unification may prove the last major
challenge to establishing peace and stability in the region. The Kosovar
Albanians have had the legitimate right to fight against the authoritarian
oppression of Belgrade and search for a decent level of self-determination
in order to guarantee their rights and freedoms. The international
community has supported this claim, involving the most powerful military
alliance of the present  NATO  into an action to cut off Kosovo
from the control of the Belgrade regime. The eighteen months, following
this successful action, though, do not provide evidence that the Kosovar
Albanians are able to implement the principles and rules of the free
democratic society in their land. The return of the Albanian refugees back
to their homes has initiated a mass scale purge of the Serbs, as well
12
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as of all other minorities from Kosovo (Roma, Muslims, Goranci, etc.)2.
The radical intolerance to any citizens of non-Albanian origin in Kosovo
compares to the worst examples of ethnic hatred in the region of the
last decade. All efforts of KFOR and the UN administration to initiate
decent disarmament of the civilian population and the paramilitary
troopers of the KLA have proved unsuccessful. The spillover of organized
military activities of the KLA followers to the southeast of Serbia proves
the expectations that the liberation effort in Kosovo will develop into
a full-fledged strategy of irredentist unification of all Albanians. The
actions of the armed Albanian groups in the valley of Presevo, Bujanovac
and Medvedja show a clear example of an organized strategy of spillover
of a joint irredentist action for Greater Kosovo in the South of Serbia
towards Macedonia.
In this way, the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis puts forward a
major legitimate question: how to contain the radical aspects of Albanian
nationalism and irredentism on the Balkans. A key issue in this context
is the future status of Kosovo.
Self-determination and Sovereignty:
Changing Borders on the Balkans
The Kosovar Albanians could not live any more in any common state
together with the Serbs. The independence of Kosovo is unavoidable.
This position is a firm belief not only of the Kosovars themselves, but
also of a growing number of international observers on the Balkans. The
future independence of Kosovo may really be unavoidable. There is no
reason to keep this community within Serbia or within a joint Yugoslav
state (if it survives in time) if the citizens of Kosovo radically disagree
with such an option. The issue under question is how to achieve a future
2 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Special Report Chaos and Complexities in
Kouchners Kosovo, Issue 107: January 14, 2000; available from
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr/bcr_20000114_2_eng.txt; Internet;
accessed January 28, 2000.
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independent status of Kosovo without further destabilizing the entire
region. The answer to this question is subject to the following preconditions:
n An independent status for Kosovo should lead to a sustainable
society. This should be a country with its own sources of legal economic
development. A system of law and order should function in the land, where
the institutions will guarantee the civil liberties for all citizens, irrespective
of ethnic origin. The clan-based illegal networks, smuggling and mafia
economics should give way to legitimate economic and political order. Unless
this precondition is adequately met, an independent Kosovo will be a major
source of organized crime and corruption, spilling over the entire Balkans.
It will take years under international military and administrative protection
before those factors of sustainability are step by step accumulated. Thus,
independence is an issue for the future, not for today and tomorrow.
n The independence for Kosovo should be achieved under the
principle of non-violability of borders, upon which the entire European
architecture rests. The independence should not be granted as a primary
consequence of war. Otherwise, the risk of further chain reaction -
separatist claims throughout the region  may well be unavoidable. A
reasonable period of change in Kosovo and within Serbia itself should
be granted in order to make the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina
possible. In this way, an independent status should be negotiated under
active international mediation, with respect to the international law and
to the facts on the ground. This process will also take time.
n Independent Kosovo should not cause a domino effect of
spillover claims in the broader region. Today Albanian paratroopers
operate in southeast Serbia, claiming liberation of eastern Kosovo.
What comes next? A south Kosovo in Macedonia? Or a west Kosovo
in Montenegro? Both those countries are small enough and fragile to
resist major ethnic crises. A potential split  communal or territorial
may question their very existence. And if Macedonias sovereignty is
14
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questioned, the old historical Macedonian issue may well come at
stake? Who is prepared to deal with such an issue, involving all major
countries in the region into an ill forgotten bitter dispute?
n Independence, granted for Kosovo as a primary consequence
of war may also affect the broader status quo in the region, achieved
after years of painful negotiations and conflict management. Republika
Srpska in Bosnia, as well as other parts of ex-Yugoslavia may easily
seek a new status by analogy with the Kosovo case.
n The future status of Kosovo should be finally adopted after
an effective evolution of the Albanian public opinion  in Albania proper,
Kosovo and Macedonia  towards one simple truth for the Balkans:
the era of great nation states and all nationals in one state belongs
to the past. It is worth reducing the importance of borders, rather than
changing them.
Kosovo is not the sole example for an independence claim in the
region. Montenegro is on its way of independence too3. Its desire should
be respected, if subjected to the same conditions, enlisted above.
There is no obvious opportunity to reduce the risk of ethnic conflict,
based on the factors, formulated above. Irredentism, spillover crises, domino
effect, transferring ethnic claims from community to community on analogy
basis  those are the effects of a decade of violent disintegration, which
has de-legitimized all major arguments and normative frameworks, capable
to maintain stability and balance in the region. Principles and rules should
be re-imposed within a process of careful containment of potential future
crises and step by step confidence building among communities in an
environment of democratic development and international mediation.
3 See Montenegro governments Platform for Talks with Government of Serbia on New
Relations Between the Two States, Europa South-East Monitor, Issue 19, January 2001,
Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels; available from:
http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/SEEMonitor/Monitor19.htm
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Ethnic Rights versus the Rights of the Citizen
Multiethnic society is the inescapable future of all Balkan countries
whatever the present composition of their population and whatever
policies they may adopt to reduce the importance of ethnic plurality in
their lives. This basic premise has several important consequences.
First, it is useless to involve one nations resources and the
resources of the international community in order to achieve change of
borders under the argument of a presupposed ethnic and national
homogeneity after the new territorial configuration is being achieved.
There is no physical opportunity to achieve an ethnic homogeneous nation
in the region, avoiding the instruments of ethnic cleansing, or arbitrary
assimilation, both of which are not tolerated in present day Europe. The
most likely consequence of a forceful change of borders is the inevitable
bitter revisionism of a territorially deprived neighbor, seeking an adequate
environment in the future to reclaim its former territorial possession.
Therefore, the arbitrary change of borders remains the most important
fuel resource to continue the Balkanization process4 as a perpetuum
mobile in the future. Reducing the importance of borders in the region,
and applying the European style regionalization is a much more reliable
instrument to put all your ethnic nationals into the Fatherland of a daily
cross-border communication and cooperation, rather than building new
walls across newly established borders.
Second, all Balkan nations should pay substantive efforts to change
their historically burdened concept of nationhood, solely built on ethnic
integrity and unity. The Balkans have suffered a historical delay in modern
nation building, and the shortage of institutional and civil resources to
found a new nation upon, has been compensated with the overrating of
ethnicity and  in some cases  religion, at the expense of civil equality
and integrity. The civilian elements of nationhood should be emphasized
4 For more detailes on the so called Balkanization process see Maria Todorova, Imagining
the Balkans, Oxford University Press Inc, 1997
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and encouraged in the final stage of modernization process on the
Balkans, coinciding with the process of European integration. Many
people on the Balkans view their state as a tribal instrument of defense
and oppression against the members of the hostile tribe. This ethnic
tribalist vision deprives the Balkan citizens from the opportunity to claim
much more important assets from their own nation state: guarantees for
their citizens rights, education and health opportunities, adequate economic
policies and effective law and order etc. A nationhood of effective
institutions - guardians of rights, delivering services to their citizens and
supporting the expression of their culture and identity is a much more
dignified purpose of nation building for the Balkans of the future. More
dignified and promising, rather than the ethnic nationhood of tribal
instinct that has jeopardized 150 years of modern history of the Balkan
nations.
Third, but not least, the approach to deal with ethnic diversity
through institutionalizing corporate political ethnic rights should give
priority to the institutionalization of guaranteed civic equality and liberty
of the individuals. The Balkans represent an institutionally disintegrated
reality. Both the effects of post-communism and the decade long ethnic
wars have deprived the citizens in the region from the implementation
of their fundamental liberal democratic rights as individuals. Crime,
corruption, poverty and social injustice have prevented the people from
seizing their opportunities as citizens. The basic instrument to compensate
for that civil deprivation has been the search for ethnic-communal
integration directed against the other ethnicities as rivals or enemies. The
rival communities integrated under the authoritarian command of power-
thirsty elites, deprive the community members of their citizens rights.
Those elites maintain their grip on power through constantly generating
conflicts with the neighboring communities and through searching greater
and greater opportunities to split, to secede and separate from the larger
national entities. This type of tribal nationalism flourishes under the
circumstances of weak states and fragile institutions, impotent to deliver
to the people as citizens.
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One of the major mistakes of the international community
throughout the 1990s has been to legitimize such a corporate ethnic
division process under the concept of communal or collective rights.
Encouraging collective rights at the expense of the fundamental human
rights of the individuals as citizens directly feeds the process of communal
fragmentation, where smaller and smaller communities take the chance
to claim independence and go for a separate nation state. The
individuals as citizens are the sole holders of their natural human rights.
Any communal reference to the notion of rights might draw legitimacy
only from the free will of its members as citizens. The practical impact
of this simple truth, embodied into the liberal democratic system brings
us to the essential strategy to develop adequate institutions  guardians
of civil liberty and equality, before any collective derivatives of rights
could be thought of and practically enforced.
The instruments of civil integration into a civil community should
receive priority as means of containing and resolving the ethnic conflicts
on the Balkans. If such an approach proves successful, the implementation
of the collective rights will be much less painful and arbitrary. No
society is entirely immune against militant communal secessionism (as
the examples of Northern Ireland, Spain and some others in Europe show),
but only strong liberal democratic system is capable to put this risk under
control. A functioning system of liberal democracy and citizens rights
is the priority number one for the Balkans. The right to secession, self-
determination and disintegration comes next  just in case no other
option works.
Organized Crime and Corruption
The organized crime networks in SEE have developed as a considerable
regional, and  lately  international factor, capable to influence the
regional security environment in longer terms. The painful post-communist
institutional destruction, the ethnic wars, the embargo upon Belgrade and
the absence of any decent alternative to make ones living for a growing
18
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number of Balkan youths  all those factors have considerably
contributed to the development of the criminal and mafia networks in
the region.
There are two basic sources of organized crime expansion in
the near Balkan future, which have to be addressed analytically and
contained with a detailed strategy both of the countries in the region
and of the international community. The reality of clan based social
and economic life of the Albanian communities on the Balkans,
accompanied with a very low level of institutional capacity to ensure
law and order both in Albania and Kosovo represent the first source
of organized crime expansion. The institutional environment in Albania
proper is slowly improving after the dramatic events of 1997, but the
level of effective performance of the state institutions is very low, and
the corrupt relationships between the illegal economy and the power
holders intensify. The Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 has considerably
strengthened the influence of Kosovo Albanian illegal networks on the
territory of Albania proper. For the most of the years 1999-2000 there
has been no effective border between Albania and Kosovo, which has
produced a joint space of operation of the local and the international
organized crime syndicates. The continuing tough relationships between
the government of Albania and the major party of the opposition 
the Democrats of former president Berisha  do not provide any hope
for a consensual and integrated national policies to reduce organized
crime and the corruption, inter-linked with the operation of the major
political factors and with the dealers of the shadow economy of the
country.
The most intense challenge to the region from the organized crime
and mafia networks stems from the territory of Kosovo, and  to an
extent  from the neighboring and integrated into the process territories
of Western and Northern Macedonia. The organized resistance of the
Kosovar Albanians to the oppressive Belgrade regime has produced a
strong link between the major Kosovar clans (organizing the resistance)
and the Albanian Diaspora in Europe and the US, providing the funds
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for the weapons purchases throughout the years of the Kosovo crises5.
This is the way, how the KLA has emerged and developed into the major
force of Kosovo Albanians resistance to Milosevic? Officially unconfirmed
but intense suggestions blame on the KLA and its supporters the
organization of strong networks of drugs trafficking, funding the purchase
of weapons. It is pointed out that the so called Balkan route  a
smuggling channel from Afghanistan to Western Europe  that supplies
80% of Europes heroin is now dominated exactly by the Kosovo
Albanians6. All those networks  for drugs and weapons smuggling, for
illegal trade with white slaves in the Balkan region, as well as for
any type of unregistered and illegal commercial activities  have
dramatically expanded after the successful NATO action to oust the
presence of the Serb army and control in 1999. The slow process of
assuming control over the territory on behalf of the international UN
administration, the failure to disarm and pacify the KLA and its leaders,
the disintegrated clan based structure of social life on the territory 
all those factors have contributed to the development of Kosovo into
a safe heaven for all illegal practices, enlisted above. As a consequence
 we witness more and more successful attempts to turn the local
organized crime structure into an internationally effective force, covering
the Balkans and reaching up to the West of Europe. There is no easy
answer how to deal with the complexity of such a challenge. One thing
is for sure: the containment and the reduction of organized crime, based
on the illegal Albanian networks might be based predominantly upon the
adequate development of decent public institutions both in Kosovo and
5 AIM Press correspondent in Tirana Ramzi Lani pointed out that Albania gets $1 million
per day from immigrants remittances, of nearly 500,000 immigrants who work in Greece
and Italy and that considerable ammount of hard currency circulate in the country due
to the illegal traffics of drugs, prostitutes, stolen cars, etc. Ramzi Lani, Albania: nine
yaers later, AIM Tirana Dec 16, 1999; available from
http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archieve/data/199912/91216-007-trae-tir.htm
6 Stratfor, The Global Intelligence Update Kosovo: One Year Later, March 17, 2000;
available from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreport/special26.htm;
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Albania proper. Institutions, capable to impose law and order and generate
stimuli for legal economic performance and business success. The
responsibilities of the UN administration in this respect are crucial. An
important step to resist the criminal spillover of the above mentioned
networks is to resist their operation on the territories of the neighboring
countries. In the case of Macedonia, the growing influence of the illegal
Albanian networks has a direct impact on the growing potential for an
inter-ethnic explosion in this small country.
The second source of potential organized crime expansion on the
Balkans reflects the opportunities of economic performance of the former
Belgrade regime oligarchy in the post-Milosevic era. For almost a decade,
the Yugoslav economy has functioned under the rules of a systematically
corrupt authoritarian government, holding an overall control of the
national economy. The international embargo upon the Milosevic regime
has forced the entire economic life into the underground. No concept
of legitimacy could be applied neither to the restricted privatization
process nor to the handling of the financial system. Huge financial assets
have been misappropriated by the oligarchy and exported abroad.
The democratic transformation of post-Milosevic Yugoslavia will
face its major challenge in imposing adequate public control over the
illegal economic networks reproduced by the former regime. The very
process of political change largely depends upon depriving the political
police and the other organized remnants of the regime from their control
over the national economic assets. Like every post-communist democratic
process, the transformation in Belgrade will unavoidably be accompanied
by a considerable degree of de-institutionalization and mal-performance
of the newly created democratic institutions. Following the example of
the other post-communist countries in the region, the ex-communist
oligarchy of the Milosevics regime will rapidly de-centralize and produce
series of local, institutional and professional mafia groups, competing with
each other, but successfully cooperating against any legitimate effort to
impose law and order in the land. Provided the size of the country, and
the assets accumulated throughout the 1990, those Serb mafia networks
21
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may prove capable to affect and operate not only on Yugoslav territory,
but throughout the Balkan region.
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, when regional cooperation
and joint democratic development has helplessly given way to ethnic wars
and destruction, one international regional power has really cooperated
and has created a joint regional space for operation  this has been
the power of organized crime. Serb networks have sold weapons to
Kosovar Albanians to shoot against Serbs, Albanian mafia groups traded
successfully with the major villain in the neighborhood. There are no
borders and ethnic barriers in front of the shadow Balkan dealers and
their international associates. The Balkan international of crooks would
not allow a decent strategy of regional development and cooperation to
be effectively implemented in SEE. The success of such a strategy would
inevitably mean the decline of their business and power. Therefore, any
successful strategy for development of the Balkans, for the inclusion of
the region into the European mainstream requires reduction of organized
crime and cutting off its systematic links to the corrupt officials and
governments in the region. This is not simply an economic and civic
issue. This is an issue of redistribution of political power in favor of
legitimacy and democracy, against the effective criminal control over the
entire public and economic life of the Balkan societies. This is an issue,
directly shaping the alternative options for the future of the Balkans: a
region of the future European mainstream with decent and effective rules
and institutions, or a region of instability and unrest, remaining a painful
periphery of Europe.
22
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The International Community and the Dilemma
of Balkan Security
The Kosovo crisis of 1999 has been an exceptional case in the long
history of international interventions on the Balkans throughout the
modern age. With all its dilemmas of legitimacy and long term
accomplishment, NATO action has been the first integrated effort of a
cooperative international community to resolve a Balkan crisis on the
basis of principle and humanity. The Balkan region has seen a number
of interventions, cause by the Great Powers competition and power play
throughout the 19th and 20th century. Those interventions have been the
engine of the process, popular as Balkanization. Mobilizing the public
opinion of the West, the NATO resources and the political support of
all governments of the West and in the region, the international community
has performed the first successful action of the NATO as a security system
for the entire Euro Atlantic space. The greatest challenge in front of this
effort has not been the success of the military campaign. The greatest
challenge is whether the unity of the international community will stand
until the decade-long chain of Balkan crises is finally terminated and
a new reality of democracy and cooperation is established throughout
the region.
SFOR and the international administration in BiH are functioning
for almost five years after the Dayton peace accords. Among many
positive activities  the economic reconstruction, the healing process
in Bosnian society after the war, one basic achievement and one basic
failure fill the record of BiH as an international protectorate. The
achievement is that the international protection has stopped entirely the
hostilities and the war. The failure is that billions of dollars injected could
not create even the background of an organic community: Serbs, Croats
and Muslims continue to live parallel lives in a nominally common
nationhood. The situation in Kosovo represents even a worse case.
Drawing their legitimacy from a decade of humiliation and suffering, the
Albanians of Kosovo strongly refuse to live together with the traditional
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minorities of the land like Roma and the Turks, not to speak at all about
the Serbs, even if the Albanian leaders pay a lip service to multiculturalism
and respect for minority rights.
The communities in the war stricken zones on the Balkans will
need time to resolve the issues of their own identity, to adapt to the
new world around them and to pass the process of reconciliation and
normalization with their neighbors 3 old and new. They will have - at
the same time - to take care of their living, to restore their economy
and decent institutions. There is nobody else, but the international
community to serve as an interim support authority, lasting for years if
not for decades. The big question about that is who pays for such
international missions. The UN is facing bigger and bigger financial
problems, caused by suspicious governments of powerful member states
(like the US) about how the UN money is being spent. The European
Union is willing to bare the financial responsibilities of the Balkan
reconciliation, but the question is for how many crises and for how long?
The problem gets even worse if one pays not only money, but with the
human lives of its soldiers. This is the environment, in which the new
US administration of president elect George W. Bush has declared its
decision to withdraw the US troops from the Balkans.
Such a decision may well be legitimized within the intense debate
about the European Union common security and foreign policy (CSFP)
development. CSFP may well lead to a particular division of labor on
the both sides of the Atlantic, affecting to an extent the structures of
NATO. The peacekeeping operations on the territory of Europe could
be considered a priority for the European wing of NATO with such a
transformation of responsibilities, considered within the transatlantic
debate. Lets repeat  the division of labor between the EU and the
US in serving the NATO security agenda might be the answer to the
present problems, and such a division could happen in the future. One
thing is for sure  such a transformation of the transatlantic security
structures will take time and it is a subject of a longer process, rather
than of a short series of acts like the potential US troops withdrawal.
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There are particular dangers for the Balkan region and for the entire
system of European security, if the US military presence on the Balkans
is subjected to a rapid decrease:
n The first danger is related to a potential security vacuum,
emerging on the Balkans as a direct consequence of US troops
withdrawal. Who is going to replace the US troops? The EU countries
might do that, but this should be a process of long-term and uneasy
restructuring of the European countries responsibilities within the Balkan
peacekeeping missions. The US troops could be replaced by soldiers from
the Balkan neighbors of the protectorate zones, but particular historical
attitudes may jeopardize their effective mission. As a consequence of the
unsettled responsibilities among the Atlantic partners after the US
withdrawal, the hostilities between the warring parties in Bosnia and
Kosovo will most probably resume. The Balkan conflicts contain high
potential for spillover. Both Bosnia and Kosovo  if reopened in a hot
phase - will almost certainly spillover in Macedonia, Montenegro,
Sandzak etc. This is how a security vacuum  even if it is only
psychological (the US is out now) will practically reopen the Balkan
conflicts agenda for years to come;
n The united action on the Balkans of all NATO countries,
together with all other democratic nations in Europe has created the notion
of the international community, as an integrated authority, capable to
enforce the democratic principles of public behavior in a legitimate way
against all major violations of humanity and democracy. This integrated
role of the international community has not only moral, but very important
geopolitical consequences. The notion of Balkanization represents a
process of intense fragmentation  ethnic, territorial and communal 
under the strong pressure of powerful external  international factors.
This is what has happened on the Balkans in the last 150 years: the
ambitions of the local small nation states have been tolerated by the
competition of the Great Powers, and the combined foreign and domestic
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competition for national greatness has created the amorphous, fragmented
reality of the Balkans. The only chance to rebuild the present Balkan
community as part of a normal European space for the future is to avoid
international competition of interest, or even substantive diversity of
interest within the international community towards the Balkans. If the
US participation in the Balkan security equilibrium is sharply reduced,
two major misbalances of interest may be expected.
First, the restructuring of the Balkan peacekeeping responsibilities
among the European partners may sharpen the diversity of interest in
Europe. We should not forget that Europe is designed to become a
common political and security space, but still is a space of shared national
interest and diversity. If not prepared to act in a united way, the EU
security arrangements may cause bitter disputes rather than effective
action. In such circumstances the EU peacekeeping efforts will be reduced
to a military presence with low efficiency, feeding a growing security
vacuum that may reopen the local conflicts.
Second, a rapid US withdrawal will revive Russias appetites to
resume its role of a Great Power on the Balkans. Russia has never hidden
its alternative to the US and NATO geopolitical interests in Europe.
Having been deprived from its imperial control over Central and
(partially) Eastern Europe, Russia views the Balkans as the only possible
zone of its imperial return to Europe. The new Russian government under
President Putin has a real tough domestic agenda to deal with. The only
potential source to improve the governments ratings and the Russian state
standing is a major international success. There are hardly chances to
get such a success anywhere, but in a zone of security vacuum on the
Balkans. The return of Russia will re-start the Great Powers play on the
Balkans, even if the other Great Powers have no enthusiasm to play.
Russias return will encourage ex-communists, anti-Western nationalists
and ambitious populists on the Balkans to take control over the power
instruments. A long lasting de-stabilization and multiple conflicts will
follow, turning the Balkans into a European Caucasus.
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Russia is a former empire, searching for its new identity in a
changing world. It would be unfair - both to the newly democratizing
Balkan countries, and to Russia itself, to seduce the new Kremlin masters
to exercise its old imperial instincts on the Balkans against its own
interest.
The Balkans remain a test case for the ability of the EU and the
US, united into a transatlantic partnership, to create and reproduce a new
security system for the Euro-Atlantic space. In an environment of
decreasing dangers of a classical military nature, the peacekeeping
operations and the containment of local crises, together with containing
terrorism, arms proliferation and local dictatorships turn to be the major
security challenges. The models of sharing responsibilities in order to
meet those challenges should be tested patiently and flexibly. One of
the most reasonable instruments to deal with the growing diversity of
interest between the both sides of the Atlantic would be to speed up
the enlargement of NATO process. There is no excuse to keep the Balkan
countries with positive democratization and economic reform records out
of the Alliance for the undetermined future. NATO accession for Bulgaria
and Rumania in 2002 will support the regional stability and security more
than other intense and costly efforts of the international community on
the Balkans.
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Since the end of the NATO military campaign in Yugoslavia and the
fall of Milosevic from power, the new security situation in the Balkans
has entered a stage of reduction of tensions. Several processes are
occurring simultaneously. The security environment is changing and new
tendencies are emerging. New national, social and political paradigms
have been sought and advanced, which are the basis for a reshuffling
THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE BALKANS AND
THE EXPECTATIONS FROM
THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION
1 The assessments and views expressed herein reflect only the authors opinion. In writing
this article I have used also ideas, materials and data, obtained at international conferences,
meeting and discussions, for which I would like to express my deep gratitude.
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of social and political powers. Key positions of national and international
concern are being redefined and the bilateral and multilateral relations
are being reviewed. Priorities are being redefined and new political and
international configurations are being established. International factors
reassess the results from their involvement into crisis management, apply
lessons learned in political, international and military aspects and
redefine their future goals and priorities.
The regional security trends describe a pattern where the major
eternal regional issues remain unresolved, but already in a new
correlation.2 Regional and international factors have adopted new qualities
and even new status in the context of the crisis. But the processes are
divergent as regarding different countries as well as in terms of diverse
directions of regional political, economic and military relations. This is
the reason why the consolidated during times of crisis image of a
common Balkan interest is endangered and has even started to
disintegrate.
In this situation the logic of stabilizing the region requires that
the process is further guarded and sustained by multilateral external
support. The possibility of losing the vision of deep involvement by all
the important factors inevitably provokes the sense that the processes
could be reversed, to one extend or another. The investments that have
been made so far for establishing and developing regional motive powers
of positive processes requires much more time. In this context any sign
of reassessment and redefinition of the involvement on behalf of the US,
European countries, the Security Council, NATO, OSCE and the European
Union will be critical for the dynamics and orientation of the processes.
This article is focused on the security situation in the Balkans
after the fall of Milosevic from power and is addressed to the possible
motives, goals and approaches in the policy of the new US administration
regarding Balkan security.
2 A definition given by Dr. Ognyan Minchev, Director of the Institute for Regional and
International Studies, Sofia.
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The Security Situation in the Balkans
Following the end of NATO military operation in Yugoslavia the security
situation in the Balkans is stabilizing. The bitter experience from the last
three years once again demonstrated that the security of any state in the
region depends on the security of its neighbors, because every significant
event affects neighboring countries and self-isolation is practically
impossible.
The transition towards a new political regime in FR Yugoslavia
is characterized by perspectives for resolving the problems generated by
Milosevics governance, as well as by the emergence of major risk factors
for the fragile stability in the country and the region.
The results of the special parliamentary elections, held on
December 23, 2000, reaffirmed the will of a significant part of the
population to break with the former regime and provided the necessary
prerequisites for strengthening democratic reforms. Eight parties and
coalitions participated in the election. In the new 250-seats Skupstina
of Serbia the Democratic Opposition of Serbia has 176 seats (64,21%),
the Socialist Party of Serbia has 37 seats (13,67%), the Serbian Radical
Party has 23 seats (8,55%) and the Party of Serbian Unity has 14 seats
(5,33%).3 The Serbs in Kosovo voted in three municipalities of the
province and the Kosovar Albanian did not take part in the elections.
The composition of the new Serbian Skupstina clearly indicates
the polarity in the Serbian society, divided basically in two large groups
 adherents of the Democratic opposition and the still undifferentiated
left-wing political space. The performance of Milosevics Socialist Party
shows that it has preserved its influence among part of the Serbian society.
The low voter turnout (approximately 60%) in comparison with the
federal presidential elections and the successful mobilization of the hard
3 The following parties couldnt overcome the 5% threshold and stayed out of the
Parliament: the Serbian Renewal Movement with 3,76%, the Yugoslav Left with 0,38%,
the Democratic Socialist Party with 0,85% and the Serbian Social Democratic Party with
0,78%.
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electorate of the relatively small Party of Serbian Unity (established by
the radical nationalist Zelko Raznatovic-Arkan), which participated in
coalition with three other parties, enabled it to receive 14 seats.
The new Serbian government of Zoran Dzincic has the following
priorities: restoring the trust in state institutions, renovating and renewing
the economy, fighting corruption, strengthening social protection of the most
vulnerable groups in society, negotiating with Montenegrin authorities about
regulations of the federal relations, developing regional cooperation and
further integration in international organizations.  But the serious problems
between the subjects in the Federation remain in the political situation.
The situation in Monte Negro is extremely complicated. The small
republic is at the height of its international political significance and this
is clearly indicated by the generation of more or less realistic ideas for
behavior and expectations of the future. But the abundance of alternatives
negatively affects the possibility of formulating a consolidated position and
this fact decreases the attractiveness of the Montenegrin cause.
Observers of the Balkans claim that Monte Negro has no special
motivation to accept a change in the status of Kosovo and this will definitely
be a criterion when deciding whether to stay in the federation or not. Some
experts point out, however, that there is no guarantee that if Monte Negro
secedes from FRY, similar disintegration processes will not start on its own
territory.4 There is also an opinion that Monte Negro cannot survive with
its own resources (for example, the revenues from tourism in the best years
are less than the necessary funds for buying food and basic commodities),
especially in regard to the non-corporate behavior of Serbia.
These issues give rise to problems in political circles in the
republic, notwithstanding the ongoing campaign in favor of independence5
4 In the end of 2000 and in the beginning of 2001, a meeting of the clans in the republic
took place. Most of them declared that in case Monte Negro secedes from the federation
they would join Serbia.
5 President Djukanovic again reiterated his position in his New Years address: The New
Year is the beginning of a great, realistic hope for Monte Negro and its people. We will
decide our future by ourselves.
31
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
and the preparations for a referendum on the future of the federation
(which will probably held in the middle of 2001). The Peoples Party
left the governing coalition after the government has adopted a platform
for changing the relations with Serbia. The platform envisages that FR
Yugoslavia will be transformed into a free union of two internationally
recognized sovereign states. It is also suggested that within the competencies
of the Union would include defense, external security and foreign affairs,
providing for common market and convertible currency. The Union would
have a one-chamber parliament.6
The Yugoslav and the Serbian authorities met with restraint the
requirements for redefining the relations between the republics and insist
on deciding the problems through negotiations. President Kostunica
suggested a project for a new constitutional arrangement, which envisages
broadening the competencies of the republican institutions, for the federal
authorities remaining common foreign policy, defense, customs control,
transportation, regulation of securities market and monetary policy.
To a great extent, the Western allies have contributed to this
problem, by encouraging the Montenegrin demands for independence
during the Milosevics rule hoping that this will weaken his regime.
The Kosovo crisis is in general contained, notwithstanding that
there isnt a single problem that has been solved. The concentration of
political attention and instruments for rapid and effective reaction is big
and reliable enough so to guarantee a relatively stable environment for
the next steps of crisis management.
But the developments in the province in the last six months
indicate that the process of stabilization should be military guarded and
decisive measures should be taken. The absence of a real deterring factor
can give the wrong signal to one of the sides to start resolving the key
problems by force.
6 On this occasion the Democratic Party of Socialists, which participates in the governing
coalition put forward (January 8, 2001) a proposal for dismissing the Parliament and
start preparations for special parliamentary elections in Monte Negro not later than March
2001.
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The behavior of the Albanians has been assessed in the countries
in the region as a typically Balkan. Their demands are extreme to
provide space for maneuvering before the positions of the new Serbian
authorities and that of the international community are consolidated. An
essential aspect of the analysis is to what extent Albanian policy is formed
independently. This question is in the air in the Balkans, because there
are no public answers to the questions: who exactly supplies the different
groupings with arms, how the policy of recently opposing leaders was
consolidated, and how for a few months the poor and illiterate highlanders
became political and military strategists.
Straining the situation in Southern Serbia is viewed as a desire
to provide another trump card in eventual negotiations. But as the driving
forces behind the events have (formally) broken away from Hashim Taci
it is very probable that a new independent player will appear at the
negotiations. The Army for the Liberation of Presevo, Medvedja and
Bujanovac  about 1000 people, with light armaments, controls ten
villages in the 5-km buffer zone on the administrative border with
Kosovo. The differentiation of this conflict center is obviously aimed
at arousing the reaction of the new authorities in Belgrade, which could
not be especially different from that of Milosevic. The success of this
strategy would simultaneously discredit Kostunica as a democrat and will
reduce the support granted to him by the West. The fact that he did
not succumb to the challenges, occurring in November-December 2000,
does not mean that there wont be a successful attempt in the future.
Some observers fear from a more serious connection of the activities
in the Presevo Valley and the strategy of the powers in Albania, united
around former President Sali Berisha. Such a connection is quite probable
in the context of Berishas undeviantly pursued struggle for a Greater
Albania.
The implementation of the results from the local elections, which
took place on October 10, 200, won convincingly by the Democratic
Union of Kosovo, is slow and difficult, mainly because of the competition
between the major political forces of the Kosovar Albanians, their
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aspiration to win over the international representatives in the process of
establishing municipal structures. But this is the lesser trouble. The graver
problem is that the Kosovar Albanian boycotted the December 2000
elections. The conclusion from these elections is that the question of
Kosovo independence is still on their agenda despite the democratic
changes in Belgrade. If their problem was really the authoritarian regime
of Milosevic and the nationalistic Serbian policy in the last dozen years,
they would support the process of democratization and contribute to the
ultimate ousting of nationalists from the political scene.
This sounds reasonable but it did not happen. As the President
of Bulgaria remarked I guess, it is not because democracy is not
important to them, but because they want it within the frontiers of a
separate state of their own, the creation of which is being proclaimed
as a basic priority of all Albanian political forces in Kosovo.7
In this period the main efforts of KFOR has been to neutralize
the ethnic violence and guarantee the security of the population of the
province. KFOR tightened the control on the administrative border with
Serbia and the state border with Macedonia after the complication of
the situation in South-eastern Serbia, resulting from Albanian separatist
groups activities, aimed at terminating the traffic of people and arms
in the 5-km buffer zone.
Observers from the region in general share the opinion that Kosovo
has a high military strategic and military-political value for NATO. The
control over this territory can be compared to the effect of enlarging the
Alliance south of the Danube River. The difference between them is that
the enlargement is a matter for the future, and the control over Kosovo
is a fact and deserves to be invested in for the future. Moreover, the status
of Kosovo de facto as a protectorate greatly facilitates NATO policy 
this is the policy of a protector towards a protectorate, i.e. taking into
consideration sovereignty and borders, promises are not mandatory.
7 World Economic Forum, Davos, 28.01.2001; available from http://www.president.bg;
Internet; accessed  February 1, 2001.
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The role of Russia in the Kosovo case should be viewed essentially
in the context of the question for strategic partnership with the West (above
all with the USA)  was there such a partnership after the Gulf War
and is it still on the agenda? In Kosovo, and during the whole crisis, the
Russians were in general ineffective, which validates the fact that their
foreign policy has exhausted its resources to have a real influence in Europe
and that the military factor will need a longer time to be reformed before
turning it into an actual instrument of new Russian policy. Besides the
strengthening, and consequently the stabilization, of NATO military
presence in Kosovo and the region as a whole will have, in practice, a
deterring role towards Russia in regions where it does have interests: the
Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. The prevailing
opinion is that as after Dayton as well as after Rambuille one of the main
tasks was to reduce Russian influence in Southeastern Europe to the
smallest extent possible. With the fall of Milosevic this task was
accomplished. The question is whether this puts an end to the honeymoon
between them and what happens next. It is obvious that the United States
wants to resolve this issue before progressing into building up the national
anti-missile defense system. It is obvious also that Russia would like the
greatest possible role in deciding European security issues.
The efforts of the UN mission in Kosovo UNMIK are directed
towards establishing new municipal structures, ensuring the participation
of co-opted members (representatives of minorities, appointed by the UN
High Representative) in their activities and improving the cooperation
between different parties and ethnic communities.
The situation in the FR Yugoslavia is additionally complicated by
the negative economic performance. The external debt exceeds USD 12
billion, the internal debt is USD 11-12 billion and unemployment is about
50% (official numbers 30%) of the active population. The state has
approximately USD 6 billion kept idle in foreign currency, belonging
to the citizens. There is a reduction of incomes  the average monthly
salary in Serbia is about USD 45. The currency reserve is about USD
385 million (135 million of them in gold, 200 million in foreign currency
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and 50 million in securities and stocks). Energy problems are of special
concern and energy supply restrictions have been introduced.
On the whole, the new correlation of the political forces in the
country will durably define the development of political processes in the
future. Despite this, there are a number of unresolved complex problems;
the potential of ethnic and social tensions is intact. The new model of
coexistence with Monte Negro in a common state and a new status of
Kosovo will be difficult to bring into line. New security challenges are
emerging in relation to the growth of criminal (including economic)
activities, traffic in arms and illegal drugs etc. The new democratic forces
in FR Yugoslavia for years to come cannot deal with the criminal groups,
which until recently were closely connected with and controlled by the
former regime. At the same time, it is very probable that after the expected
reforms of the secret services and the Yugoslav army that some of their
former employees to join these groups and using their experience,
channels and contacts to widen the scope of criminal activities.
The downfall of Milosevic is viewed in a different way  with
enthusiasm in the countries of the European Union, somewhat skeptically
in the United States and with suspicion in the countries of the region.
Most probably because of the dynamics of the processes and the still
insufficient information, the problems of Serbia are being interpreted on
a rather low level  is there a democratic alternative in electing Voijslav
Kostunica a president or he will return to the nationalistic practice of
his predecessor? Is he a nationalist or is he a true democrat? Is Milosevic
going to be prosecuted by the international court? How will the people
survive the winter? But the key questions of Serbias internal development
are the following:
 To what extent the surprising easy manner Milosevic was
overthrown as a result of a real political process or there was
the typical for the communist regimes deal?8
8 A.Lukashenko, President of Belarus, first made such statement.
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 What are the real alternatives to Serbian nationalism, which
could be invested in?
 To what extent Milosevics influence over state institutions and
the population is sustained?
 How many more harsh winters the Serbs will survive and is
this going to bring back to power through a democratic process
Milosevic or his heirs?
 How will the influential elite of Serbian military and secret
services develop?9
After a short political crisis, the situation in Macedonia is well
in hand. The problem is that one unstable coalition was substituted by
another unstable one. After the Democratic Alternative left the governing
coalition VMRO-DPMNE succeeded in establishing a coalition, including
the Democratic Party of Albanians.10 The Democratic Party and a group
of independents ensured the necessary support in the Parliament (65
representatives of 120 in total)11. The Coalition is being kept in power
by the cooperation with the Albanian party and this is important for the
region for two reasons. On the one hand, this is a coalition of the most
powerful forces, which were and still are against the policy led by Serbia
9 Federal Supreme Defense Council, chaired by Yugoslav President V. Kostunica, dismissed
Milorad Obradovic, Head of the Second Army, Milan Zec, Head of the Marine Forces,
among other officers. However, Nebojsa Pavkovic remains as Head of the General Staff,
a fact that is explained with his moderate position during the development in October
2000 and after that.
10 The negotiations held with the leadership of the other party of the ethnic Albanians
- Party of Democratic Prosperity - on its participation in the ruling coalition produced
no results.
11 Democratic Alternative, Socialdemocratic Union of Macedonia, VMRO-DPMNE,
Socialist Party and Liberal Democratic Party remained in opposition.
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and Milosevic and against any attempts of restoring this policy. But on
the other hand this political formula makes the link between the internal
situation in Kosovo and the development of Kosovo extremely strong.
The main problem for stability is the economic situation in the
country. More than 257,000 people are unemployed according to official
data. Inflation rate reached 14,7%. The external debt amounts to 1,4
billion dollars. The external debt is estimated to 500 million dollars and
is rising. The external trade deficit of the country for 1999 is 604 million
dollars. The foreign currency reserve is about 740 million dollars (the
National Bank has approximately 440 million dollars and the commercial
banks reserves are about 300 million). This situation provides arguments
for exerting pressure, including social pressure, against the government.
Obviously, there are expectations, that due to the changes, Serbia will
start rapidly attracting as aid as well as investments and the recent interest
in Macedonia will be diminished. This possibility provides a ground of
the ex-communist party to portray itself as a better partner of the new
Serbian government.
The interethnic relations in the country remain complex and to
a great extent depend on the meeting the major demands of the Albanian
population, including constitutional changes and establishing the post of
vice-president, which would be occupied by an Albanian minority
representative, proclaiming Macedonia a bi-national state, appointing
ethnic Albanians to high-offices, including the ministries of internal affairs
and defense. Progress was made on the issue of education in Albanian,
and with the mediation of the OSCE the Parliament drafted and passed
a Law on Higher Education. Problem resolution is facilitated to a great
extent because the constructive participation of the Democratic Party of
the Albanians in the government. After the successful performance in the
local elections this party has remained the most influential party of the
Albanian community in the country.
The transition of Macedonia to market economy and guaranteeing
its security will be dependent on the external factor, which also defines
its foreign policy priorities: accession to European and Euro-Atlantic
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structures, receiving loans, participation of foreign companies in
privatization, making use of the possibilities, provided by the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe, regional co-operation development.
The security situation in Albania is characterized by political
instability, sharp political confrontation, reaching to violence, breaching
the constitution and the laws, high level of crime and corruption,
especially in some regions of the country. The high level of instability
is maintained by the contradictions in principle between the major
political forces. The Albanian Socialist Party strengthened its position
as the most influential political force by the successful performance at
the local elections in October 2000. The parties, constituting the ruling
coalition Union for the State, signed a cooperation agreement, obliging
them to accomplish the necessary legislative and administrative reforms,
recommended by the international factors after the local elections took
part.
The leadership of the main opposition force  the Democratic
Party  refused to accept the local elections results and made an
unsuccessful attempt to consolidate the right-wing opposition parties. The
attempt to organize a protest campaign of the opposition brought about
affray and skirmishes with the police. The opposition rejected the OSCE
and Council of Europe initiative for accommodating the contradictions
between the different parties about election procedures and legislation
concerning the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
The IMF leadership gave some positive assessments to the
economic policy of the government, which brought about to a relative
economic growth, activating the Albanian capital market, reduction of
the basic interest rate, inflation of about 0%, etc. The 2001 budget
proposed by the government has envisaged a 7.3% GDP growth, inflation
between 2%-4% as decreasing the budget deficit from 3.7% to 3.1%.
The following areas have been pointed out as priorities: physical
infrastructure, education, health care and social protection as creation of
appropriate conditions for stable economic development on the basis of
the micro-economic stability achieved during recent years.
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The foreign policy priorities are the efforts to employ the
opportunities, provided by the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and
protection of the rights of the Albanian population in neighboring
countries. In principle, Albania expressed its readiness to restore its
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia but this is conditional on the
implementation of some prerequisites.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation is relatively stable. The
domino effect (that could be triggered by the events in Kosovo), which
everyone feared during the NATO air campaign did not happen. The fact
that at the last parliamentary election the so-called non-nationalist
forces did not gain the expected advantages indicates a certain cyclical
pattern of the developmental level reached. That is why a key question
remains the establishment of a single Albanian state.
Despite the tendency of public trust increase in some moderate
political formations and the results from the Dayton Agreement implementation,
the nationalist parties remain a decisive factor in society. The ethnically based
division prevails as well as the heavy dependency on external financial aid
and foreign investment; an overall economic strategy is missing. Over 1
million refugees still cannot return to their homes.
The general election that took place on November 11, 2000 in
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not substantially change the political status
quo. The three major nationalist parties  Serbian Democratic Party,
the Croatian Democratic Community and the Party for Democratic Action
 confirmed their significant role in the political life of the country.
In parallel with the elections a referendum took place in the cantons
populated predominantly by Croats. The referendum demonstrated the
growing efforts of the Croatian nationalists to change the status of their
community in the framework of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
or at least to make it equal to those of the Serb community.
The international community makes efforts to establish multiethnic
state government structures and to establish the necessary legislative basis
for their functioning. The Bills on State Court, Pension Security and
Uniform Identity Documents were passed. The first squad of multiethnic
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border police was established. There was control over the recruitment
policy in the state administration, dismissing the persons accused in
hindering the economic reforms and corruption, hampering the return of
refugees, etc. Despite this, the suspicion between the Muslim, Croat and
Serb community, accumulated during the war, renders difficult the work
of common institutions.
The reconstruction and restructuring of economy is being
implemented in unsatisfactory pace. The increase in GDP was low during
the last two years and, in general, it is below the 1990 level. The
privatization and banking sector reforms experience difficulties. The
economy is heavily dependent on international aid; the foreign investors
activity is low, due mainly to the political and legislative insecurity.
Organized crime and corruption cause significant loses, which gave
ground for harsh criticisms and reactions on behalf of the international
community (to some estimates the state loses about DM 500 million of
uncollected levies and taxes, which amounts to almost half of the budget).
The establishment of joint armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
has been accompanied by significant difficulties and it will hardly be
implemented in the short run despite of some partial accomplishments,
which were not further developed (for example, the formation of joint
army command structures in the Federation). The most important
problems in the area of military affairs are the lack of a common military
policy and common military doctrine, the regulation of the interaction
between the armed forces of the different communities, etc. The military
representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of
Republika Srpska are only interacting within the Standing Committee on
Military Affairs and within the Military Mission, established in the
beginning of April 2000, for intercommunication between the armed
forces of the Federation and Republika Srpska. The positive signs in this
situation are the implementation of the initiatives for reduction of 30%
of military expenditures for 1999, reduction of 15% of the armed forces
of the Federation and Republika Srpska in 1999 and 2000 and reduction
of heavy armament and military technical equipment.
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The international presence and SFOR will continue to have a
decisive role in sustaining Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, for its
democratic development and guaranteeing its stability.
The situation in Turkey is developing under the influence of state
institutions for further democratization of the country and its adaptation
to the EU accession requirements. The government has undertaken
measures towards economic stabilization to master the financial crisis, to
counteract Kurdish separatism, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. A
relatively negative impact continue to be exerted by the contradictions
between the ruling coalition parties and the lack of consensus between
them on the implementation of some reform policies, problems in economy
and especially the stabilization of the banking sector, corruption, etc.
The disagreements within the ruling coalition, constituted by the
Democratic Left Party, the Nationalist Movement Party and the Fatherland
Party, refer to the pace of introduction of some EU criteria in the area
of protection of human rights, including broadcasting programs in Kurdish
on the national TV and radio stations. Despite these contradictions, the
prerequisites of crisis emergence and destabilization of the situation are
missing.
The problem of eventual prohibition of the main opposition party
 the Virtue Party (with 103 seats in the 550-member parliament), is
constantly adjourned by the Constitutional Court because of a possible
political crisis.
The Government is preparing amendments in Constitution and
basic laws referring to the democratization of society, i.e. abolishing
capital punishment, reforming judicial, banking and taxation systems,
agriculture, improving administration of mainly Kurds inhabited vilaets
in South Eastern Turkey, etc. The undertaken urgent measures for taking
control over the financial crisis and macroeconomic stabilization of the
country lead to the improvement of some indicators  economic growth
of 3.7 %, including about 4.5 % growth in GDP, low inflation  45
% in 2000 compared to 68.8 % in 1999, and low unemployment (7.2
% and 7.3 %, respectively). Albeit serious problems remain  the foreign
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and domestic debt service (in 2000 USD 21 billion have been paid on
foreign debt service, and the domestic debt rose to about USD 45 billion),
the foreign trade deficit has increased (about USD 30 billion while
expected USD 17 billion), the fall in agriculture production has not been
overcome. The decisive impact on financial and economic stabilization
was due to the assistance of international financial institutions and EU,
including the extended loans of USD 2.8 billion by the IMF in 2000,
Euro 150 million by the EU as well as the negotiated earlier credits within
the arrangements with IMF and World Bank.
The government multiplies its efforts for making the country a
main energy center for oil and gas transit from the Caspian region to
other parts of the world. The Protocol for funding a gas pipeline project
Blue Stream from Russia through the Black Sea has been endorsed
(in Turkey 100 km of the pipes have been installed). Meanwhile, the
gas pipeline from Iran is under construction on Turkish territory (in the
section to the Turkish border it is ready for exploitation). The preparation
for implementing Baku  Cheyhan oil pipeline have been completed.
Destabilizing factors for the situation in the country are radical
Islam organization activities (Hisbullah), terrorism, corruption and organized
crime. The operations of armed and security forces against armed groups
of PKK and Hisbullah aiming at their complete defeat are still under
way.
Foreign policy priorities are directed at integrating Turkey in EU,
protecting Turkish minorities rights abroad, improving the relations with
Greece, deepening the contacts with the US, the so-called North Cyprus
Turkish republic, Southeast European countries, the Middle East and
Caucasus. Turkey tries to participate on an equal basis with EU member
states in common European security and defense policy.
The situation in Greece is stable, which is owing to the unity
of the ruling party PASOK, the problems within the major opposition
party New Democracy, the lack of contradictions between political forces
regarding basic national priorities, the development of positive trends in
Greek economy, etc.
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The governments main efforts are directed at sustaining the
macroeconomic indicators, speeding up the privatization of huge enterprises
of national importance, improving the mechanisms of social safety and
undertaking measures to reduce unemployment beneath the current 11%. By
including the country from 2001 in the European Economic and Currency
Union complementary measures should be undertaken for speeding the
structural reform, introducing new technologies, increasing the competitiveness
of the Greek economy, reducing the unemployment, etc.
The main problems referring to the domestic security of the
country are related to the activities of some terrorist organizations and
especially the 17th November Organization.
By pursuing active foreign policy Greece strives for playing a
leading role in the region, involvement in the international communitys
plans for post-crisis recovery, ensuring broad economic presence in the
Balkan countries and improving relations with Turkey.
The Cyprus problem got a special meaning within the advancing
negotiations for Republic of Cyprus joining to the EU and strengthening
the efforts of different international factors for its resolution. The
conducted five rounds of indirect talks between President of Cyprus
Glavkos Kliridis and President of North Cyprus Turkish Republic Rauf
Denktash mediated by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan in 2000 did not
lead to concrete results on the discussed issues (state system, territorial
division, refugee problem, freedom of movement and settlement,
confidence- and security-building measures between the two communities,
proprietary issues, using the islands infrastructure). The main reason for
this is keeping to the initial positions on basic problems - the future
state system and EU membership of Cyprus12.
The situation in Romania is being influenced by presidential and
parliamentary elections results (26.11.2000), constituting new state
12 While Denktash insists on establishing confederation between two independent and
internationally recognized states which is to join EU, Kliridis supports bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation (on rotation governing principle) the establishment of which should
not retard Cyprus joining the EU.
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authorities and governments efforts for economic stabilization. The
winning presidential and parliamentary elections Party for Social Democracy
in Romania13 formed a one-party government and signed a declaration
with parliamentary represented National Liberal Party, Democratic Party
and Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania for respect of
democratic values, isolating extremism, on countrys priority for
development and integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures.
The parliamentary support is fragile and indicates that the parliaments
activity and governments stability will be influenced by the differences
of their interests.
Regardless the recorded at the end of 2000 process of economic
stabilization (for the first nine months of last year compared to the same
period of 1999 the industrial production has risen by 7.8%, the most
important is the rise in energy, extractive and processing industries, the
import has risen by 24.2% reaching USD 7.62 billion) there are still
some negative trends. The foreign debt for the same period has increased
by 1.9% reaching USD 9.222 billion. The inflation in 2000 exceeded
the projected 40.7%. The number of unemployed people is about 11%
of the working force.
There are no signs that some changes in the foreign policy of
the country can take place. The efforts are primarily focused on meeting
the EU requirements in different spheres, further extension of the
negotiations for EU membership, intensification of the dialogue on NATO
accession, achievement of interoperability with NATOs arm forces,
development of the cooperation with the United States, participation in
regional initiatives, programs of post-war reconstruction and transcontinental
infrastructure projects. There is a problem that is to be solved: that is
the necessity to endorse the rights of the Hungarian minority (that is
about 1.6 million), which includes the inauguration of a Hungarian
University in Kluj as well as the restitution of the land of the Hungarian
church, among others.
13 The same party nominated Ion Iliesku for President.
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Following the radical political shift and the returning of the old
guard, a general distrust on the part of the external factors could be
expected. From the security perspective, there are some elements in
Romanias case that are discussed among the experts in the region. These
are as follows: the extremely strong influence of the military over the
political system; the experience accumulated in the last few years in
managing social crises, where the army was engaged in suppressing social
discontent caused by hard economic situation; the possibility for reviving
the old communist thesis for the specific role of Romania and for the
specific policy it has to carry out. Resulting from the lack of an apparent
progress in the relations with EU and NATO, the growing disappointment
among the population is a solid ground for such developments.
Bulgaria is maybe the only country, which was positively
transformed after the Kosovo crisis. The escalation of tension in Kosovo
coincided with the hard political, economic and social crisis in Bulgaria
in the last days of the Bulgarian Socialist Party government (January
1997). The government of the United Democratic Forces14 had to solve
two strategic issues: to get the country out of the domestic crisis through
quick economic reforms and put an end to the foreign policy self-isolation
of the socialists leading unconditionally the country towards EU and
NATO. In that context, some radical decisions and activities were
undertaken. Security policy was shifted from stability through maintaining
equal distances and non-alignment to stability through involvement.
In political aspect, stability is underlined by three major components
 the government of Ivan Kostov is the first one, which succeeded in
completing its 4 years mandate; President Stoyanov became president
of the whole nation; the main political opponent  the Bulgarian
Socialist Party - supported the integration of Bulgaria in EU and NATO,
changing its political platform. In economic aspect, stability is demonstrated
through the sustainability and improvement of the macroeconomic
indicators. Sustainable macroeconomic conditions were achieved in the
14 Leading formations are the Union of Democratic Forces and Peoples Union.
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last three years: a stable currency board; low inflation; low official interest
rate; substantial currency reserve; real economic growth of 3.5, 2.5 and
4.5% from 1998 to 2000, respectively. Banking system was stabilized.
Private sector accounts for more than 70% of the GDP. There is a
functioning market economy in Bulgaria. All these indicators as well as
privatization and the adoption of different European type laws created
a better investment climate and increased economic confidence in
Bulgaria. In social aspect, stability is based on the successful (against
the background of the Balkan situation) functioning of the ethnic model
in the country. Here, the attention is shifted from the Bulgarian Turks
to the Roma population because of the extremely hard economic and
social environment. High rate of unemployment (between 18% and 30%,
depending on reporting on shadow economy) as well as daily criminality
are still serious problems that are to be solved. The biggest problem,
however, is corruption spread among public administration, in the
privatization process and in political process, in general.
The activities of the international terrorism indirectly influence
Bulgarian security. The reforms of the security services brought about
more extensive cooperation with the international institutions engaged in
combating terrorism and organized crime. The attempts at trafficking in
people through Bulgaria towards the EU increased significantly during
the last few years. Being a transit station before the Yugoslav crisis,
Bulgaria is now turning to be a market offering all kinds of drugs. The
lack of an effective control over the export and the transit trafficking
in arms (including towards embargo states) is still a serious problem.
Concerning the process of Serbias democratization, Bulgaria
supported the opposition against Milosevic, although not Kostunica in
particular. In contrast to the EU, Bulgaria lifted the embargo against
Yugoslavia immediately after the fall of Milosevic and started exporting
products of vital importance for the social situation in the country i.e.
energy and gas products. These steps were welcomed by the Serbs who
agreed to sign an agreement regulating the opening of new border
checkpoints as well as the construction of the Sofia  Belgrade highway,
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which is of key importance for Bulgaria.  An important issue in the
bilateral relations is the status of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia, which
does not enjoy the same rights as the representatives of the minority
groups recognized by the Constitution. There are already some
improvements in political aspect  the Bulgarians participate in the ruling
coalition at local level.
Bulgaria has to find solution to several problems resulting from
the combination of some extremely unfavorable economic and political
factors, which are: world financial crisis, Kosovo war, the most difficult
phase of the reconstruction of Bulgarian economy. The country has not
overcome these negative impacts that are still creating some risks. These
challenges are to be eliminated in the next few years but they will also
be interpreted during the forthcoming parliamentarian and presidential
elections that are to be held in 2001. The best scenario has been
formulated by President Stoyanov in Davos. There, he appealed for big
bang approach in the EU enlargement process15. The worse scenario (in
case of an overall failure of the economic reforms) is integral part of
the question of Janusz Bugajski: Is Romania an example for Bulgaria
and is Serbia an example for Romania?16.
The Perspectives: Expectations and Possibilities
1.  The Balkans have suffered the consecutive stage of regional violation.
I would like to believe that this would be the last war in the region.
The involvement of the international factors, the permanent monitoring
of the situation, the presence of enough as quality and effective
international military contingent, and last but not least, the changing
national development paradigm of the countries in the region make almost
impossible any large-scale military conflict.
15 See also at http://www.president.bg.
16 Videoconference Sofia-Washington, 19.12.2000, organized by the Institute for Regional
and International Studies.
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2. The major security issues, posed in the course of the crises
in the last decade, are still in the agenda: was this the last Balkan war?
How will the ethno-religious problems be resolved? How will we
counteract against political nationalism? How will the regional political,
economic and security cooperation be developed and stimulated? How
will civic and social problems be resolved? How will democracy be
developed? How will the fight against international organized crime and
corruption be organized? What is the real perspective for EU and NATO
membership?
3. There is an important conclusion (no matter how paradoxically
it sounds) saying that it is hard to find somebody, who is ready to work
in favor and to discuss the issue related to regional security or to regional
security system. Kosovo crisis transformed Balkan security into almost
a global question. Any idea trying to enclose the region in its geographic
boundaries will be rejected by most of the countries, including influential
ones. The security relations among the Balkan countries will be assessed
in the context of European and Eurasian security, regardless of the issue
in question  the Cyprus problem, the Bosnian Federation or Transylvania.
4. The outcomes of the peacemaking operation in Kosovo are
another key conclusion. In contrast to the Bosnian case, the military
intervention in Kosovo has not led to negotiation process between the
conflict sides  both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have brought their
positions to the extreme sides.
It has not been proved yet that a military operation with
humanitarian aims could be accomplished through the destruction of
civilian targets too. This manner of leading a peacemaking operation is
not legitimate in Europe. It identifies the US and NATO activities with
those of Russia in Chechnya and with the attitude of the Islamic terrorists.
In this respect, neither the new NATO self-interventionist strategy, nor
the EU intentions to establish a military force for the Petersberg missions
meet enough understanding and optimism on the Balkans.
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5.  The future of the Yugoslav political system emerges as a key
security issue. The future status of Kosovo and Montenegro are the major
questions in this context.
In fact, a great number of the Serb population does not consider
Kosovo as a Yugoslav province. On the other side, however, a lot of
Serb politicians think that a possible secession of Kosovo would be a
dangerous precedent in the region, where still are a lot of unresolved
ethnic conflicts. Any restoration of the 1999 status quo is almost
impossible having the high level of ethnic intolerance and the fact that
the Albanians would never agree with it. UN Resolution 1244 is an interim
decision that postpones the solution of the issue concerning the future
status of Kosovo. This decision, however, creates a risk for the Albanians
to increase their pressure in order to achieve a formal independence. For
the present, all the parties concerned reject the formula according to which
Kosovo is the third federal republic within FR Yugoslavia. However, this
approach could turn to be the possible compromise. Broad autonomy
within the framework of FR Yugoslavia approach is in compliance with
Resolution 1244. If a referendum for Kosovo independence takes place,
there will be serious difficulties in recognizing its results with the
respective consequences on FR Yugoslavia and the region, in general.
A possible accession of an independent Kosovo to Albania would provoke
joint reaction of the consolidated international community. The division
of Kosovo scenario also seems impossible and does not enjoy the support
of the parties concerned nor of the international actors.
The international protectorate formula will most probably last for
a long time, as it is acceptable for the majority of the interested parties.
Despite all critics against UNMIK and KFOR, the Kosovo Serbs and
the Yugoslav authorities have a strong interest in keeping the status quo,
as they are not able to govern the province. Moreover, the international
presence provides mechanisms for control and influence over the Albanian
factor aiming at not allowing the establishment of a new Albanian state.
In general, there will be a slow and difficult development of the
peace process with sporadic incidents (mainly in the areas with ethnically
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mixed population) and complex criminogeneous environment influencing
the situation in neighboring countries. So, the international presence will
be maintained for a long period of time.
The unresolved ethnic problems in Vojvodina and Sandzak remain
as a serious challenge to the new Yugoslav government. The development
of the processes and their settlement will be closely interrelated to the
overall situation within the federation.
6. Obviously, the Montenegrin question will be a key issue for
Belgrades government as well as in the regional agenda, in general,
whatever its final solution is. According to an optimistic scenario, the
two republics could divorce in mutual consent preserving close political
and economic relations. Following the pessimistic one, Monte Negro
would unilaterally break away from Yugoslavia. In this case, the domino
effect would cause a series of demands for independence by the Kosovo
Albanians, the Bosnian Serbs and the Albanians in Macedonia.
7. From the point of view of Yugoslavias neighboring countries,
there are two main theses concerning the future of the federation. The
nationalist-negativist thesis defines that the more fragmented and weak
is ex-powerful Yugoslav State, the better for its neighbors. Yugoslavias
fragmentation means also disintegration of its economic, political and
military potential, growth of its own importance for the international
factors, prospects for imposing its own interests and priorities.
The positivist thesis includes finding a lasting solution to the
Balkan question. Politicians and analysts from the region also offer
two different perspectives: preservation of the existing borders and
national status quo as well as progress towards EU accession following
the country by country approach, on the one side; Balkan confederation
minimizing the importance of state borders and making the region in
general much more attractive for the EU, on the other side.
From the political declarations of the most of the countries in the
region it is evident that they share a common vision  not changing
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the borders of nowadays Yugoslavia17  the threat that unpredictable
consequences and a possible chain reaction is quite substantial. If however
an eventual dissolution occurs the question is whether it would happen
as a legal divorce or other outbreaks of violence will take place. This
problem generates and supports one of the basic incentives for the
countries in the region to insist on continuing the US commitments along
with the presence of NATO, EU, OSCE and other big European countries,
as well as Russia. It is expected that a consolidated strategy for the region
could hardly be achieved for the time being. What should be avoided
however are the improvisations of some countries and the racing for the
sake of ones benefits that have occurred during different phases of the
10-year Yugoslav crisis. Each of the listed countries and organizations
holds a piece of the puzzle of the Balkans stabilization process. Such
statements as there is nothing on the Balkans which the EU cannot do
while the US can are insubstantial. For local people it means that wrong
conclusions of the 10-year crisis have been made.
The vision of the best strategy is being consolidated on the basis
of the formula of waiting, matched with the formal execution of
protectorate status of Kosovo by the UN supported by military-police
forces KFOR.
8. The security situation in the region, the heritage of military
activities and the great amount of available weapons out of the authorities
control, the overall economic stagnation and the insufficient consolidation
of state institutions create favorable conditions for crime groups and
networks taking control over the region. The criminal activities of
17 On this topic amongst Western circles it is well-known that despite one-sided declarations
the opinion is strongly divided - a confederation of independent states, asymmetrical
Yugoslavian state (Croatia and Slovenia on confederation principle, the rest ones - on
federal - K. Gligorov and Alia Izetbegovic), federation of republics with broad autonomy,
Karl Bildts federation (former Yugoslavia, but with Albania instead of Slovenia, and
Kosovo as a republic - an attempt to solve Kosovo independence issue and to postpone
with decades the ambitions of Balkan countries for EU and NATO membership),
disintegration of Federation and disintegration of Serbia.
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international scale are being recorded in the areas of smuggling of goods,
money laundering and using illegal financial mechanisms, crimes against
intellectual property, transit and dissemination of drugs and illegal
migration. Within the context of this topic these security risks in the region
discredit democratic political changes, create grave economic difficulties,
promote trans-border corruption at all levels and establish damaging
psychological inclinations against certain ethnic and national groups.
The Logic of Stabilization
The logic of the stabilization of the Balkans requires a complex decision
for achieving lasting peace, stability and security in the region. The
parameters of this decision include principle abolishment of reasons for
violent conflicts, combating poverty of people in the region and a clear
European and Euro-Atlantic perspective.
The attention should be concentrated on settling serious disputable
issues because the Balkans come out of the subsequent/ successive
historical crisis with a list of activated but not resolved conflicts. In
practice there is no conflict in the region that has been uprooted after
having escalated to a crisis or an even a war. And that happened due
to and though the Great powers involvement. The piling up of unresolved
conflicts maintains the perception of domino effect which generates
mutual suspicions among neighboring countries. The non-confidence
demolishes the premises for regional cooperation, engenders the politics
of axis and balances, and permanently maintains the necessity of a bigger
brother. The concept for nation  states within ethnic borders should
be ultimately abandoned because ethnic borders are not distinguishable
in either of the Balkan cases.
Poverty is the key to the problems in the region. The people on
the Balkans have always been the poorest in Europe. At the beginning
of the new century the distance is the same as during the time of the
Ottoman Empire. The struggle for political power in most of the countries
is almost never a matter of ideas. The political power in the countries
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from the region is the main source of profits. It attracts the criminal
elements as well as the new democratic partocracy. Poverty is the
environment where criminality and corruption become immense and
international. In the era of comprehensive information the differences
between living standards could not be hidden as it had been some fifteen
years ago. Poverty however motivates the activities and sacrifice only
if there is a common feeling in society that it could be overcome. What
come next are the political and social apathy, the dissolution of values
and the end of history.
The European and Euro-Atlantic perspectives are the main positive
and motivating factor for all the countries in the region. They do what
the new ideology of quickly imported democracy cannot do  to motivate
people to stand the unbearable burden of shock of reforming the political,
economic and cultural constructions of societies. No regional strategy
could be successful unless it comprises the prospects for membership
in Euro-Atlantic organizations. The more and further countries advance
in their democratic and economic development, the more the European
paradigm will become dominant and comprehensive. Further more - the
states and peoples from the Balkan region are perhaps the only in Europe
who need, use and support globalization.
Weak states will continue to be the major source of instability.
Though one should not jump to conclusion that the only way out is tough
hand and austere government. The attention should be directed towards
forming strong social contracts based on the democracy idea and
European prospect.
The realistic decision for the countries in the region is modernization
of the existing status quo through introducing democratic constitutional
principles, development, consolidation of democratic institutions and
applying democratic political practices. The long-term perspective includes
the transformation of the political systems based on ethnic principle to
civic ones.
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The Expectations from the New US Policy:
Security Issues
The analytical groups in the region share the opinion that the basic motive
for the US involvement in the region in view of lacking vital interests
is the threat arisen due to the crisis in post-military values. It is necessary
to modify the Euro-Atlantic solidarity in the new circumstances,
counterbalancing the strive of Europe to globalize its political and cultural
influence and pushing Russia out of its last access to Europe. This motive
could really have global meaning for the New World order but it is of
too strategic scale to be perceived by the crisis-paralyzed Balkans. It
sounds selfishly regardless of the fact who articulates it  Americans,
West Europeans or Russians. The spread of democracy thesis, reiterated
in US and NATO documents, cannot compensate this feeling because
it reminds (as a message) of the communist thesis of exporting
communism to the Third World countries. Further more that Europeans
have used very carefully and rarely this motive.
We cannot expect a joint attitude towards the US role in the
region. The US policy and activities have been criticized on a variety
of occasions but as a whole its contribution to conflict settlement in
Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo and to conflict prevention in Cyprus and
Macedonia has never been questioned. Most of these US activities
provoked a change in the level of involvement of the EU and its member
states. Without these US initiatives the Stability pact and the beginning
of the process of association of West Balkans to the EU would not
be likely. The prevailing opinions however are based on profits
estimating and not calculating the eventual shortcomings if the US
would not intervene.
The expectations from the new US policy towards the Balkans
are controversial. The declared intention by President Bush and his
administration to reconsider the American military presence in strategic
regions and conflict zones is not new. It has been expected once the
Warsaw Pact disintegrated. In fact, however, there have never been
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discussions on diminishing the military factor impact on the US foreign
policy. What has been discussed is reconsidering the priorities and
arranging the intensity of involvement.
On the Balkans no one is ready to accept the arguments for quick
withdrawal (political, military or economic) of the USA from the region.
For many people the very fact of debating on this option is being
perceived as a factor for destabilization not only of Southeastern Europe
but also of Euro-Atlantic relations. The thesis that the US could free
space for the EU implementing its Common Foreign and Security Policy
and its military aspect is mistimed. At the stage of its current development
the EU has no resources for a large-scale involvement in the Balkans
complicated case. If the initiative is being given up there would be an
inevitable vacuum of power and control as well as unsanctioned
maneuvers of local actors and even Russia, China and Islamic
fundamentalists. The withdrawal of Americans from Kosovo would not
only diminish the efficiency of international military presence but also
multiply the risks for those who would stay there. It is not a matter of
secret that Kosovar Albanians consider the Americans being their only
trustful allies and guardians and their withdrawal will give a chance for
direct clashes among Albanian terrorists, Yugoslavian army units and the
international contingent. Terrorists are not afraid of well-equipped and
trained American soldiers but what bothers them is the US reaction in
case of US troops casualties.
Apart from that, there would be greater contradictions within the
EU in regard to what should be done in Kosovo and what policy should
be pursued towards each of the countries in the region. For Europe stays
as one only when it argues with America18.
There are series of principle issues on stabilization, security and
development of the region that only the US could deal with. Amongst
the main issues are:
18 Ivan Krastev, Director, Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; available from
http://www.mediapoolbg.com; Internet; accessed February 2, 2001.
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n Acting strategically and decisively to prevent sudden overhaul
of hostilities and to avoid the escalation of new crisis by means of
permanent monitoring and maintaining rapid reaction forces.
n Continuing and completing simultaneously what have been
started in Dayton and Kosovo, to promote the stabilization of Albania
and Macedonia and to influence the development of processes within
the Yugoslav federation.
n Balancing the interests of Russia and other big European
countries in the region in such a manner that local states have
opportunities for development.
n Reacting effectively in case of strain in Greek-Turkish relations
and unblocking the situation in Cyprus.
n Maintaining and advancing the process of regional military
cooperation, supporting military reforms in the countries fulfilling the
Action Plan for NATO membership as well as sponsoring their participation
in big events within Partnership for Peace initiative.
n Stimulating the enhancement of confidence  and security-
building measures in the region and strengthening control over the
transfers of weapons.
n Influencing the development of infrastructure projects for
transporting oil and natural gas from the Caspian sea to Western Europe
so that countries from the region could gain economic and security profits
(i.e. to consider Balkans in a broader than European context).
The countries on the Balkans are well aware of the fact that without
vital interests in the region as a whole the US would hardly commit
themselves to a long-term and large-scale strategy for stabilization and
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development. But on the other hand, everybody understands that what have
been started in Bosnia and Serbia could be neither canceled nor conserved.
The problem from local point of view is to avoid the repetition of Clintons
attitude, who needed quite much time to understand the Bosnia issue.
Within the context of all these threats and variables the outbreak
of depleted uranium scandal turned out to be a multiple risk. It
questioned not only the notion that NATO operations against Serbia have
been motivated by humanitarian reasons but the military success of the
Alliance at all. The scandal would inevitably put the US in trouble in
case of a move for banning depleted uranium weapons. But the most
important consequence is that the US could not just afford withdrawing
from the Balkans in near future, they could even not afford talking
seriously about that19.
The development of transatlantic relations will surely influence the
US behavior on the Balkans. The way the Kosovo crisis was managed
reasserted the conviction not only amongst European politicians and
analysts that the US abilities to control the strategic decisions in Europe
should be overcome. It was actually the projection of the Balkan crisis
from the last decade that has shown how far America has gone in regard
to a one-polar world. As a counter reaction the Europeans will alter their
strategy of behavior but not only symbolically. The interests of Europe
coincide no more with the US interests. The American worries that NATO
would turn to be anachronism if Europe establishes its own army would
be counteracted by the statement that after Kosovo NATO is already
anachronism. It is just one aspect of the problem of trans-Atlantic
relations, which reflects on the perspective of Southeastern Europe. In
short term, the biggest threat is if the inner debates in the Western Alliance
diminish the control over the situation and the efficiency of post-crisis
regulation of the Balkans. In long term, analysts warn that the development
of transatlantic relations could reach such a point that the states from
19 Ivan Krastev, Director, Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; available from http://
www.mediapoolbg.com; Internet; accessed February 2, 2001.
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the region could be forced to choose between the US and Europe, between
NATO and European Union.
One of the major expectations with regard to the US is that the
new administration will keep (at least) the complex approach to lasting
stabilization and development of the Balkans. In the region there are all
the necessary resources for secure foundations of such an approach to
be built: The Security Council to ensure a mandate and to guarantee
the involvement of the main actors; the NATO potential to ensure the
stability of environment; the commitment of EU to ensure political basis
and resources necessary for economic and social stabilization and
institutional development; the US commitment to guarantee the will for
completing this process.
Within the basic components of the decision, along with political
regulation and economic development, is the key issue of security.
In the sphere of security it is expected that the US policy will
be directed at avoiding new crises in the region. In short term the key
issues are:
n Clear indication of the commitment to resolve the crisis and
strategy for stabilization, regardless that parallel process of trans-Atlantic
aspect will be under way.
n Immediate and effective reaction in any case of organized armed
violence.
n Establishing trustful and principle control over the inflow of
weapons into the region.
n Completing the demilitarizing of para-military and para-police
forces.
n Elaborating and pursuing sound and consistent policy of
involving Yugoslavia in Partnership for Peace Initiative and the process
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of South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (Serbs are very sensitive
to military security issues).
In long term, the US commitments are in several key aspects of
security:
n Interaction and support in combating organized crime,
international corruption and terrorism.
n New confidence and security-building measures emphasized on
enlarging transparency of military activities and diminishing military
presence in border zones.
n Further development of military cooperation from a process
to a concrete product.
n Invitation for Bulgaria and Romania to join NATO.
Broader interaction and cooperation in combating soft-security
issues is a top priority because the outcomes result directly on public
opinion and political attitudes. In many of the countries fighting
corruption at the high levels of power and at international level is an
essential element of political pre-election and governance programs. It
is substantially important in this context the cooperation on equal basis,
thus avoiding the impression that the US closely observe the processes
and react selectively with regard to their own interests. The principle
cooperation in controlling the production exports and transit of weapons.
Enlarging confidence and security-building measures in the aspect
mentioned above is just the first step. Projecting the formula of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty on the new map of the
region reveals serious gaps. Somehow these gaps have been bridged by
the inadequate notion of strengthening the defense of a new country or
seeking military balance and parity or providing groups with arms to
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fight against or defend themselves. The countries in the region have
neither potential for resolving a problem nor even stimulating a debate
on it. Therefore the US commitment is a part of the possible solution.
An important issue in this context is the expected release of hundreds
and thousands of small and heavy arms units in due course of the
commenced armed forces reduction. The cooperation and interaction with
the US is significant from technical as well as political aspect.
The political will and organizational impetus of the USA established
the military cooperation in the region. It initiated important processes
and concrete results - the key process for the region is the South-Eastern
Europe Defense Ministers Meetings (with the participation of the USA
and Italy), the joint position on Kosovo, the participation in Partnership
for Peace Initiative20, Multilateral Peace Forces in SEE, the bilateral
military initiatives, joint military infrastructure projects as the Center for
Air Sovereignty, National Military Command Center, etc. The cooperation
with the USA underlies the military reforms of the countries in the region
regarding the conceptual, methodological and military-technology aspects.
What should be invested in is cooperation leading to interdependence.
NATO enlargement towards the countries from the region is the
indisputable issue of the security strategy. All the arguments in favor
and against have been laid down on the table and their reiteration could
have the reverse effect. The notion that is being shared by many people
on the Balkans is that if we are to witness the real implications of this
process the very philosophy of enlargement should be altered: from
incorporating secure and stable countries to incorporating countries in
order to become secure and stable.
As Jeffery Simon precisely concludes NATO needed 10 years to
integrate the easiest for incorporation countries21. The new administration
20 For example, the 5-year Bulgarian participation in Partnership for Peace Program is
due to the substantial financial aid and support of the US.
21 Videoconference Sofia - Washington, 19.12.2000, organized by the Institute for Regional
and International Studies.
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can change the pursued policies of doors (closed, slightly open, open,
open but no one enters) and polishing candidates. Obviously, everybody
is tired of this game. It is time to lay cards down on the table  the
problems along with the potential for decisions. The notion that the
recipient of security guarantees should be importer of security to the
Alliance is true but needs further clarifying. Each newly accepted country
at first gains more than it has given. It can not be required accession
of a country in such an invisible manner that no one can perceive it.
The statement that NATO membership is an important factor for
domestic development but does not solve all the problems is also true
but needs further clarification. The NATO membership changes the
attitude towards the invited country  it becomes more perspective, the
readiness and scale of foreign political support is being changed; the
political support guarantees economic investments; good and active
economic relations develop positive social perceptions within the country
as well as within most important partners, change the policy of opponents.
The option Bulgaria and/or Romania to remain out of NATO consciously
or not is being related to an inevitable change of national paradigm of
security transforming the vision of collective security in Europe to the
vision of sanitary belt around the Balkans and all the consequences
of it.
Cooperation with NATO, preparation and accession should be a
matter of normal business and not political sophistication. The talks
between political and military bodies of NATO and the candidate
countries should not be assumed as an elitarian process. In this context
it is of ultimate importance to avoid political surprises between the USA
and their partners in the region. Establishing mechanisms for early
warning and precise policy interpreting are needed. It should not be
ignored that the time for political reacting as well as the political culture
of key institutions and persons in the US and in the countries from the
region is quite different. The piled potential for interaction during the
last decade could be better structured on bilateral as well as on regional
basis. In this context it is also important to establish and maintain effective
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interface towards the societies in member countries and candidate
countries in order to inform them and motivate them, respectively. The
potential of non-governmental organizations and target groups should be
reactivated in this respect.
*   *   *
The end of the Cold War started several hot wars on the Balkans - wars
that no country won and yet the Balkan peoples lost altogether.
Instead of myths and stereotypes that have recently used to
explain the so-called Balkan mentality establishing a realistic vision for
resolving Balkan problems, the Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov
appealed to his colleagues22. The positive aspects of post-Second World
War West European history are based on the presumption that the way
out of a crisis is through economic and social solidarity, reciprocal
compromises in view of the common interest and shared acquisitions with
regard to future bigger investments. The key issue of the stabilization
strategy for the region is motivating and supporting solidarity perceptions,
developing positive trends with strong and large-scale basis that are worth
investing in. This particular approach should be stimulated by the
countries, which want, can and consider as ones own interest the
transition of the Balkans from a powder keg to a European region.
22 Balkan countries leaders meeting in Davos, 28.01.2001; available from http://
www.president.bg; Internet; accessed  February 1, 2001.
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The general outcome after the conflicts in South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
was that the international community, together with the countries of the
Balkan region, is seeking to prepare a regional program which will help
to establish the basis for stability and security in the region. The Stability
Pact signed in June 1999 in Cologne, was given as one of its missions
to define and support such a program for sustainability. The region
includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as
Bulgaria and Romania (SEE-7 countries).
The main intention of the overall regional initiative is to present
strategic direction on how economic and social benefits could be completed
from internal integration within SEE. The most significant part of the Pact
is accomplishment of an affiliated policy for the infrastructure development
INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SEE REGION
Elena Triffonova
Program Director, Institute for Regional
and International Studies
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of the SEE region. Improving infrastructure in the region will be very
considerable to support economic growth and the integration process.
The total population of the SEE-7 countries is approximately 55
million, or 15% of the EU population of 375 million1. Since the region
is Europes poorest, its economic share is even more marginal. Total GDP
in the SEE-7 stood at around EUR 100 billion in 1998, or 1.4% of total
EU GDP2. The series of conflicts that disordered large parts of the Balkan
region since the early 1990s doubtlessly lead to economic decline not only
in the countries which make up former Yugoslavia but also in all the rest
states on the Balkans. Theoretical economic considerations point out the
crucial role of infrastructure investments as pre-conditions for economic
growth, as well as providing some pointers to the likely sources of financing
for such investments.3
Infrastructure covers structurally important areas as transport,
power generation and communications. It is very significant factor for
achieving sustainable economic development.
Transport corridors
South Eastern Europe is on the crossroad between Europe and Asia and
it is also the natural transit route between Europe and Asia. Six out of
ten European multi-modal transport corridors proceed through SEE
countries. The development of the network of transport corridors into
an integrated system is a deliberate policy of the European Union, realized
by the decisions taken at the Second Pan-European Transport Conference
1994 in Crete and of the Third Conference in Helsinki 19974.
1 Report The Basic Infrastructure Investment in SEE, by Balkan Task Force, EIB,
Luxembourg, September 28, 1999.
2 The Basic Infrastructure Investment in SEE, Balkan Task Force, EIB, Luxembourg,
September 28, 1999.
3  The Geostrategic and International Political Implications of EU Enlargement, by
Guenter Krenzler, Report of the second meeting of the working group on the Eastern
Enlargement of EU.
4 Please, see Table No 1 in the Appendix.
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Aims of Southeast European Countries
for Developing Road Transport
The common tendency for the region is the improvement of the quality
of road connections related with handling international traffic.
Romanias main goal is to develop the roads of the European
transport corridors passing through its territory. This intention is also
connected with an easily explained striving to extend the length of the
corridors passing through the country.
Another of Romanias goals is a co-operation with the neighbouring
countries in  precisely assessing the need for developing and linking the
existing national road network with the future motorways of the European
corridors. There is a considerable discrepancy between stated intentions
and actual work on the part of the country since it gives priority to
national interests at the expense of maximum efficiency in setting up
international roads.
Romanias programme plans the reconstruction and expansion of
the national road network. The main priorities in that respect are the
reconstruction of the Budapest-Pitest motorway  and constructing another
3 000 km of motorways. Along with that another goal of the country
is improving safety which is directly connected with improving the quality
of the transport system.
In the field of combined transport it is important for Romania
to build new road-ferryboat links with Bulgaria.
Yugoslavias plans for development of the road infrastructure are
in two directions. One is completing the Trans-European motorway
sections. Another is connected with the plans for restoring the close
relations with Macedonia and with the resulting attempt to improve the
transport communications with the former Yugoslavian republics as well
as  restoration of  damages from  the  NATO bombings.
The main intention in the transport policy of Macedonia is to
overcome its isolation and provide alternative transport connections in
the direction of east to west. The transport connections of the country
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with Europe until now have been mainly in the direction north to south
and pass through the territory of Yugoslavia on the north and access to
the Mediterranean sea is achieved through the territory of Greece.
The plans for the development of the road network from east-
west are expressed by the emphasis the country lays on building transport
Corridor No.8 and on the striving for establishing co-operation with
Bulgaria and Albania. Through this corridor Macedonia will provide itself
an alternative to its link to Europe through Yugoslavia and will acquire
an alternative outlet on the Mediterranean.
Although the priority in the countrys policy is the development
of the links in the direction east-west, the second major goal of Macedonia
is to restore and develop road connections with Yugoslavia.
In its transport policy Greece has set three main goals. One is
to complete and modernize the existing road network. In that respect
the main priority is build and develop the road connections which include
the west coast of the country. Another priority is building road connections
which will improve the road network in the region of Athens.
Another goal of Greece is to attract additional international traffic
through its territory. The process of ensuring the most favourable
conditions for building the Via Ignatia and PATHE motorways, situated
along the main international road axes of the country, has been intensified.
The other priority  establishing new and improving the existing
contacts with neighbouring countries and thus improving the possibilities
for land communications with other European Union members is also
connected with the second goal of attracting more traffic. In that respect
the priorities are opening three new border checkpoints with Bulgaria,
as well as creating a new road link to the Greek-Albanian border.
Turkeys strategy for developing the road network has several
aspects. Its main goal is to ensure maximum opportunities for attracting
transport traffic from Europe to Asia and back. Connected with that is
also the intention to complete the sections of the Trans-European network.
In order to ensure the fastest and shortest access to the markets of Western
Europe, Turkey plans to build key projects  road bridges at Izmit bay
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and Chanakkale over the Dardanelles. In the future these projects could
influence the restructuring of the transport traffic in the Balkans.
If there are many questions to Turkeys inclusion as a full member
of the European economic space, the countrys turning into a regional
power in the Black Sea region is a real process which takes much
ambition and efforts. In the context of the globalization process shaping
the Black Sea region into an integral link between continents requires
an infrastructure adequate to these needs. In accordance with that is the
policy of building connections between the countries of the Black Sea
region. In that respect it is of priority to build a motorway along the
Asian coast of the  Sea of Marmara, as well as to develop the Black
Sea coast corridor, which connect Europe, the Caucasian countries and
the Middle East.
The geographical location of Bulgaria defines the special
importance of the transport sector integration with the European Union,
as well as for its overall development. Bulgaria is on the Balkan routes
cross road that connects EU with Turkey, the Middle East, Ukraine,
Russia and Central Asia and between Greece and Scandinavia. The
corridors that pass through the territory of Bulgaria are roads that have
been approved by history. The traditional, over the centuries, movement
of people and goods from Europe to Asia and backwards has been realized
and is still performed along the destinations of the five Pan  European
corridors, that cross the territory of the country.
First, the main priority in the future development of the road
network of Bulgaria is improving and finishing the roads that are part
of the European transport corridors.  That is determined by the fact that
Corridors No.4, No.8, No.9, and No.10 are the way to the real integration
of the countrys road network into the European one.
The reconstruction of main international roads - motorways and
class I roads  aims at bringing the quality closer to the European
standards. The main activities in the strategy are improvement of the road
network structure on a national and regional level, development of new
road axes and recategorization of those in operation. Building fully
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compatible road networks in the European countries, which meet common
standards, is one of conditions for a successful integration of the
Bulgarian economy into the common European market.
The second important point is opening the road network of
Bulgaria to the countries of the region in order to improve the co-
operation between them. In that respect it is important to open new border
checkpoints. The goal to develop the road infrastructure in border
territories is also connected with the implementation of transborder co-
operation.
The third important point is improving the technical and operational
condition of the road network of national importance and equalizing the
quality of service in the different parts of the country and thus equalizing
their chances for development and attracting investments.  In that respect
it is necessary to pursue a consistent regional policy for development
of the Danube and Black Sea coast, the Rhodopes, Strandzha-Sakar and
the west border territories.
Some priority projects of the Bulgarian transport investments
policy along the routes of the main European transport corridors (given
by order of their numbering and not by the degree of their importance),
and the respective steps undertaken for their implementation are as
follows.5
European transport corridor No.4 where electrification and
reconstruction of the railway line to Greece is in progress, as well as
reconstruction and rehabilitation of sections of the first-class international
roads in the direction towards Romania. The Bulgarian state strongly
supports the idea for construction of a new bridge in the western part
of the common Danube River border and has always pointed out that
it would be not only a bridge between the two countries but also would
have European significance.
International commerce in the whole Danube River region has been
blocked due to the destruction of bridges by NATO bombers attacking
5 Please, see the table 2 in the Appendix.
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Yugoslav targets in the war for Kosovo. Several countries, including
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany, have complained
of trade losses running into billions of dollars because river ships with
their convoys of barges cannot traverse the Danube.
The river is a major transportation link for most of its 3,000
kilometers route from southern Germany to the Black Sea. For about
400 kilometers, it flows through Yugoslavia. Those 400 kilometers are
vital for trade between Eastern and Western Europe. Any disturbance that
cuts traffic through the Yugoslav section has an immediate effect on trade
figures.
European transport corridor No.8 (East-West  of crucial
importance) where works are in progress for construction of a direct
railway connection between Sofia and Skopje, reconstruction and
rehabilitation of the road beds of the corridor and of the borderline transit
ways. The investigation made by authoritative European consultants
indicated for the economic viability of the corridor and the forecasts are
proving to be absolutely true. The states connected by the corridor co-
ordinate their investment plans and have the necessary international
support. Within this corridor it is envisaged the construction of Sofia
Airport as a modern transit center of passengers and cargo flow of the
Balkans.
European transport corridor No.9 including construction of highway
sections and rehabilitation of the road connections implementing the
national program for reconstruction of transit ways.
Modernization of the Bourgas and Varna ports is of particular
importance for the development of the corridors on the territory of
Bulgaria. They establish comfortable connections to the transport networks
of the states in the Caucasian region and in Central Asia, which also
look for alternative ways of their commodity exchange with Europe.
Railways ferryboat terminal in Varna which is the only one along
the western Black Sea coast with adjustable track spacing of wagons
coming from the railway network of the former Soviet Union. For this
reason it is not necessary to construct new expensive terminals there,
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but only ferryboat quays.
The transport corridors must offer equivalent alternatives and must
function in the conditions of a freely competing market environment in
respect to all aspects of the transborder collaboration. For the efficient
development of the transport corridor both the technical aspects of the
coordinated construction and maintenance in respect of time and place,
and the institutional framework (facilitation of the frontier and customs
procedures, security of the roads, etc.) are important. The recent conflicts
in Yugoslavia, the sanctions and embargo have resulted in important
disruptions on these corridors.
Roads
The road infrastructure is a basic element that has a crucial role in sharing
the structure of national transport systems, the main transport corridors
and with their binding with the network with neighboring countries.
As a whole the road networks in the SEE region are extensive
with differing densities. Primary and secondary roads amount to some
57,000 km in the SEE-5 countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, the FR of Yugoslavia and the FYR of Macedonia), and another
86,000 km in Bulgaria and Romania6. The tertiary network of local and
unpaved roads, which is at least as significant in length, is not considered
here. There are some 1,435 km of motorways (two-by-two lane divided
highways), which are concentrated in the FR of Yugoslavia, Croatia,
Bulgaria, the FYR of Macedonia and Romania7. Though not accomplishing
the exemplary levels of the EU, road network lengths are significant in
the region and illustrate the considerable capital expenditure that has gone
into building and preserving such networks over the years, often on
difficult terrain.
6 Regional Infrastructure Projects in South Eastern Europe, Sofia 1999.
7 Basic Infrastructure Investments in SEE - Regional project review, Regional Funding
Conference for SEE Brussels, 29-30 March 2000.
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The state of the network is very uneven, although there is a general
trend toward lack of periodic and current maintenance. Considering the
Pan-European transport Corridors, defined in Crete (1994) and revised
in Helsinki in 1997, SEE region represent an area of high importance
for the South Eastern directions.  Six of all ten European corridors involve
seven SEE countries.
The issue of competitive routes arise to some degree in certain
cases, such as between Corridor No.10 and Corridor No.4 or Corridor
No.8 and Greek project Via Egnatia as major transit routes between
Western Europe and the South-East and East-West direction. Physical
characteristics such as route length, topography of alignment or physical
obstacles, and excising capacities may implicitly indicate an economically
preferred route. Notwithstanding, political circumstances or geo-strategic
considerations may make the alternative corridor the only feasible route
in terms of security in a medium-term perspective.
The Energy Projects
The region of South Eastern Europe is quite well endowed with energy
resources - coal, limited amount of gas and petroleum and considerable
hydropower reserves. Nevertheless the countries are net energy consumers,
with energy imports outside the region representing approximately 40%
of total energy consumption8. Energy production and consumption have
fallen during the last decade due to economic changes and persistent
conflicts. Per capita primary energy consumption in the region is about
half of that in developed European countries. The gas is the important
source of energy for industry and heating in most of the region, the primary
source being Russian supplies. Romania is able to satisfy its gas demand
from domestic production. As well as in other regions, the interdependence
of energy such as electricity, oil, gas and coals forms an important factor.
8 Basic Infrastructure Investments in SEE - Regional project review, Regional Funding
Conference for SEE Brussels, 29-30 March 2000.
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Most of the countries in the region are small gas producers of
modest volumes that they use in their own domestic markets; in general,
there are no cross border interconnections among the gas networks of
these countries.
The region is a net importer of natural gas; the Russian Federation
has a dominant role as the almost exclusive supplier. This almost total
dependency creates one of the most important restrictions to the
development of the gas industry and highlights the issues of diversification
and security of supply.
Natural gas consumption in the region compared to that of the
European Union reveals the existence of free capacity and therefore
potential for investment initiatives in the gas industry. Although the
situation changes when factors associated with the short and medium
perspectives of some national economies, the old subsidization system,
which forces to prices lower than the costs, and the structure of local
gas markets have to be considered.
Proposed natural gas projects cover the whole spectrum of
activities from Trans-Continental pipelines to isolated LNG terminals and
national underground gas storage facilities. The evaluation of the
Common Interest Projects led to the establishment of three levels of
priorities:
1. Priority projects concern the supply of gas to recognized markets
that have demonstrated their propensity to consume higher gas quantities.
Previous works have already been undertaken showing the development
of activities towards further project stages. The two previous conditions
denote that the risk to proceed with the investment is rather low.
2. Priority projects are oriented towards new regions without a
tradition of using natural gas, some of them even with lack of
infrastructures. These projects concern new interconnections between
Balkan countries that can contribute to the development of a regional
gas network. Additionally, these projects concern the installation of new
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trunk lines to supply natural gas from alternative gas sources or to
transport natural gas to Balkan regions still isolated from gas networks.
First studies have been undertaken and respective conclusions are being
analyzed.
3. Priority projects are still at a preliminary stage and some of
them need to be further studied to evaluate their feasibility. These projects
concern the launching of pipelines crossing borders between different
countries. Due to the low level of project development some of the
countries involved, although supporting the project, require further
explanations regarding specific points. The two previous conditions
denote that these projects have, presently, higher risk.
Apart from long term considerations associated with transcontinental
pipelines, local markets attempt to regulate their supply problems during
peak seasons through the development of nationally oriented underground
gas storage facilities. A number of projects referring to this type of
investment initiatives have been registered in the inventory but since they
were not related with at least two Balkan countries they were excluded
from the list of common interest projects and, consequently, were not
evaluated.
If, however, these proposals were to be considered as elements
of a regional transmission system then the whole approach would change
and they could be raised to the first priority group.
Under the assumption that the involved countries would agree on
a regional approach, an overall study should be undertaken to explore
and propose optimum solutions for the necessary feasibility studies. The
necessary co-ordination could be offered at the early stages by a scheme
similar to the Task Force while funds could be raised from PHARE and
other relevant programs.
In such a perspective, the formation of a regional multinational
organization as a joint venture company by all involved parties could
prove to be more efficient in raising funds from international institutions
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and the private sector. Meanwhile it could cover in a more persistent
and economic way undesired disturbances in the supply sector.
Gas Transmission Network. Development Projects
Significant gas deposits have been discovered until now neither in
Bulgaria nor in the neighboring Balkan countries, Romania being the only
exception. This determines the importance of the Balkan region in regard
to natural gas transmission from gas-production fields to end consumers
as well as the regions performance as a potential market.
The major producer of natural gas to the developed European
markets are the fields in North sea, the huge reserves of the Russian
fields in Siberia, North African ledges predominantly in Algeria and the
Caspian basin in Iran. The construction and functioning of a terminal
of liquefied natural gas in Turkey and the forthcoming launching of such
a terminal in Greece will feasibly enhance the opportunities of natural
gas import from other sources.
Russian natural gas is very important for Balkan states in respect
to the transit and the reliable deliveries of natural gas. At this stage
Russian natural gas is the only opportunity for most of the Balkan
countries, including Bulgaria. In a short term perspective two simultaneous
processes will take place in SEE countries  with increasing natural
gas consumption the problems related to ensuring the accuracy of
deliveries and possible diversification will aggravate.
To 2003 the export of natural gas from Caspian region and
eventually from Iran is expected to reach European markets through
Turkey and Bulgaria. There is theoretical probability for connecting the
Bulgarian transmission system through Romania and Hungary, but the
expectations are that the price of natural gas will be higher than the price
of Russian natural gas. Construction of new liquefied gas terminals and
their joint operations are also expected. Therefore, the possibilities of
increasing the readability of gas deliveries and their diversification are
connected both to certain expenses, which should be provided by states
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in transition, as well as unspecified perspectives in the development of
the gas market. The general economic situation in the SEE countries does
not allow the provision of significant funds for diversification of natural
gas delivery, aimed at reduction of prices and thus directly influencing
the development of gas market.
In a regional perspective the Bulgarian transmission and transit
system, the consumer structure of natural gas and the potential of development
of the country, together with the geographic situation, define the future aspects
of the country as an energy distribution center on the Balkans.
The tendencies of increase in electric power production from
natural gas, based on significant advantages of natural gas as a resource,
will increase the importance of natural gas in determining the energy
structure of SEE countries.
The requirements of Kyoto conference for reducing the emissions
of noxious gasses in the atmosphere are also a factor in the growth of
natural gas consumption in the region.
The diversification of natural gas deliveries is an important element
of the development of the gas industry in the region. Feasible opportunities
for diversification are created by the development of technologies and the
reduction in the prices of liquefied natural gas. However, the level of market
development will be decisive for such solutions. In the next six years the
development of gas market in the region will be crucial for implementation
of new transit projects, as well as for the diversification of the market.
The direct supplies for households especially are expected to
intensify the development of the gas market in the Balkan countries. In
all of the Balkan countries the gasification of big cities and regions and
the development of distribution companies is a priority, which will
increase the consumption of natural gas.
The future usage of natural gas depends on development of the
technologies of its transmission and storage.
Bulgaria can be one of the major distribution centers of natural
gas in the Balkan region and gain the respective economic and political
advantages.
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The change of the market structure in Bulgaria and
neighboring countries, as well as the increase in consumption of
natural gas need a favorable transmission and transit system. The
transit of Russian natural gas though Romania and Bulgaria to the
rapidly developing Turkish market is economically most profitable
both for consumers and exporters.  This will improve conditions
for extension of the transfer system, magnification of the power
of compressor station, expansion of underground gas depository of
Chiren9 and the construction of a new one.
The current economic condition in SEE countries and
especially the significant differences of national economies and
potentials of each country to invest own resources or to make use
of subsidiaries in the implementation of diversification of natural
gas deliveries outline and following trends. Countries like Turkey
and Greece are oriented to the usage of installation of liquefied
natural gas despite of higher prices.  Turkey has such terminals
and Greece is on the way to putting into operation of a similar
installation. Having in mind the level of economic development
and the state of affairs in the market, it is unlikely that the rest
of the countries in the region including Bulgaria will adopt the
usage of such terminals within the next years. Consequently, given
an approximately equal level of economic development, the different
countries have different opportunities for diversification of gas
deliveries and protection of consumers from the monopoly prices.
The regional approach requires equivalence to be guaranteed
and avoiding decision that can be used for economic and political
pressure. Economic sustainability should be the criteria for choosing
a long-term investment strategy in the region. An example of this
could be the alternative projects for Albanian Carrying System,
which at present uses local resources and lack natural gas. The
possibilities of connection are mainly via Macedonia with the
9 The existing underground gas storage in the northwestern part of Bulgaria.
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Bulgarian transit system or via Greece. The two projects are
alternative but their implementation can be influenced by different
finances of the respective countries.
Another project of importance for Bulgaria is the building
of a transit branch to Serbia. It is considered that the Serbian
economy will become a considerable consumer of natural gas as
soon as change in its political conjuncture occurs and the process
of disintegration diminishes.
The main projects which have good prospects in the field
of natural gas transit from  the East to the West are the following:
n Connecting itself with the European network Russia is
also in a process of modernization of its own gas transfer system.
The Yamal gas pipeline will provide gas through Belarus and
Poland, flowing into the West European gas pipeline system in the
territory of the former East Germany.
n Development of the natural gas deposits in Turkmenistan
and construction of transit pipelines leading to the European market.
n Freeing the exploitation of the Iranian natural gas and
transit supplies to the western markets (provided that the status of
the country will be changed).
Natural Gas Transfer Projects
of Priority Significance for Bulgaria
The interest of Bulgaria is to expand its gas supplies network and
integrate with the gas market in SEE, however, due consideration
should be given to the existing specific conditions. On the one hand,
because of its specific territorial position, Bulgaria is a strategic
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factor in the system of natural gas supplies to Turkey, and in the future could
have the same position also in respect to Greece, Macedonia and Serbia with
the transit gas pipeline constructed by Bulgargas as it provides to these countries
access to the Russian natural gas. It is in the interest of Bulgaria to participate
in transborder projects for expansion of the transit gas pipeline and making the
country a center of transport and distribution of the Russian natural gas, which
would bear real income from transit fees, however, provided that a specified
minimum available quantity could be guaranteed.
On the other hand, Bulgaria must solve the problem of its own
gas supplies while keeping the possibility to obtain the prevailing supplies
from Russia, provided of course, that best possible terms and conditions
of prices and suppliers will be agreed. It is of crucial importance to find
variant solutions for alternative supplies of natural gas and connection
with another gas supply system because only under competitive conditions
on the gas market Bulgaria could negotiate better gas supply conditions
and increase the extent of its energy independence.
Bulgaria is on the way of the biggest ever designed facility for
alternative gas supplies to SEE  the gas transit pipeline from
Turkmenistan through Turkey to Central and West Europe.
The geographical position of Bulgaria offers two essential
advantages. On the one hand, Bulgaria has the privilege to be the most
direct, cheapest and most secure way to the Medditeranean and in
particular towards Turkey. On the other hand - it is on the way towards
Western Europe for the alternative supplies of Turkmenian gas along the
route beyond the control of Russia. It could become a regional distribution
center and, after connection of the alternative gas deposits with Europe,
Bulgaria could break through its dependence on Russia. At the same time
during the last years there has been in practice a stalemate as a result
of the crisis in the Bulgarian-Russian relations in respect to natural gas
supplies which inevitably affected the problem of transit and expansion
of the gas transfer system.
Oil
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The regional demand for crude oil cannot be satisfied by the regions
own oil resources. There is ample production only in Romania, Croatia,
Serbia and Albania. Also, in spite of the apparantly high nominal refining
capacity, the actual available capacity is not sufficient to provide the
required product mix.
The increasing volumes of crude oil that will enter the Black sea
market will provide an opportunity to the region to take advantage of
the competition between supplies from both the east and the west. The
region can also play a key role in transit of crude oil from the Caspian
sea to consumption markets, and in helping to reduce the environmental
concerns assosiated with increased oil shipments through the Bosphorus.
Although in view of several mutually competitive projects the strategic
option remains to be fully investigated.
Planning of oil interconnections in the Balkans is subject to
decisions associated to national policies, concerning security of supplies,
and expectations related with the international routes of oil, originating
either from Central Russia, or from the Caspian fields.
The analysis of the energy balance in the oil sector announces
that the region is a net importer of crude oil and that despite the existence
of high refining capacity, especially in Romania, the existing infrastructure
cannot meet the increasing demand.
Balkan countries appear to face two alternatives in connection with
the emerging Caspian oil and the expected finalization of transportation
routes. They can either upgrade some of their own refineries satisfying
their internal demands and becoming exporters of light products, mostly
in the region, or they can import refined products from western markets
and certain selected upgraded refineries of the region.
The list of Common Interest Projects includes four projects
separated in two groups. All of them are in a very preliminary stage
in their planning process although project   (Bourgas  Alexandroupolis)
has a considerably higher volume of available information. Two of the
projects (Bourgas  Alexandroupolis and Bourgas  Vlore called
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AMBO) refer to possible routes of Caspian oil transportation from the
Black Sea ports to Mediterranean Sea while the remaining two refer to
the South-North axis intending to satisfy regional demands.
Statements that the crude oil of the Caspian fields (Tengizchevroil
and Azerbaijan International Operating Company  AIOC) will be
transported to international markets through the Black Sea ports of Russia
and Georgia have revived the importance of ideas for by-passing the
Straights with pipelines ending to Alexandroupolis on the Aegean Sea and
Vlore on the Adriatic Sea. Furthermore, expectations that the USD 2 billion
pipeline which is under construction by Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
will be commissioned in 1999 and that the Bacu-Soupsa line of AIOC
could be operational by the end of 1998 have set the time horizon for
decisions associated with the possible routes of oil transportation throughout
the Balkans. Besides the expectations of the countries concerned, there
some questions to be answered prior to the construction of a new pipeline
ending somewhere in the Mediterranean Sea. They are related to the
maximum volume of oil that can be transported and the possible restrictions
that may be imposed on international trade through the Straights.  With
utilization rate of 88% and a maximum agreed international throughout
of about 50.0 mtpa10 of crude oil and refined products southbound, it seems
that no much space is left for the gradually increasing volumes of Caspian
oil in the Black Sea. If this is true, then in addition to the Bosporus tanker
route, the expected growth in transported volumes justifies, at least for
the near future, an additional capacity of up to 40 mtpa11.
The proposed projects of Bourgas-Alexandroupolis and Bourgas-
Vlore are in some competition, although decision making will not be
based on economic criteria. In any case, whatever the outcome on this
issue may be, it will affect decisions concerning the structure and the
10 Study by European Commission Directorate General for Energy (DG XVII) Balkan
Energy Task Force, October 1997.
11 Study by European Commission Directorate General for Energy (DG XVII) Balkan
Energy Task Force, October 1997.
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development of the oil industry in the Balkans.
A first consideration of priorities would appear to confirm that
Bourgas-Alexandroupolis is clearly the highest priority project in the oil
sector, due mainly to the growing pressures for an alternative route to
the Bosporus and Dardanelles for transporting crude oil from the Black
Sea to the Mediterranean.
Even though Turkey has environmental reservations. As far as
international environmental impacts are concerned, the expected oil which
may be shipped from the ports of Eastern Black Sea, South Turkey
(Caspian oil) and the North Adriatic (Russian oil) may double or even
triple the annually transported volumes from these areas. This situation
may lead to environmental damages far beyond the self-regulatory
capabilities of ecosystems.12
The other three projects can be grouped together in a lower priority
due to the very preliminary stage of planning, and also because of several
other factors. As it has been already explained, if the Bourgas  Alexandroupolis
project proceeds, it is unlikely that a second major trans-Balkan crude oil line
such as AMBO could be justified in the near future. In the case of the
Thessaloniki-Skopje projects, the need for an in-depth refinery study casts some
doubt on whether both crude oil and product lines are justified.
Priority Projects for Bulgaria in the Field of Oil Transfer
The main projects related to the transfer of oil through the territory of
Bulgaria are two. Both of them are connected with transfer of Caspian
oil and are based on the presumption that it will be transferred through
the territory of Russia to Novorosiysk or through the territory of Georgia
to Supsa. In addition to the alternative of the Trans-Balkan projects in
the variant Baku-Cheyhan, there is also the possibility of passing the
pipeline through the territory of Ukraine to Odesa and to the North-West,
12 See the article by Hakan Akbul, Energy Decision-Making: the Turk case, in
Perceptions, September-November, 2000.
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to connect with the oil pipeline Drujba.
The first project envisages construction of an oil pipeline from
Burgas through the territory of Bulgaria to the Greek port Alexandroupolis
at the Medditeranean Sea. From there the raw material will be shipped
by oil tankers to the European markets. It is envisaged that a part of
the raw material will be processed in the oil rafineries in Bulgaria and
Greece. The efficiency of the project is based on the circumstance that
the most direct way from Novorosiysk to the Meditteranean petroleum
market passes through Bulgaria. The project for the pipeline Burgas 
Alexandrupolis is calculated for the time being at US$ 760 million.13
The second project is the so-called AMBO. It is initiated by the
American businessman Vuk Tashkovitch and envisages joint participation
of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania in the construction, and at a later
stage, in the exploitation of the oil pipeline from Burgas through the
territory of Macedonia to the Albanian port Vlora at the Adriatic Sea.
AMBO, according to experts, will cost about US$ 850 million14.
The interest of Bulgaria in the two Trans-Balkans projects is
apparent. However, until this moment, the project which is at a more
advanced stage of negotiations  the project Burgas  Alexandroupolis,
has not made any significant progress. There are several problems in
the negotiations on this project. Bulgaria and Greece still disagree on
the issue of the shareholding of the two countries in the future joint-
venture which will operate the transit through this pipeline. This problem,
however, turns out to be insignificant at the background of the general
ambiguity on the future routes of the Caspian pipeline.
The variants preferred by Bulgaria are the routes through
Novorossiysk and Supsa to Burgas and thårefrom to the west and/or
soutwest. There is a touch of optimism in the support of the EU, the
representatives of which have declared their support for the route Burgas-
13 Data from Regional Infrastructure Projects in South Eastern Europe (Sofia: IRIS) 1999.
14 Data from Regional Infrastructure Projects in South Eastern Europe, Sofia: IRIS, 1999.
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Alexandroupolis. Besides, it seems that Russia is not able to guarantee
neither with its own deposits the minimum quantities of oil which would
make the oil pipeline profitable.
Lately the project Baky  Cheyhan is favored route by US
admnistration. It is running through Georgia and then south through
Turkey to the countrys Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, even though a
new pipeline along this route could cost as much as 84 billion US$15.
This figure would be twice what it would cost to upgrade and expand
the two Black Sea pipelines favored by the AIOC consortium, and with
world oil prices plunging to historic lows, cost became an important issue.
However, getting the oil to market remains the hard part. Two
pipelines, one from Baku to Georgias Black Sea port of Soupsa and
another from the Azerbaijan capital to the Russian Black Sea terminal
at Novorossiysk, can together only handle around 200,000 barrels per
day, or a 300,000 barrel shortfall16.
The Baku  Cheyhan project is favored by the US for several
reasons. Above all, the Americans are keen to make sure that no oil is
routed through Iran. It would give Turkey, one of Washingtons firm allies
in the region, a degree of control over the export of oil from the Caucasus,
and reduce the newly independent states dependence on Moscow, which
will probably be collecting transit duties from the large amounts of oil
that will be exported from the Kazakhstan fields of Tengiz. There are also
valid environmental reasons in favor of the Baku  Cheyhan route:
Novorossiysk and Soupsa are both on the Black Sea and oil will have
to be transported by tanker through the Bosphorus, which bisects Istanbul,
15 Data from online article Central Asia: Caspian Resources Provide Alternative To Middle
East by Ben Partridge, published at www.rferl.org.
16 See the online article Geopolitics and Energy in the Middle East, Anthony H. Cordesman,
published at www.rferl.org.
17 See an article by Ben Partridge Central Asia: Caspian Resources Provide Alternative
to Middle East, Radio Free Europe, March 16, 200, available from http://www.rferl.org/
nca/features/2000/01/f.ru.000105125920.html, Internet; accessed February 15, 2001.
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a city of over 10 million. The Turkish authorities have been trying to alert
the world for the danger that supertankers present for the city and its
environment. With strong currents and counter-currents, navigation is
notoriously difficult on the winding straits and accidents are frequent. So
far, major environmental disasters have been averted, but with 4,500 tankers
currently passing through the Bosphorus every year, the risk is high17.
Conclusions
The infrastructure in SEE region has several significant dimensions. First
one, crucial efficiency gains can be made by occupied infrastructure
development regionally rather than on a national level. Given the small
size of most SEE countries, development of infrastructure investments
and policies strictly on a national basis does not allow for the exploitation
of economies of scale, which are likely to be important especially in
transport and energy. Second, since the benefits from regional projects
are realized beyond national borders, fair mechanisms for financing, and
in general burden sharing, of these regional projects will need to be
established, again at a regional level. Third, the creation of new nation
states with international borders can be an obstacle to trade and
integration, if each border crossing is associated with long waits, new
visa requirements, high transaction costs. Such obstacles can only be
addressed by reaching international agreements on border crossing
processes, the establishment of the necessary infrastructure at the border
transit points and the implementation of supportive and efficient customs
administrations18. Fourth, the development of infrastructure is constrained
by issues - including weak institutional arrangements and large rehabilitation
and reconstruction needs  that are shared by SEE countries and thus
warrant a coordinated, regional approach to addressing them.
One additional common element of infrastructure development in
the SEE region will be the gradual adjustment towards EU standards
and the EU acquis communautaire. EU policies for the transport,
telecommunications and energy sectors will need to be gradually and
prudently introduced by SEE countries. A regional approach to providing
assistance to SEE countries towards this objective should be considered19.
18 See the World Banks Report The Road to Stability and Prosperity in Southeastern
Europe - A Strategic Approach, March 2000.
19 See the Report on the achievements of the Stability pact from the Special Coordinator
of the Stability Pact to the heads of State and government participating in the Istanbul
OSCE Summit, 2000.
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APPENDIX
Table No. 1
PROJECT NAME MAIN POINTS
Corridor No.1 Helsinki-Tallin-Riga-Kaunas-Warsaw with
a spur Riga-Kaliningrad-Gdansk
Corridor No.2 Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow
Corridor No.3 Berlin/Dresden-Wrotzlaw-Katowitze-Krakow-Lvov-Kiev
Corridor No.4 Dresden/Nurnberg-Prague-Vienna/Bratislava-
Gyor-Budapest-Arad-Constanta/Crayova-
Sofia-Thessaloniki/Plovdiv-Istanbul
Corridor No.5 Venice-Trieste/Kopper-Ljubljana-Maribor-the Slovenian-
Hungarian border-Budapest-the Hungarian-Ukrainian
border-Uzhgorod-Lvov (Kiev) with sidings:
Branch 1 : Rijeka-Zagreb-the Croatian-Hungarian
border-Budapest-the Hungarian-Ukrainian border
Uzhgorod-Lvov-Kiev; and
Branch 2 : Bratislava-Zhilina-Koshitze-Uzhgorod
Corridor No.6 Gdansk-Katowitze-Zhilina
with siding Grudzhiazh-Poznan
Corridor No.7 the Danube River
Corridor No.8 Durres-Tirana-Skopje-Sofia-Plovdiv-Burgas-Varna
Corridor No.9 Helsinki-St.Petersburg-Moscow/Pskov-Kiev-
Lyubasevka-Kishinev-Bucharest-Dimitrovgrad-
Alexandropolis
wiwith sidings:Kiev-Minsk-Vilnius-Kaunas Klaypeda/
Kaliningrad; Lyubasevka-Odessa
Corridor No.10 Salzburg-Lubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade-Nis-Skopje-
Veles- Tessaloniki and the folloing sidings:
a) Budapest-Novi Sad-Beolgrade
b) Nis-Sofia(Dimitrovgrad-Istanbul along the route
of Corridore N. 4)
c) Veles-Bitola-Florina-Via Egnatia-Igoumenitsa
86
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
Table ¹2
ROADS PROJECT TYPES COUNTRIES
Corridor No.8 Completion of key sections Albania
of East-West link to Macedonia
appropriate standard Bulgaria
Corridor No.10 Completion/repair of key Albania
sections of North-Southwest BiH
link to appropriate standard Macedonia
Corridor No.5 Completion of key sections BiH
of North-Southwest link Croatia
to appropriate standard
Corridor No.4 Completion of key bridge Bulgaria
over Danube Romania
RAILWAYS
Corridor No.8 Completion of cross-border Macedonia
line to Bulgaria
Corridor No.10 Renewal of key sections BiH
Corridor No.5 Renewal of key sections BiH
Corridor No.4 Completion of key sections Bulgaria
WATERWAYS
Corridor No.8 Renewal of Ports Albania
of Durres and Bourgas Bulgaria
Corridor No.7 Restoration of FRY
Danube shipping Romania
AIRPORTS
Terminal Infrastructure Macedonia
Tirana/Rinas - Skopje Albania
ELECTRICITY
High    Voltage Vrutok-Burrel Albania
Interconnections Blagoevgrad-Dubrovo Bulgaria/Macedonia
Saraevo-Mostar-Bileca BiH
Generation Vjosa River Hydropower Albania
Distribution Renewal countrywide BiH
OIL AND GAS
Gas Pipeline Possible link to Greece Albania
interconnection or Italy
Oil and gas Part of Caspian Bulgaria
transit pipelines Sea Project
Gas Transition System renewal; Romania
and Distribution pipe replacement
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Fixed networks Modernization All countries
and extension
Mobile networks Extension All countries
87
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
BULGARIAS TRADE
PERSPECTIVES IN
BALKAN CONTEXT
Dr. Krassen Stanchev, Martin Dimitrov, IME1
Introduction
In this paper we make an attempt to cover most of the basic factors,
determining trade performance, comparing Bulgarias position with that
of other Balkan countries. Trade potential is correlated with: trade
openness, capital and labor resources, regional trade agreements, tariff
and non-tariff policies, FDI inflow, economic, financial and political
stability and world organizations membership, which influence the
framework to regulate trade on the country level. The analysis is based
on the assumption that trade performance reflects a possibility to
participate in international exchange with a share corresponding to its
1 We would like to thank Borislav Georgiev of BIA for his assistance in putting together
paragraph 6 and 8 of this paper.
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competitive abilities. Competitiveness is the capability to generate
prosperity by increased productivity in providing goods and services that
stand tests of the market place under normal conditions.
Openness of Bulgaria and Other Balkan Countries
Openness is a precondition for better trade and competitiveness since
it sets the opportunity to serve more sophisticated demand and tap richest
markets responding to unlimited supply of cheaper resources and labor.
Trade plays a varied role in the SEE economies, with trade/GDP ratios
ranging from as high as 87% and 91% for Macedonia and Bulgaria, to
as low as 32 to 29% for Albania and FR of Yugoslavia (FRY). In terms
of trade to GDP, there is a significant difference between Bulgaria, Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH), and Macedonia with their greatest ratios of trade
to GDP, the medium ratios of Croatia and Romania, and the smaller
international exchanges of Albania, and FR Yugoslavia (FRY).
TRADE OPENNESS: 1999 (IN%)
(Exports + Imports)/GDP
Albania 32
BiH 76
Bulgaria 91
Croatia 60
Yugoslavia 29
Macedonia 87
Romania 56
Source: World Bank2
Conventionally speaking, an economy is open when the given
ratios are more than 50%. In this sense Albania and Yugoslavia would
be considered relatively closed economies. In Albania, reasons are to be
found in the size of the industries, low productivity levels and the wide
spread informality of the business environment. In FRY the ratio reflects
2 Trade Integration for SEE in the Context of the Stability Pact, World Bank, 2000, p. 55.
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distort impacts of embargoes, sanctions, closing markets because of
military conflicts and respective contraction of the economy.
However, the greater openness of Bulgaria and Macedonia in SEE
comparison does not necessarily means immediate trade potential. It is
an evidence of getting some fundamental rights: established trade
directions and contracts, cooperation links and routes, a probability to
resist competitive pressures and perhaps cluster internationally.
It is likely that Balkan economies with greater openness would
sustain greater output and, over time, would achieve higher income.
Recently, James Gwartney, Charles Skipton and Robert Lawson constructed
a Trade Openness Index  (TOI),3 designed to measure the interception
of basic growth factors with international trade. It has 4 components:
t - statistics in parenthesis   * significant at 99% level;   ** significant at 95% level
a - Real GDP numbers are derived using the purchasing power parity method and are in  U.S. dollars
b - There are 87 countries in this analysis
c - High income, long standing OECD members are excluded.
3 J. Gwartney, C. Skipton, R. Lawson, Trade Openness, Iincome Levels, and Economic
Growth, 1980 - 1998.  James Gwartney and Robert Lowson are editors of the Economic
Freedom Index of the World, published since 1997 by the Fraser Institute in Canada;
IME is a co-publisher of the Index (See).
THE TRADE OPENNESS INDEX, CONVERGENCE,
KEY POLICY VARIABLES, AND INCOME
Real GDP per capita 1998 Average annual growth rate
of real per capita GDP-a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade Openness 3.1 (9.6)* 2.0 (5.96)* 0.4 (3.85)* 0.4 (2.8)* 0.3 (2.13)**
Index (1980-98)
Per capita -0.1 (3.13)*
GDP 1980
Property rights 1.0 (5.32)* 0.2 (2.33)** 0.2 (2.46)**
rating 1980
Inflation 0.5 (2.27)** 0.4 (4.81)* 0.5 (4.89)*
variability rating
Intercept -8.1 (4.29)* -12.2 (6.29)* -1.0 (1.5)* -3.6 (5.00)* -4.3 (4.91)*
N 87-b 87-b 87-b 87-b 66-c
Adj R- Squared 52 65 14 36 38
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a) tariff rates, b) the black market exchange rate premium, c) restrictions
on capital movements, and d) the actual size of the trade sector.
The results illustrate the relationship between countrys average
TOI rating during 1980-98 and a given countrys 1998 per capita GDP,
the correlation is positive and highly significant.  The adjusted R-squared
comparison indicates TOI explains 52% of the variability in 1998 per
capita GDP among the 87 countries. The next equation includes inflation
and property rights, which significantly correlate at 95% The TOI remains
highly significant (t = 5.96). The R-squared adjustment shows that all
three variables explain 65% of cross-country variations in per capita GDP.
Equation 3 looks at the relationship between the TOI and the growth
rates of real per capita GDP for 1980-98. The t - ratio for the TOI is
highly significant with R-squared indexes explaining 14% of the cross-
country variation in growth. If we exclude from the equation 5 the high-
income industrial countries (21 long standing OECD members) and reran
the model the results are quite similar to those for all countries. The
TOI remains positive and significant explanandum low-income countries.
Bulgarian Policy of Trade Liberalization
Trade partnerships are often shaped by policies. Reorientation of
Bulgarian foreign trade was supported by a respective change in the
policies. Although Bulgaria originally has succeeded in trade liberalization
at the start of the reforms, it failed to maintain the original pace and
direction of trade reforms while it was the advantage of countries like
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. The reasons for this uneven
progress could be found in macroeconomic instability, uneven progress
in introducing broader market reforms, and reemergence of price
controls (in 1993-1996), which resulted in exchange rates volatility and
demands for protection. Protectionism measures artificially boosted
GDP in mid 1990. But even these temporary positive effects were
immediately neutralized by the government support for loss making
enterprise.
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This liberalization process may be divided into several periods,
according to the extent of trade liberalization and EU integration progress.
BULGARIAS ROAD TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Period Policy mixes Results
First period:
1991-1993
 Price liberalization;
 Introduction of internal
currency convertibility;
 Elimination of non-tariff
barriers and export subsidies;
 EFTA Agreement
(July 1993);
 Signing of an Agreement
with EU on the reciprocal
establishment of tariff quotas
for certain wines
(November 1993).
 Decrease in the gap
between domestic and
international prices as a
result of  internal
convertibility;
 Frequent changes in foreign
trade regulations and
restrictions, aiming at
decreasing licensing
procedures (import licenses,
export permissions, etc.).
Second
period:
late 1993 -
early 1997
 Reestablishment of price
control from 10% of
consumer basket at the end
of 1992 to 51% at the end
of 1996
 Design of 1996 and 1997
Custom Tariffs to individual
inefficient and uncompetitive
state owned or private
enterprise;
 Signing of the EU
Association Agreement (EAA)
(February 1995);
 Attempts to politically
revitalize trade with Russia.
 Import duties remained very
high: 3-30%
(first column) and 5-40%
(second column);
 Unpredictable regulatory
environment;
 Political and Customs
corruption
 Low FDI;
 State owned enterprise
indebtedness to suppliers
of energy resources;
 Low competitiveness;
 Sharp contraction
of the output.
Third
period:
1997-1998
 Second prompt liberalization
of trade and prices (from 51
to 10% of the consumer
basket), introduction of the
currency board regime;
 Bulgaria becomes a
member of WTO;
 New, impartial Customs
Tariffs is introduced.
 Continued contraction
of the output in 1997;
 Revealing the inefficient
export structure;
 Repeated changes in
foreign trade regulations,
reflecting the measures
included in the EAA;
 Clear policy direction.
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Fourth
period:
1998-present.
 National Program for
Adoption of the Acquis
(NPAA) was adopted in 1998,
sustained commitment to EU
membership is a stated
priority of the Bulgarian
government;
 Bulgaria unilaterally lifted
import duties on textile
commodities from EFTA,
equalizing duty treatment with
that of the EU4;
 Agreement on Accession to
the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA)5;
 Free trade agreement with
Turkey (January 1999) and
Macedonia (January 2000);
 New Customs Code was
adopted in 1998 and
amended in 2000, providing
for custom procedures similar
to those of EU;
 Establishment of new
institutions;6
 Elimination of the existing
2 % import tax in 1999 and
of export fees in the
beginning of 2000;
 2000 removal of certain
licensing procedures,
replacement of licensing
regime with registration
regime regarding transactions
with unprocessed timber and
precious metals/gemstones.
 Decrease of duties on
exports improves Bulgarian
access to the international
market;
 Significant impact of trade
integration with EU;
 Higher profitability and
competitiveness are gradually
achieved at enterprise level;
 Meanwhile the overall
competitiveness remains low;
 Revenues from exports are
low;
 Increase of FDI;
 Slow impact of newly
signed bilateral and
multilateral agreements;
 Slow impact of institutional
reforms but 2000 economic
growth is already export
driven.
4 Since January 1999, duties on all industrial goods exported to the EU are tariff-free.
5 In January 1999 the agreement was enforced, duties were reduced on 80% of the goods
imported from CEFTA countries. Duties on CEFTA imports will be eliminated in January
of 2002.
6 E.g. Center for Export Promotion, Encouragement Bank and Export Insurance Agency.
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As a whole, the gains from the liberalization of foreign trade have
a limited impact on Bulgarias economic performance, because of weak
flexibility and adjustment to the domestic and international market on
the part of economic agents. The hope is that, perhaps in the longer term,
benefits from trade liberalization will be secured via enhanced
competitiveness and diversification of the export structure based on higher
value added products7.
7 See: Yonkova, Stanchev (Eds.), In Search for Growth: Policies and Lessons From
Bulgarian Economic Reforms, IME Newsletter, vol.5, No 11-12, 1999.
8 Bulgaria: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report #00/54,
April 2000
9 Ibidem. The index combines measurements of the restrictiveness of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers and measures the overall restrictiveness of the trade system of the given
country relative to protection levels in all IMF member countries.
CROSS COUNTRY COMPARISON OF TRADE PARAMETERS
Trade restriction index* Non-tariff Non-tariff
barriers barriers
1997 1998 Average tariff 1997 1999
1998
Bulgaria 7 6 15.1 6 2
Romania 5 6 19.8 7 2
Slovenia 5 4 5.7 4 2
Slovak Republic 2 1 7 3 1
Czech Republic 1 1 6.9 1 1
Poland 2 2 11.6 2 1
Croatia 2 2 12.1 2 1
Hungary 6 5 13.3 5 2
Estonia 1 1 0 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 4.5 1 1
Source:IMF8
*(Ratings 1 - 10 equal to most open - most restrictive trade regime.)9
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The table does not reflect most recent developments. Over the
last three years Bulgarias trade regime became less restrictive: the
average tariff rate is reduced from 16.8% in 1997 to 13.7% from the
beginning of 2000, non-tariff barriers were reduced substantially as well.
Reduction of trade restrictions is already contributing to trade diversification
and improves the efficiency of resource allocation. Under the conditions
of monopoly structures, any effects from decreasing tariffs on resource
distribution are lower than in countries with well-developed property
rights. At the same time, Bulgarias trade regime is far more restrictive
than the other two currency board countries from the group of EU
candidates, Estonia and Lithuania.
More detailed analysis on Bulgarian tariff measures illustrates the
policy towards liberalization in the last five years. The mean tariff went
from 16.1% in 1996 to 10.99% in 2000. Though, the process of trade
liberalization could be faster. The tariff standard deviation is decreasing;
i.e. there is more unified tariff policy.
BACKGROUND OF TARIFF MEASURES (BULGARIA)
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
1996 16.1 15 5 40 8.31
1997 15.49 15 0 40 9.04
1998 15.24 15 0 40 9.01
1999 12.55 10 0 40 9.13
2000 10.99 10 0 40 8.11
Source: Ministry of Finance
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Bulgarias Trade (Re)-Orientation
Trade and growth potential depends on the development prospects of
the major markets: in the 1990s an average of more than 70% of the
exports is previous import. Bulgaria, similarly to other Balkan countries,
depends critically on international trade. Presumably, the growth prospects
of EU and other major partners would be contributing to growth prospects
of both Bulgaria and the Balkans.
Bulgarias openness has a long history but in 1950-1980s it was
channeled to former CMEA10. Thus the openness did not produce
sustained output and higher income. Compared to Slovenia, which in 1991
had close to 60% of its trade with EU and EFTA, Bulgaria had to re-
orient its trade from the same trade volume to then at the eve of
dissolution CMEA, seeking other markets. Bulgarias starting point of
reforms was significantly worse than that of other emerging economies.
Also, Bulgaria lost markets in Iraq, Libya, and Iran. Sanctions against
Iraq and Libya blocked USD 2 billion of their debts to Bulgaria. It
happened simultaneously with the default on foreign debt payment in
March 1990, announced unilaterally by then communist cabinet. It also
happened at the eve of the first democratic general elections of the post-
communist history of the country, held in June 1990. Then elected new
set of government had still to establish itself and simultaneously, in a
condensed time-period, with the reorientation of trade to deal with debt
rescheduling, launching reforms and constitution making. The immediate
victim of this agenda was not the constitution making, political reforms
or the international relations but the consistency of economic reforms.
The following two graphs visualize the great redirection of
Bulgarias foreign trade: the result in 1999 is diametrically opposite to
the situation at the start of the reforms.
10 See: Attachment 1 and Attachment 2
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Source: NSI [Data on years before creation of CEFTA are for the current
member-countries.]
Since 1998, imports from Russian Federation and CIS had virtually
been limited to energy resources. It equalizes its rank as a market to
CEFTA countries, while exports to EU have become ten times higher.
The original decline in 1991-1993 in the Eastern trade is to be
explained with two factors: the disappearance of the CMEA greenhouse
and the fact that Bulgaria lost its unique access to COCOM-embargoed
products, thus ceasing to be an exclusive supplier to the East. Until 1997
(i.e. before the Russian crisis), exports to CIS share in Bulgaria exports
remained comparatively high. This is due to the so-called Yamburg
agreement - an ex-CMEA (1987) agreement on natural gas supply at lower
prices than international ones, which was paid back by pre-agreed
reversed supply and barter.
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After 1989, only four years registered growth in real GDP. In 1994,
1995 the growth was modest but fueled by indebtedness of the state
owned enterprises, quasi-fiscal subsidies and international conjecture. The
experience of the mid-1990 suggests that the absence of straightjacket
on government interference could hamper prospects for growth11. The
country economics reemerges in 1998 and 1999 on sounder fundamentals
(stable currency, low inflation, bankrupted loss making enterprise, etc.).
In 2000 the registered growth is about 5% of GDP, thus completing a
three-year test period for growth sustainability. At the same time, since
1989, real GDP has lost more than one-third of its initial volume and
the recovery is slow, reaching in 2000 72% of the pre-reform level.
These circumstances suggest that the trade re-orientation, although
taking place through out the period, was not backed by economic stability
and restructuring, (which could assist penetration to new markets).
During 1992-1997 lead exporting sectors were the petrochemicals,
ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, chemicals plus tobaccos and wines.
These sectors have had a considerably larger global market share that
11 See Attachment 2
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the average Bulgarias position in the global trade.12  Tobacco was and
still is a government monopoly. Though wineries remained yet government
owned in mid-1990, marketing wines abroad was a private venture with
a global market share four time higher than the average Bulgarias export
in different sectors. Short-term advantages of the heavy industry sectors
were either in the cheap natural gas supply under the Yamburg agreement
or in different forms of quasi-fiscal subsidies (debt forgiveness, subsidized
electricity or postponed environmental liabilities). Although still with an
artificial structure, the Bulgarian economy in the most of the 1990s
directed its exports westwards.
Thus, besides some sporadic attempts to impose protectionists
tariffs, even in difficult general conditions Bulgarian economy remained
predominantly open.
12 Atanas Gochev (editor), Competitiveness of Bulgarian Economy, International Relations
Association, Sofia, 1998, p.15, 16-17.
BULGARIAS EXPORTS/IMPORTS IN 1989-2000
AS PERCENT OF GDP
Year Export Import Total turnover
1989 34.5 32.3 66.9
1990 23.3 22.7 46.0
1991 42.3 33.3 75.5
1992 45.6 51.9 97.5
1993 34.4 46.8 81.2
1994 41.5 43.1 84.6
1995 40.9 43.2 84.1
1996 49.2 51.0 100.2
1997 48.2 47.9 96.1
1998 35.1 40.9 76.0
1999 38.2 52.8 91.0
2000* 44.0 58.0 102.0
Source: NSI, *IME forecast
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The export/import comparisons by year give evidence of imports
most of the time exceeding exports. The weight of the exports as a GDP
factor was constantly declining in reform years, thus proving the
uncompetitive real positioning of Bulgaria on international markets. For
all years the pattern has been the export of low value added and energy
and labor intensive products. The external demand did not serve as a
factor of then registered growth.
Basic Growth Factors
The table above compares the demand driving Bulgarian GDP since the
start of the reforms in March 1991. The data for 2000 demonstrate a
restoration of the role of exports as a factor of GDP. The significant
fact is that it is the first development of the sort for ten years. The big
question mark, however, is whether it marks a beginning of a trend or
simply due to conjecture factors.
To answer this question, we need to pay a closer look to different
domestic factors that are likely to support greater trade potential. For
different factors we allocate different meaning of contemporaneity. As
factors select:
Average growth of GDP for certain periods, although there was
a growth in 1998 of 3.5%, we categorize this year to the previous period
in order to discount a provisional impact of the economic inertia, and
not to take into account the factor of the low starting point (the contraction
of 1996 real GDP was 10.9%, in 1997 - 6.9%);
Average export growth for the same periods;
DEMAND-SIDE STRUCTURE OF GDP
1991 1999 2000
Private consumption 55.9 80.3 81.4
Government consumption 17.2 8.4 7.8
Investments 22.6 19.0 19.0
Net exports 4.3 - 7.7 - 5.8
Source: NSI
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Average growth of savings to GDP, this time the contemporary
period includes 1998, and it is compared to the years between 1995-
1997 in order to avoid the sharpest decline in saving at the beginning
of reforms;
Gross domestic investment (taken for the period of 1994-1997 in
order to skip the dis-investments in first reform years) and foreign direct
investment.
COMPARISONS OF SELECTED GROWTH FACTORS
FOR SELECTED PERIODS
Indicators [Period] / percent [Period] / percent
Average GDP growth 1990-1998 / - 3.9 1999-2000* / 3.3
Average export growth 1990-1998 / 6.7 1999-2000 / 9.7
Average savings to GDP 1995-1997 / 13.16 1998-2000 / 13.13
Gross domestic investment 1994-1997 / 11.6 1998-2000 / 16.3
Foreign direct investment 1990-1998 / 3.3 1999-2000 / 4.4
Source: IMF, NSI, own calculations
(*) - 2000 forecast.
Growth trend seems to be reversed. Investment is steadily higher
in the last three years than in the previous period. Foreign investment
is higher than in years before 1998 but still unused factor. Bulgarian
trade was converted from East to West under circumstances less favorable
in 1998 - 2000 period, than they could be at early years of transition.
Institutional background was also providing for greater government
discretion, which allow eventually mismanaging the exchange rate and
restored price controls and protectionism in 1995. In addition, by the
end of 2000 90% of Bulgarian banks are private and 70% of them -
foreign. No domestic political party is advocating major changes in the
monetary or trade policies. External policy framework of EU accession
is an additional institutional constraint to domestic temptation for radical
policy reversals.13
13 See below the paragraphs of trade policy reforms and the Balkan context.
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Major Trade Partners
The external demand is a major factor of growth. Given the assumed
low value added of the Bulgarian exports, the geographical proximity
presumably is playing a significant role. In this paragraph we concentrate
on two major markets - the EU and SEE.
EU is the biggest trading partner for all SEE economies, ranging
from just under 90% of exports in the case of Albania to around 46
percent in the case of Croatia. On the other hand, all of these economies
together account for a very small fraction, 1.6% of EU imports and 4.4%
of exports to third countries. These countries are simply not major markets
for EU exporters and are even less important as competitors to EU
industry and agriculture. Excluding Bulgaria and Romania, they account
for less than 1% of extra EU imports - and of course much less of the
EU market, if EU production and intra-EU trade are included. The
dependence is obviously not mutual, but it is important to see which
countries of the EU have replaced the former CMEA Bulgarian markets.
The alternative SEE market has its own peculiarities. In terms of
the trade potential it is the important to attempt to reflect to what extend
Bulgaria differs from other countries in terms of partners they compete
for. Tables below show the distribution of main trade partners in 1998.
One year is obviously not sufficient to draw general conclusions, but
BULGARIA: RELATIVE SHARE OF EXPORTS
TO SOME GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
1996 1997 1998 1999
USD mln % USD mln % USD mln % USD mln %
EU 1,912.5 39.1 2,128.7 43.3 1,083.8 44.6 2,085.3 52.6
Other OECD 554.0 11.3 661.7 13.5 249.0 12.0 491.1 12.4
EFTA 49.5 1.0 44.3 0.9 15.5 0.8 57.8 1.5
CEFTA 94.8 1.9 137.1 2.8 119.9 4.8 169.7 4.3
(incl.Romania)
SEE 514.2 10.5 291.9 5.9 397.6 5.4 315.4 7.9
Source: NSI, BNB
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it is a normal year, without political distortions, appropriate for an
illustration. At the same time, 1998 is not at all different in terms of
partners distribution from any year since 1995 for most of the countries.
SEE TRADE PARTNERS (IMPORT, PERCENT IN 1998)
AL BiH BG HR FRY MK RO SEE
SEE+SL 6.9 43.4 3.4 12.1 17.4 28.9 1.5 11.5
EU 79 41.5 44.6 58.1 72.6 52.8 56 56.1
I 38.7 14.7 13.9 20.5 25.2 14.4 17.5
(Ita) (Ger) (Ger) (Ger) (Ger) (Ger) (Ita)
II 24.4 11.8 7.9 19 22.7 13.8 17.4
(Gre) (Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ger)
III 7.9 4.9 6.4 5.1 8.8 8.9 6.9
(Ger) (Aus) (Gre) (Fra) (Aus) (Aus) (Fra)
Industrial 81.9 44.8 53.4 71.1 78.9 57.7 65.4 65.1
world
Source: IMF Direction of Trade
For Bulgaria, the geographical proximity matters only for the trade
with Greece, which ranks third partner since 1994, being a member of
the EU. For other countries, only Albania has a major trade with a
neighboring country.
SEE TRADE PARTNERS (EXPORT, PERCENT IN 1998)
AL BiH BG HR FRY MK RO SEE
SEE+SL 3 39.3 7.7 25.3 25.9 22.8 3.3 11.5
EU 88.8 50.9 47.9 45.8 71.7 51.8 62.8 58
I 58.9 22.3 13.1 18.4 28 22.4 22.3
(Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ita) (Ger) (Ita)
II 12.8 18.8 10.9 17.3 25.5 11.4 19.5
(Gre) (Ger) (Ger) (Ger) (Ger) (Ita) (Ger)
III 8.3 4.5 9.2 2.3 5.3 3.7 5.9
(Ger) (Aus) (Gre) (Fra) (Fra) (Bel) (Fra)
Industrial 94 54 56.7 53.4 71.7 65.9 70.7 65.6
world
Source: IMF Direction of Trade
103
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
For Bulgaria SEE trade cannot be underestimated.14 In 1998, it
was relatively negligible but in 2000 it tripled, though it is likely that
it has been more or less extraordinary development (mostly due to
petroleum exports to FR Yugoslavia).
As a whole, intra-regional trade is limited, less 12% of the total
Balkan trade. But this average hides many peculiarities. Bosnia and
Herzegovina is significantly dependent on its trade with Croatia.
Macedonia used to have a significantly larger regional trade within
SEE than many neighboring countries. Some neighboring countries
rarely trade among themselves, like Bulgaria and Romania. SEE
countries trade over 60% with EU and the industrialized West, but
not with one another.
There are at least several reasons for this:
n Regional integration of a low-income economy with low-income
countries usually makes an economy poorer;
n The demand is weak and relatively unsophisticated, and
competitive companies chose more complex markets;
n The countries in the region have relatively similar product and
quality structures;
n Instability of the regional markets in monetary and political
terms;
n Inefficient contract enforcement and dispute resolution;
n Tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Dependency on EU is to be seen in the totally insignificant Balkan
share in the Unions import - 1.59% in 1998. In addition all the countries
have same partners in EU trade, Germany and Italy, presumably trading
similar goods. In the future the trade potential of Bulgaria, as well as
of the other SEE, would to a significant extend depend on the economic
growth in these countries.
14 See also the paragraph on SEE context below.
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Re-channeling trade flows to neighboring Balkan countries
would not serve as alternative because eventually the extra-regional
demand has roughly the same address. The longer-term potential
would depend mostly on the growth in Germany and Italy. The
diversity of the third rank partners is greater but trading in that
direction is times lower then for first/second ranks. The same must
be true for the entire prospects of the GDP growth in Bulgaria and
SEE countries.
The dependency comes from the low income of these economies.
Bulgarias GDP per capita is 1/5 of the EU lower rank economies.
The average SEE GDP per capita at market exchange rate in 1998
was USD 1,793. Lowest GDP per capita had Albania (USD 1,110).
Highest GDP per capita had Croatia - USD 4,635. The total SEE GDP
was USD 94.92 billion. It is 0.32% of the value of the 1998 world
output. If we exclude Romania (which is roughly 40% of the total
SEE), remaining SEE GDP for 1998 is USD 58.12 billion, i.e. 0.2%
of the world output (Average per country it means 0.033%). Excluding
Romania, the total SEE GDP was roughly 1/12 of the combined 1998
public procurement budget of the EU member states.
COMPOSITION OF EC IMPORTS FROM SEE COUNTRIES IN %
OF TOTAL EC IMPORTS BY SECTOR (1998)
Albania BiH Bulgaria Croatia FRY FYROM Romania Total SEE
Total (%) 0.03 0.03 0.31 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.72 1.59
Agriculture 0.04 0.01 0.4 0.1 0.24 0.09 0.24 1.11
Textiles 0.13 0.14 1.02 0.88 0.32 0.4 3.39 6.29
Footwear 0.91 0.57 1.51 2.21 0.61 0.31 8.08 14.21
Iron and steel 0.1 0.08 2.77 0.11 1.76 1.21 3.51 9.54
Wood 0.07 0.36 0.5 1.49 0.41 0.08 1.16 4.07
Other 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.34 0.79
Source: ComExt
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Agriculture goods are the only category in EU import from
Bulgaria in which it has somewhat greater share. Exports of textiles and
footwear are important to all SEE countries: but the share in EU imports
ranges from 0.13% in the case of Albania to 3.39% for Romania (textiles)
and from 0.31% for Macedonia to 8.08% for Romania for footwear. In
textiles and iron and steel Bulgaria is second after Romania, but in the
former goods its EU-market share is more than three times smaller than
Romanias.
Bulgarian Trade with the Balkans
In order to deeper reflect upon institutional foundations of Bulgarias
trade potential we decided to check to what extend different partners
contribute to the efficiency of trade and investment. Efficiency is
understood as amount of investment per number of companies.
In 1998, the EU based companies constituted 6% of all registered
companies with foreign capital, and their share in FDIs was 36%, or
60% in 1999 if we take into account reinvested earnings and loans.
The difference in comparison with companies established by SEE
(including Greek) capital is more than telling. They constituted 36%
of all registered foreign companies, and their share in FDIs was 6%
in 1998.
In order to understand what could be the reason we tried to
compare different measures of trade between Bulgaria and the Balkans
with the number of companies. We looked at values and the volumes
of trades (as a relative estimation of quantity in metric tons) and compared
them with the number of companies taking part in trade between Bulgaria
and all Balkan countries (including Greece and Turkey) for a relatively
long period - 1993 - 2000 (first six months).15
15 This approach is inapplicable to the trade with EU due to unavailability of data on
the volumes and the very different figures on values from Bulgarian and EU custom
statistics.
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In the case of imports Bulgaria has too many importers from
Turkey compared to the values and volumes of trade. It is difficult to
draw a general conclusion but it is obvious that there is a concentration
of companies competing similar amounts of trade between Bulgaria and
the Balkans, which itself constitutes a relatively small share of the total
Bulgarias trade.
BULGARIAS IMPORT FROM THE BALKANS,
AVERAGE FOR 1993-2000 (%)
Value Volume Firms
Albania 0.04 0.04 0.50
BiH 0.07 0.04 0.32
Greece 45.35 33.99 35.08
Romania 14.85 31.42 9.19
Turkey 21.48 17.58 55.88
Croatia 0.91 0.68 0.95
Yugoslavia 4.24 4.69 3.42
Macedonia 13.07 11.55 11.70
SEE 100.00 100.00 117.00
Source: NSI, Customs statistics, IME calculations
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Particularly high concentration of importers relative to the
value and volume of trade, besides Turkey, is in the case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, while it is relatively on the balance in the imports
from Croatia and is somewhat more efficient in the similar relation
with other parts of the Balkans.
In exports participants outnumber both values and volumes
of trade with virtually all countries except Turkey. This is to be
explained by the nature of the Bulgarian exports to this market,
which consists mostly of electricity and energy resources. Especially
inefficient seems the export to Macedonia and Albania. Part of the
explanation is to be found in difficult administrative conditions and
non-tariff barriers. Given the longer term we have the opportunity
to compare and the rather unstable commodity structure of the
exchange between Bulgaria and the Balkan countries, it is strange
that companies still seek opportunities for arbitrage and profit. It
is likely that part of the explanation is in the poor markets
information readily available for the region.
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As a whole, it seems that exports to Balkan countries are more
inefficient than imports: the concentration of exporters is higher than that
of importers for all the countries.
As mentioned, these comparisons do not allow for firm
explanation but they have a heuristic power. Bulgarias attempt to
trade more with neighboring markets seems quite persistent,
regardless the diverse circumstances of 1990. It is possible to
suppose that elimination of the institutional barriers would release
greater efficiency and would contribute to the growth of the
Bulgarias Balkan trade.
FDI and Trade
A different way to look at the trade potential is to compare the
demographics of Bulgaria with its global share in FDIs. Such a
measurement has been proposed as a part of general benchmarking on
Bulgarias economy by the US based consultant company J.A. Austin
Associates (JAA). JAA compares Bulgarias FDI for a selected year
with its share in the global population. In 1998, the first year of a
relative breakthrough after the crisis of 1996-1997, Bulgaria attracted
BULGARIAS EXPORT TO BALKANS
AVERAGE FOR 1993-2000 (%)
Value Volume Firms
Albania 3.30 2.18 14.97
BiH 0.46 0.57 3.10
Greece 29.21 27.82 31.87
Romania 6.11 6.10 13.20
Turkey 29.15 33.74 21.92
Croatia 0.94 0.71 2.94
Yugoslavia 12.93 10.75 17.66
Macedonia 17.90 18.10 43.48
SEE 100.00 100.00 149*
Source: NSI, Customs, IME calculations
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USD 401 million FDIs, which put her on 61st place out of 162 countries
on which information was available for the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. Between EU accession countries behind
Bulgaria in that year there were only three countries: Latvia, Slovenia
and Cyprus.
BULGARIAS SHARE IN GLOBAL FDI FLOWS16
Source: World Development Indicators, JAA calculations
JAA assumption is that FDI/population ratio might be considered
fair if it is at least close to 1. Obviously this is a conventional
assumption, but it helps comparisons.  While Bulgarias FDI share is
six times smaller the share of the world population, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, although having a similar size of the population, look
considerably different.
The development is the following. In 1998, FDIs as percent of
GDP constituted 3.3%. A year later it almost doubled to 6.1%. In the
years after 1998 the inflow of FDI is on the average 30% higher per
annum. Accumulated stock of foreign direct investment in 2000 would
16 Martin Webber, Kevin Murphy, Bulgarias Competitiveness Beyond 2000, J.A. Austin
Associates, Washington DC, Sofia, 2000, p. 14. WDI figure for 1998 Bulgaria FDI is
different from that officially accepted by Bulgarias Foreign Investment Agency; WDI
does not takes into account reinvested earnings and credits, if we add to them the figure
would be USD 620 million.
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be at least 21% of the GDP. It would be twice less than the share of
FDIs to the GDP of Hungary but roughly the same percentage as in
Poland.
FDIs per country of origin give more information on provisional
trade developments. Presumably, the trade would be sustained or even
improved if trade partners interweave respective economic entities and
cooperate. As mentioned in a different context, in 1999 EU capital had
60% of the FDIs in Bulgaria, in 2000 this share will be already 63-
64%. (In terms of per capita the figure would almost double the amount
of 1998.) Similar but higher shares of EU investment have the Central
European countries.17 On the SEE scene similar is the performance of
Croatia and Romania.18 An interesting development is that of the Italian
investment. Italy use to be a prime trade partner for the last ten years,
but in terms of direct investment she has been at bottom of the list with
only USD 35 million. In 2000, the fourth biggest Italian bank, with a
major presence at the emerging European markets, Unicredito Italiano,
bought the biggest Bulgarian bank. Thus Italys Bulgarian position as
a second trade partner converted itself into a third investor. The structural
impact of such development cannot be underestimated: it has finalized
the privatization of the Bulgarian banking sector, diversifying the foreign
presence in accordance with the major trade and investment partners.19
As of the end of 2000, Germany, Belgium and Italy would amount to
over 40% of the investment in Bulgaria.
17 Gabor Huya, FDI in SEE: Implementing Best Policy Practices, WIIW, 2000, p. 5.
18 Ibid. p. 5-6.
19 The EU ownership of the Bulgarian banking system is about 70%, with other investors
like Societe Generale, National Bank of Greece, AIG, Reiffeisen Bank, ING, etc.
Structurally significant Italian investment is taking place on a smaller scale as well, e.g.
a leading Italian woolen textile producer bought earlier this years one of the biggest
Bulgarian factories (with 30% of the assets in the sector and 25% market share), inducing
domestic rivalry and thus changing the future of the entire sub-sector in the textiles.
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FDI BY SOURCE AND YEAR (MILLION USD FOR 1992-2001*)
Year Privatization Portfolio Greenfield Total per year
1992 34 34
1993 22 n.a. 80 80
1934 134.2 n.a. 76 200.2
1995 26 n.a. 136 162
1996 76.4 n.a. 180 256.4
1997 421.4 29.7 185 636.1
1998 155.8 64.2 400 620
1999 305.7 53.1 447 805.7
2000 480 20 500 975
2001* 400 25 450 875
Total period 2,021.5 192 2,488 4,676.5
Source: Foreign Investment Agency (FIA), IME
[* - IME forecast.]
Earlier foreign investors, like Belgium based Solvey and Union
Miniere, have bought respectively major chemical plant producing soda
and a copper smelter. They build up their advantages on the originally
subsidized in mid-1990 markets, restructured the enterprise and provided
a bridge to sustained exports without relying on quasi-fiscal transfers.
Similar developments take place in the textile and knitwear industry.
It seems that the structure has been established, and it will not
allow for sharp decline in trade values and quality. Exports for 1999
and especially 2000 have demonstrated stronger exports than ever before
in the last decay. Low value added is still significant with 17% net growth
in the first six months of 2000. But this is to be attributed to clearing
up stocks from the last year and partially accelerated restructuring after
privatizations in 1998 and 1999.
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The Balkans in the European Integration Context
After the Kosovo crisis there are international political developments,
which will eventually result into some sort of equalization of the
international trade frameworks for Bulgaria and the rest of the region.
The current Bulgarias predisposition to the region is shown in the
following two tables. But situation may change due to political
developments.
BULGARIA: RELATIVE SHARE OF EXPORTS TO BALKAN COUNTRIES (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Greece 4.6 6.2 7.8 6.9 7.1 8.3 8.8 8.6
Turkey 6.3 7.6 5.1 7.2 7.9 9.0 8.2 n.a
FR Yugoslavia 4.4 3.5 3.6 1.6 4.7 2.5 1.9 4.1
Romania 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4
FYROM 4.0 6.1 10.3 8.1 3.0 2.0 1.8 2.7
Slovenia 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.9
Croatia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
BiH 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Albania 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.8
Source: NSI
BULGARIA: RELATIVE SHARE OF IMPORTS FROM BALKAN COUNTRIES (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Greece 5.6 3.5 4.8 4.4 3.9 4.2 5.8 5.7
Turkey 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.9 n.a.
FR Yugoslavia 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.3
Romania 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3
FYROM 0.8 1.6 3.1 3.1 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5
Slovenia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Croatia 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0
BiH 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Albania 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources: NSI
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Countries of the so called Western Balkans are on the route to
signed EU Stabilization and Accession Agreement which in tackling trade
issues are similar to EAAs of Bulgaria and Romania. In November 2000,
the EU adopted a 97% non-tariff treatment of its trade with these
countries, maintaining quota-approach for agriculture produce, fish and
wines. There are talks of debt restructuring and reductions, which could
put other countries of the region in a position towards financial markets
comparable to that of Bulgaria.
DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND CREDIT RATINGS
            Debt restructuring Credit ratings
 [Moodys/S&P]
Paris club London club
Albania Dec. - 93 Jul. - 95 -
BiH Oct. - 98* Dec. - 97* -
Bulgaria Apr. - 91 Jul. 94* B2/B
Apr. - 94
Croatia Mar. - 95 - Baa3/BBB-**
Romania - - B3/B-
Macedonia Jul. - 95 - -
Yugoslavia - - -
Source: IMF; World Bank. [*- Restructuring involved debt reduction;
** - plus investment grade rating.]
Bulgarias advantage is that of a relatively early comer. It
has debt restructuring agreement and it exists on the international
capital flow map, performing modestly. Similar is the comparison
to other SEE countries in terms of membership in international
organizations and initiatives with more direct or remote relation
to trade frameworks.
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MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND INITIATIVES20
Countries Key trade related organizations Key EU agreements South-East Europe Initiatives
UN/ECE WTO WCO OECD ICC European Union EFTA BSEC CEI SECI SE
Stab.
Pact
TR PECO
Albania (WTO) WCO GSP, (UTA) BSEC CEI SECI SESP
(SAA)
BiH ATP (UTA) CEI SECI SESP
Bulgaria WTO WCO ICC EAA& PECO FTA BSEC CEI SECI SESP
 invit.
Macedonia (WTO) WCO (ICC) TCA (SAA) (UTA) CEI SECI SESP
(SAA)
Croatia (WTO) WCO ICC ATP (UTA) CEI SECI SESP
(SAA)
Romania WTO WCO ICC EAA& PECO FTA BSEC CEI SECI SESP
invit.
Yugoslavia INCC- (UTA) SESP
NC
Notes: Brackets mean either a procedure to join (ratify) or status of
an observer and/or unclearly defined membership.
20 ECE - Economic commission for Europe, Geneva; WTO - World Trade Organization,
Geneva; WCO - World Customs Organization, Brussels; OECD - Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris; ICC - International Chamber of Commerce,
Paris (important for setting rules of conduct and international dispute resolution); EU
- European Union, Brussels; EFTA - European Free Trade Association, Brussels; BSEC
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation; CEI - Central European Initiative; SECI - Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative; SESP - Southeast Europe Stability Pact; SETI - Southeast
Europe Trade Initiative (SETI is a rather advocacy group, securing businesses support
for values and projects of SECI and SESP); EAA - European Association Agreement;
TR - Trade Relations; PECO - Pan European Cumulation of origin; FTA - Free Trade
Agreement; CU - Customs Union ; ATP - Autonomous Trade Preferences; GSP -
Generalized System of Preferences; Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); TCA
-  Trade and Cooperation Agreement; UTA - Unilateral Trade Agreement (an EU model
to liberalize its tariffs for Western Balkans.)
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The EU has established a variety of bilateral relations with SEE
countries. In each case, the nature of the agreements is different. For
Bulgaria and Romania, existing EAAs aim at establishing a free trade
area and foresee a gradual liberalization of trade restrictions by both
parties. In the case of the non-associated countries, the EU provides
BiH, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania, wide ranging unilateral trade
preferences, which in substance go back to the former cooperation
agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia. The existing agreements
are characterized by a more favorable treatment of industry and
agriculture. A recent development here is the unilateral non-tariff
treatment of Western Balkans and FR Yugoslavia provisional imports
to EU (UTA). The agreement with Bulgaria and Romania provides
for free trade in manufactures (with exceptions and limitations in some
specific sectors e.g., steel) with a variety of transition periods
(asymmetric between these countries and the EU) and some more
limited specific preferential arrangements for agricultural products.
The ATPs and the contractual agreement with Macedonia contains
preferences covering both industrial and agricultural products.
(Macedonia, along with Albania, BiH and Croatia is at the eve of
signing Stabilization and Association Agreement21 with the EU that
was set to serve as a model for other West Balkan relationship with
the union.) As a general rule, industrial products are admitted duty
free with no quantitative restrictions, within the limits of tariff ceilings
for certain industrial products (steel).
WTO membership varies. Bulgaria and Romania are already
members. Croatia, Albania and Macedonia are at the late stages of
negotiations for WTO accession, while B&H is in the beginning.
Yugoslavia was an original GATT member but the WTO has not acted
on its application for accession.
21 By end of February 2001, Croatia and Macedonia have passed the second (out of three)
rounds of SAA negotiations.  SAA for Yugoslavia is pending, perhaps, by the end of
2001.
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Directly related to trade are the columns of the table above, which
lists trade organizations (and international standard setting bodies, OECD
and ICC) and the EU accession. The third column (excluding BSEC)
lists more or less political frameworks.
Increasing the competitive possibilities on enterprise level acts
against protectionism measures on general level. Presumably, a country
would liberalize and join WTO if and when relative competitive position
of a critical mass of enterprise allow for resisting pressures of the open
market. If such a stage were achieved, political bargaining to protect
domestic players would loose economic justification. The case with
SEE is far from such an ideal reasoning.
Tariff regimes of Romania, Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia in
1999 on average are relatively restrictive. For comparison the average
nominal import tariff of the Central European countries is about 10%.
Croatia seems closer to these countries. At the same time the only two
WTO members, Bulgaria and Romania could be considered as premature
members.
The explanation for Bulgaria is pure political: memberships in
WTO and other organizations and initiatives have equipped the government
with arguments against domestic interest groups, which could oppose a
policy towards greater trade liberalization and trade openness. If this
SEE TARIFF POLICY
Country Nominal average import tariff %
Albania 15,9
BiH 7-8
Bulgaria 15.2
Croatia 12
Macedonia 15
Romania 19.8
Source: Council of Europe, IME calculations.
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explanation is correct, Bulgarias membership in the trade-related
organizations and the EU-accession is an important element of the
domestic trade liberalization policy enforcement.
A special case is FR Yugoslavia. It is on the track of reassuming
its due place in the international frameworks. The sooner it happens
the sooner generally accepted principles would be applicable to SEE
markets.
A beneficial option for Bulgaria and the SEE countries would be
to adopt the same, uniform (uniform meaning that the same tariff is
introduced across the region, on all or nearly products and services) and
moderately positive tariff between themselves, realistically, roughly equivalent
to the external EC tariff, e.g. between 5% and 10%. A free zone, ideally,
is an imposing of a uniform tariff of 0%. Such a development is in fact
under way through the EAA for Bulgaria and Romania and similar
contractual models for the Western Balkan. Combined uniformity (the same
tariff for all products and services) and similarity (enforcement by each
country) duties on imports from other countries might serve as an instrument
enlarging the market and motivating clustering. The merits of the existing
international trade framework, with their fair chance of being properly
followed and implemented, are the following:
n Uniformity would allow tracking cumulated rules of origin;
n Investors would consider the region as a single market, without
formerly establishing such a market but forwarding integration with more
sophisticated markets currently servicing as major trade partners;
n Regional players would easier utilize relative economic
opportunities22, identifying niches, specialization venues and instances of
clustering.
22As P. Messerlin, J.C.Maur point out: the uniformity allows consumers and producers
to face undistorted prices for goods coming from their immediate neighboring and from
their largest supplier, the EU; see: P. Messerlin, J.C.Maur, Trade and Trade Policies in
Southeast Europe, in V. Gligorov, M. Landesmann (editors), Economic Reconstruction
of SEE. WIIW, Vienna, 2000.
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Bulgaria seems well positioned to benefit form such developments;
at least it is standing better than most of the countries. The same is visible
and in SEE comparison in FDI.
In 1999, FDI increased in Croatia and Bulgaria but declined in
some other countries, e.g. in Macedonia and Romania. Per capita inflow
for Bulgaria is approximately 2.5 times less advantageous than for Croatia
but as a percent of GDP the volumes are roughly comparable. But it
is also important that the combined FDI inflow for Southeastern Europe
in 1999 is 62% of the FDI to Czech Republic FDI for the same year.
Cumulative inflow per capita since 1989 is comparatively very
low, more than seven time less than in Hungary or six time less than
in Czech Republic.
INDICATORS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN SEE ECONOMIES (1998-1999 IN MILLION USD)
Country FDI Cumulative
Inflow FDI abroad Net Inflow per % of GDP USD Per
capita capita
1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1999 1999
Albania 45 41 - - 45 41 14 13 1.5 1.1 424 138
B&H 100 60 - - 100 60 27 16 2.4 1.3 160 42
Bulgaria 537 739 - -5 537 734 64 89 4.4 6.1 2,228 269
Croatia 873 1,332 -83 -43 781 1290 195 298 4.0 6.6 3,552 793
Romania 2031 961 9 -12 2,040 949 90 43 4.9 2.8 5,441 243
Macedonia 118 40 - - 118 40 59 20 3.4 1.1 217 108
Source: UN/ECE secretariat
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Conclusions
If we go back now to Gwartney-Skipton-Lawson Trade Openness Index,
we may see that Bulgaria stay relatively on all the four factors (tariff
rates, black market exchange rate premium, restrictions on capital
movements, and the size of the trade sector).  Tariff rates are moderate
and two political processes (EU accession and Balkan cooperation) are
exercising pressure to further liberalize trade. Black market exchange rate
is eliminated, and exchange rate fluctuations do not significantly hampers
the trade flows. Restrictions of capital movements are modest and
institutions to link Bulgarian domestic are well-established vis-a-vis
international banking system and trade partners.  The size of the trade
sector is high in nominal terms but at a closer look is rather inefficient.
TRADE FLOWS AS % OF GDP SINCE BEGINNING OF TRANSITION
Recently, the export performance worsened in 1998 and 1999.  The
decrease was due to ongoing structural reform, while impacts of
international factors remained limited.
TERMS OF TRADE: BULGARIA 1989-1999
Terms of trade 1989 1995 1998 1999
Bulgaria 100% 69.4% 68.4% 58.4%
Source: IMF, IME calculations
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On overall terms of trade has been deteriorating.  Volume
change in 2000 export is expected to be 14.8% and the unit value
would improve by 4.3% (the import change respectively: 5.4 and
14.1%).  This means that an overall improvement compared to 1988
might be expected only in a medium run.
The deterioration results from non-elastic foreign demand for
Bulgarian exports due to unfinished adjustment and low
competitiveness. In other words, fundamental developments like FDI,
liberalization and tariffs have been uneven or hampered, and this
is the reason, besides other factors of the trade openness, the
potential for growth and prosperity to remain dormant or undiscovered.
Trade result for the entire 1993-1999 periods is negative
(-410,866 USD).
EU has promptly become Bulgarias most important trade
partner with relative share of Bulgarian trade73.92% for the period
between 1993 and 1999.  At the same time the price for the trade
reorientation was the low value added and losses in previously
complex factors of production due again to the lack of FDI to
compensate for these development.  Trade balance for the mentioned
period with the EU is modestly positive USD 146,748.
The second trade partner for Bulgaria is SEE (including
Turkey and Greece) with average share of 31.22% of Bulgarian trade
over this seven years period.  From SEE main trade partners of
Bulgaria are Greece, Turkey, Macedonia and Romania with shares
11.74%, 9.67%, 6.73% and 3.09% respectively.
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BULGARIAS EXPORT/IMPORT AVERAGE FOR 1993 - 1999
Country/region Export Export % Import Import % Balance average
Bulgaria-World 4068211.56 100.00 4,479,077.90 100.00 - 410,866.34
Bulgaria-EU 1646877.80 40.48 1,497,972.13 33.44 146,748.64
Bulgaria-SEE 937413.96 23.04 366,204.30 8.18 571,209.66
Bulgaria-CEFTA 162385.30 3.99 201,245.36 4.49 - 35,284.61
Bulgaria-EFTA 44067.33 1.08 84922,17 1.90 - 33,627.97
SEE 937,413.96 23.04 366,204.30 8.18 571,209.66
Albania 36,547.37 0.91 223.94 0.01 36,323.43
BiH 4,266.27 0.11 365.64 0.01 3,900.63
Croatia 10,638.36 0.26 3,934.03 0.1 6,704.32
Greece 304,854.36 7.59 163,705.99 4,15 141148,37
Romania 65,979.73 1.64 57,100.75 1,45 8878,98
Turkey 311,169.64 7.75 75.834.29 1.92 235,335.36
Macedonia 203,958.23 5.08 65.039.66 1.65 138.918.57
Source: NSI, IME calculations
The analysis of the longer period of Bulgarias trade development
suggests that there are two most likely directions - EU and SEE.  On
both of them Bulgaria had already repeatedly registered more exports
than imports.
The development of the trade potential depends on economic and
political factors: enlargement of the market, restoration and use of
complex factors that would allow for better competitiveness and provisional
clustering while all these depend on the political will to maintain late
1990s reforms and developments on track.
Summarizing we can draw the following conclusions. Bulgarian
economy happened to be resilient to external shock, but more so after
the introduction of the currency board arrangement in 1997. It is not
simply a merit of the arrangement per se but, practically speaking, it
has helped to follow a set of policies, which eventually offset negative
developments on the international markets. It is no accident - in early
and mid-1990s more crucial domestic policy deficiencies and
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constellations mediated external shocks.  In the cases of embargoes etc.
they aggravated the negative impacts.  In cases of international market
turbulences, they prevented the chocks. In the post 1997 period, the
economic restructuring is taking off from the limbo of the previous
period.  At the same time, besides structural inefficiencies and the
ambivalent impacts of external factors Bulgarian economy managed to
reorient its markets from the ex-Eastern block countries to the EU and
the European free trade zone.
Attachment 1
Trade and Economic Structure
at the Beginning of Transition
Bulgarian exports prior to political and economic reform of 1990-
1991 had the highest CMEA-share in comparison to other member
countries.  Also, Bulgaria (along with Czechoslovakia) was the last
to reduce CMEA-export in 1989, while others started as early as
in 1986.  Another peculiarity was that Bulgaria exported mostly to
the ex-Soviet Union while others traded more significant volumes
with one another.  Roumen Dobrinski calculated that Bulgarian
CMEA-trade in the second half of 1970s and 1980s averaged
around 60% of the total.  Closest to Bulgaria was Czechoslovakia,
with 51-52%; Romania had a less than 30%, while Hungary and
Poland were always between 40% and 50%.23 In early 1980s
Bulgaria has had an exclusive intermediary position between East
and the West, importing cheap row material and resources from the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) and selling it recycled to international
markets, and trying to resell back to the East COCOM-embargoed
hi-tech products and computers.  Between 1984 and 1989 it enjoyed
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virtual CMEA-monopoly in this trade.  This pre-history has long-
term impacts on the reform years.
Bulgarias economic structure in 1989 (59.4% industry, 29.7%
services, 12.9% agriculture)24, although similar to those of other Eastern
block was more artificial (including the hi-techs component) and less
competitive.  It also depended on 90% FSU energy supply, used energy
wasting technology and, with COCOM produce becoming obsolete,
produced lower value added.
It was, in fact, a rent-seeking position. But in the 1980s it was
interpreted as one of a good borrower, and the government sought
financing from private lenders.25;
23 Rumen Dobrinski, Transition Failures: Anatomy of the Bulgarian Crisis, Vienna, WIIW,
1997, p.7.
24 Source: Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) Annual Report 1991, p. 17.
25 In March 1990 Bulgaria unilaterally announced a moratorium on its foreign debt
payments, and in 1991 - the first reform year - the Bulgarian foreign debt amounted
to 150% of GDP and 271% of the exports (BNB Annual Report 1991, p. 30), and the
structure of the foreign debt was 80% to private lenders and 20% to official lenders.
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Attachment 2
External Factors for
Trade Performance in 1990s
For all countries in SEE there were shocks, which distorted trade volumes
and routs through adjustments international capital flows or via impacts
of military conflicts and embargoes.  Bulgarias experience is as follows.
There have been five shock waves related to: the disappearance
of the CMEA, the embargoes on ex-Yugoslavia and Macedonia, 1997
capital market turbulence, 1998 Russian crisis, and the Kosovo crisis of
1999, plus the hike of oil prices and depreciation of the EURO in 2000.
The impact has been of different significance and consequence.
1. As mentioned above the longest-term impact came from the
first shock. The disappearance of FSU and ex-Eastern block as market
led to under-investment and contraction of GDP: by 31% in 1991
compared to 198926.  In 1990, FSU still hold for 52% of Bulgarias
exports (down from 56% previous year) and 49% of the imports (down
from 54% in 1989). As reported by BNB, in 1991, the total export volume
contracted by 34.6%.  Important imports remain mostly in energy
resources, but situation is changing there as well: these import in 1994-
1997 were equal to average 10% of GDP, for next three years - to 4.5%
of GDP.
2. The impact of the embargoes on ex-Yugoslavia and Macedonia
was of a more institutional than of pure structural nature.  It contributed
to the preservation of high port fees of Varna and Bourgas, making them
not competitive even after 1995. In 1992-1994, Macedonia doubled its
share in Bulgarias trade compensating for the lost markets in FR
Yugoslavia.  Violation of the UN embargo on FRY had become an
26 Source: National Statistic Institute (NSI).
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important factor to feed the informal and semi-legal economic activities
within the country thus implanting longer-term pro-corrupt domestic
economic ethics. This period coincided with Bulgaria moratorium on its
foreign debt payment.  The central bank followed policies of managed
floating and base interest rates.  Profit and asset repatriation regulations
were fairly liberal, interest rates were attractive and this constellation
contributed to estimated USD 300-330 million capital flight from
neighboring countries to Bulgaria.  Cheaper access to financing combined
with a cross-subsidy via energy prices, soft loans and postponed liabilities
contributed to a temporary improvement of exports in 1994, which was
not sustained in the next period.27 The 1994 Brady Plan with the London
Club of private lenders (backed by international financial institutions)
required stricter financial discipline. Foreign capital inflow was not linked
to investment opportunities due continued until 1997 stalemate in
privatization and quasi-fiscal support to loss-making state owned enterprises.
On the balance, 1992-1995 embargoes (coinciding with other developments)
could create growth, investment and export opportunities for Bulgaria
provided there were healthy economic structure and proper policy-mix
to utilize those opportunities.
3. Besides its openness, Bulgarian economy remained virtually
untouched during October - November 1997 crisis of the global capital
market, the Asian Crisis and the Russian financial collapse of Summer
1998.  The explanation for the former is in the underdeveloped nature
of the Bulgarian stock market as in the unclear supply and doubtful
demand side of this market.  The direct consequences of the Russias
crisis have been minor as well, because low Russias share in
Bulgarian exports (about 6.6% in the first half 1998), further declining
to 5.2% in the first six months of 2000.  Bulgarian products have
already had difficulty accessing Russian markets, due to both economic
and political reasons. The economic reason was mainly the low
27 See the paragraph on trade orientation.
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competitiveness of Bulgarian industries, while the political one was
in the high import tariffs.  Hence, the collapse of the Russian market
did not drastically affect Bulgarian exports to Russia, given the fact
that they were not high anyway.  Imports from Russia accounted for
around 28% in the first half of 1998 of all Bulgarian imports, mainly
energy resources and mineral products.  Since Russia was interested
in achieving a stable supply of hard currency, imports were not
affected as well.
4. Direct costs of the Kosovo28 crisis for Bulgaria were
negligible.  They include $ 0.7 million aid to the government of
Macedonia, and officially registered 317 Yugoslav refugees.  The war
rather highlighted inherited weaknesses than served as a sole reason
for Bulgarias poor economic performance in 1999.  In 1999, exports
of goods and services went down by 16%, while imports decrease
by 3% only.  During the first three months of the year, effectively
before the war, export industrial sales had already fallen by 26%.
Domestic sales fell by 12% for the same period, and GDP went down
by 0.7% compared to the same period of 1998.  The poor performance
was already there before NATO air strikes.  The immediate shock
was perhaps most obvious in April 1999 when exports dropped from
$ 335.1 million29 in March to $ 283.7 in April.  Imports went down
as well, but at much slower pace: from $ 453.7 to 442.9 million.
The aggregated decline in the imports for the first half of 1999 is
only 1% while exports were down by 21.7%.  This difference suggests
that physically interrupted trade routes were no single factor of
worsened Bulgarias competitiveness, although there were delays in
deliveries.  In fact exports improve in April - June 1999, and the
28 Views of the authors differ from those of the majority of Bulgarian economic observers.
29 March was exceptionally good month for 1999 exports, the only month equaling to
the average monthly export volume of 1998; April represents rough average monthly export
for the first half of 1999.
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GDP has picked up by 1.6% compared to the same quarter of the
previous year.  Eventually, the real GDP growth in 1999 was 2.4%.
It seems that for pure domestic reasons Bulgarian has reach the bottom
of economic performance before the crisis and on its aftermath it
behaved relative independently from external influence, the main
reason being, perhaps, the low recovery starting point in 1997.
5. 2000 brought about continuous increases of the petroleum
prices and weakness of the EURO against US dollar.  Depreciation
of the EURO approaches 30% since the introduction, the Bulgarian
currency; the Lev (BGN) is pegged to the EURO at 1.96, and in the
first half of November BGN is 2.3 for US dollar (up from 1.9 a year
ago).
6. Oil and natural gas import is 23% of the total Bulgaria import
in the first 6 months of 2000.  If oil and gas are excluded form the
current account the deficit is rather modest, USD 23 million in the
first quarter of 2000.  (In 1999, the same figure would be USD 170
million.)  The reason is in the fairly good performance of non-oil
exports.  Although the current account deficit in 2000 is about 8.25
of GDP (the government forecast is 4.5%30), the balance of payment
of the country remains enough strong to absorb pressures from hiking
oil and gas prices.  It is due to the high foreign investment record
in the fist nine months of 2000, amounting USD 600 million.  On
the other hand, in the period of 1994-1997 Bulgaria was spending
on average 10% of its GDP on oil and gas imports; in 1998-2000
this figure is 5%, which basically means that there is a tendency
towards lowering the overall energy dependency.
30  Marcin Wiszniewski has calculated that the current account deficit would increase by
0.17% for each USD 1 increase of the average oil price, see: Marcin Wiszniewski, Bulgaria
Resilient to Oil Shocks, Fixed Income Research, Morgan Stenley Dean Witter, September
2000, p. 2.
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7. As to the depreciation of the EURO, it does not harm
significantly the countrys balance of payment, though 65% of its foreign
debt is US dollar denominated.  The weaker EURO adds 0.23-0.24%
of GDP to 2000 fiscal costs of debt service.31  The exports is, perhaps,
benefiting from the cheaper EURO, although the history of the 1990s
proved that structural factors are more important than the exchange rate
in Bulgarias export performance.32
31 2000 debt service ratio would be 17.6-18%.
32 See: Assenka Yonkova, Krassen Stanchev (editors), In Search for Growth: Policies and
Lessons from Bulgarian Transition, IME Newsletter, Vol. 5, „ 11-12, 1999.  See also similar
on the exchange rate impact on Bulgarias competitiveness in: Bulgaria: Selected Issues
and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report No 00/54, IMF, April 2000, p. 14-
18.
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Our aim as organizers is to incite a completely free debate
between people, which are working on the problems of the
Bulgarian foreign policy and especially in its regional context,
so to define a set of opinions. The opinions expressed would be
useful to politicians, making decisions, and to opinion leaders,
who comment on these decisions and who create the public
opinion about what is and what should be the foreign policy of
Bulgaria in its regional dimension.
Let me start with an assessment  the fact that the
Balkans after Milosevic does not seem to be so different. In truth,
the only change since October 5 is that the regime in Belgrade,
which we were used to see for a decade in the 1990s was removed
and there is a new government in Belgrade. Processes of democratic
change and transformation of society have started in Yugoslavia.
But simultaneously with it, all other factors that have characterized
and structured the situation in the Balkans  local and regional
ones as well as international factors seem to be unchanged. They
remain constants in regard to the region. The international community
commitment towards the region through the KFOR forces remains
constant. The engagement of the international community through
the international forces in Bosnia remains constant. The problem
with growing irredentism of the Balkan communities remains
constant. The problem with the perplexed balance  institutional
and ethnic  in neighboring Macedonia. The problem of how the
countries in the region could deal with organized crime and
economic mafias in the region, etc.
This representation of continuity through maintaining the
major inertial factors is though to a great extent illusionary. It is
true that all these factors are preserved and maintained but in
strategic terms their combination, their restructuring in a completely
new regional situation according to me cannot be questioned.
Without any doubt, any of these factors will be transformed and
its action will be changed as a result of this fundamental change,
which follows the change of the regime in Belgrade.
It is of crucial importance to Bulgaria and to the Bulgarian
foreign policy that the factors, on which the adequate pursuit and
protection of the Bulgarian national interest is dependent, be
optimized in such a way that Bulgaria could obtain maximum benefit
from the changed regional situation and the changed context around
the Balkan peninsula. To achieve this, an ongoing and fruitful debate
should be held about what should be the strategy of the Bulgarian
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foreign policy, both in regional and in European context.
Let me go back to the basic aim of our conference. We
do not nurture the ambition and self-confidence of people who could
offer such a strategy. But we could pose the questions about the
situation to the extent that the problems defined by us are taken
into consideration when the further strategic benchmarks for the
development of Bulgarian foreign policy are being set.
I would like to dwell on some basic characteristics of the
situation in the way it is changed after the downfall of Milosevic.
On the first place, obviously it is true that with the end of the
former regime in Belgrade ended what we could call sanitary belt
around Yugoslavia that existed for almost a decade. The countries
in Southeastern Europe for eight-nine years operated as a belt
around the processes of instability and disintegration in former
Yugoslavia. A belt, which was aimed at amortizing and preventing
the spillover of these processes in the wider European space. This
sanitary belt had a strong negative impact to all the countries in
the region, including Bulgaria, but it also brought about some
certain advantages.
We should not be blind when assessing this balance of gains
and losses resulting from the internationally imposed sanitary belt
system in the last ten years. The adequate assessment of this system
will provide us with capabilities to plan for the behavior of the
Bulgarian foreign policy in the future. Among the negative
characteristics of the sanitary belt, which in the end appear to be
positive effects of its termination, is on the first place isolation.
Complete isolation, physical isolation, including in the areas of
transportation, economy and trade, lack of foreign investments
because of regional instability. As we all well know, it is not
important whether Bulgaria is in the epicenter of instability or it
is out of it. After all it is in the Balkans and we are all in the
Balkans and the instability is Balkan. This kind of isolation has
been terminated after the fall of the regime in Belgrade. The interest
to the region will grow. It is another story that there is a number
of other factors that will diminish this interest. But this kind of
isolation, which was generated by the disintegration processes in
Yugoslavia, is coming to an end. The second negative characteristic
of the sanitary belt is the extremely artificially generated instability
in the region. This, what we have observed for almost a decade
 the particular ability of Mr. Milosevic to export his internal
problems and the internal tensions from Serbia and Yugoslavia to
the neighboring countries and regions is obviously finishing with
the end of the regime in Belgrade. Whoever comes to power in
Belgrade from now on will be compelled to cooperate and to be
cooperative with the other countries in the region and with the
international community in resolving the basic problems that have
remained as a legacy of former Yugoslavia and the post-communist
legacy in general.
At the same time, the end of the sanitary belt does not
mean only and entirely positive things for Bulgaria and the other
countries. On the first place, what will appear as a problem, and
in fact is already demonstrated, is the circumstance that the end
of the sanitary belt ends the division of the countries in the region
into good and bad ones. And if Milosevics Serbia was bad,
Bulgaria in this context, obeying to some general rules of behavior
in the region could be among the good or stabilizing factors even
in times when nothing else but a passive observation was a
characteristic of Bulgarian foreign policy, especially until mid
1990s. Now there are no good or bad countries in the region in
principle. There is a certain equalization of the chances of the
countries in the region, and of course this does not mean that those
which have gone a longer useful way will not be encouraged, but
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000 IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
134 135
nonetheless all by assumption are potentially good.
The last feature of the period, commenced after ousting
Milosevic and which puts an end to the so-called sanitary belt is
the characteristic, related to the fact that the belt was removed
for Bulgaria. It has been removed for Romania, Croatia, but has
not been removed completely. The sanitary belt is shrinking and
at the moment it is what characterizes the relations between the
Serbs and the Albanian communities. Unfortunately, it still includes
our friends in Macedonia as far as they are also directly related
to the way the Albanian question in the Balkans will develop. So,
the sanitary belt preserves its characteristics of being a minimum
net of security around the completely shrunk epicenter of potential
instability in the region.
Secondly, as a topic of consideration today I would like
to put the problem of Bulgaria and the current and forthcoming
factors of instability in the region. The first one is the problem
of sovereignty and self-determination as principles and as particular
problems for the Balkans region. What should be the Bulgarian
attitude towards all these extremely dynamic problems, related to
the status of Montenegro, Kosovo, and other regions in former
Yugoslavia, if there is a radical change of this type of status in
closest future? Should we unconditionally support the independence
of these countries and regions, or, on the contrary, we have to
support unconditionally the sovereignty of nations from which they
try to secede. What should Bulgarian foreign policy be in view
of Bulgarian long-term interests in the region as a whole? It is
not an ideological problem, though in Bulgarian political context
it has been considered as such. For example, the right parties have
one position, while the left parties have just the opposite. It is very
unwise to make artificial ideological divisions on these issues.
These are problems concerning long-term interests of Bulgaria in
the region and in Europe.
The second problem is: how we could participate in the
process of limiting and ultimately in combating mafias in the
region? There is no point in talking about regional cooperation and
exchange between nations in the region until non-institutional,
illegitimate economic and other types of exchange dominate this
exchange. Unless we combat this type of organized crime in the
region, and economic crime in particular, unless we put these
processes under control such recommendations of philanthropists
like Mr. George Soros and European Commission officials for
creating a common customs area in the Balkans will not be
practically feasible. Because from the very moment the customs
and border control checkpoints are removed from Kapitan Andreevo
to Maribor a common space is formed where people of good and
bad nature will shuttle. And all this is very sensitive to the Schengen
issue, very popular in the last few days. The common customs area
and the free border crossing do not match the European criteria
for how borders should be protected by a country recently excluded
from the Schengen list. This is a problem, which also should be
examined and structured within our debate.
The next problem, which Bulgaria will be interested in,
especially in certain circumstances, is whether there will be a spillover
of domestic instability within Serbia. Serbia is still to face a process
of economic, social and political transition. This type of transition
could lead to such kinds of domestic instability that Bulgaria has
witnessed in the first half of the 1990s. And having in mind the
recent history of Serbia, the availability of arms for quite many people
and the fact that due to the embargo and the nature of the regime
in Belgrade the greater part of the Serb economy is underground,
illicit economy. The decentralization of institutions of power after
the regime fell down could easily cause the decentralization of the
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oligarchy Mafia, existing for many years under the auspices of
Milosevic, which could start bringing such processes throughout the
region. This is an extremely important problem.
The last of these factors of instability is how Bulgaria along
with the other countries in the region will contribute to controlling
and containing of what we call ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflicts
are not over and will not be over soon. We can not make an optimistic
forecast for the termination of ethnic conflicts in the region.
Especially in some parts of the Balkan region they will continue
having in mind their current dynamics. The region as a whole needs
a strategy for ethnic conflict containment and gradual ethnic conflicts
settlement for long-term historical periods. How to contain the ethnic
conflict? I would like here to propose an idea  could we contain
the ethnic conflict and meanwhile advocate for greater and greater
minority rights thus stimulating the attempts for autonomization and
separation, neglecting the fundamental issue that there are no group
rights without individual rights. And there are no individual rights
without institutions to guarantee them. There are no civil rights and
no civil equality without liberal-democratic institutions to assume
responsibilities for the respect of other peoples rights.
When we talk about ethnic conflict, the point is not only
in terminating the bloodshed and clashes between two communities
but how the Balkan region as a whole will be developed
institutionally from now on. Without the success of liberal-
democratic institutions, effective judiciary, etc. we could hope for
neither ethnic conflicts containment and settlement, nor emergence
or whitening of the economies of these countries which currently
are two thirds in gray and black, if not more.
The next problem is whether Bulgaria is going to be a part
of the Balkans or a part of Europe. It is a question coming out
of a political campaign. It was risen mainly by Mr. Assen Agovs
statement followed by some other deliberations that unless Bulgaria
is given a more favorable visa status, it would withdraw from the
Stability Pact. But it is not a matter of a political situation. It is
a structural issue of Bulgarian foreign policy and whoever the
decision-makers in Bulgaria and in the region will be they will
face this problem. Because after the Kosovo crisis two models of
integration in Europe have been formed.
The first model is the model of horizontal integration or
integration of the Visegrad countries which strive on their own for
membership through fulfilling the criteria. Yet, there is another type
of integration  the vertical integration of countries, which EU
takes in tow in one way or another. And currently these are the
countries from the Western Balkans, though Croatia and Macedonia,
according to me, do not deserve to be in this group. In this context,
what is the place that Bulgaria is going to take  of EU
representative in the Balkans (who has authorized it for that?) or
of Balkans representative in Europe (none has authorized it for
that either, and besides there are no ways by means of which
Bulgaria could be institutionalized in one of the two positions).
On the one hand, it is obvious that Bulgaria is not interested in
being in the same category as other countries in the region, which
still have a long way to go towards European integration. On the
other hand however, the self-isolation of Bulgaria from the regional
process is an extremely dramatic retreat from our national interests
because of the fact that Bulgarias value for Europe and whomever
else is value of a country being a part of the Balkans region. Without
the context of the Balkans we are in the middle of nowhere, we
have no value outside the Balkan region.
It is a formally logic paradox  we do not want to be
in the Balkans in order to integrate ourselves in Europe and we
can not integrate in Europe without having our own identity of
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a country from this region. The formally logic paradoxes are usually
solved by introducing additional dimensions, by introducing various
viewpoints. I would like to emphasize several dangers that would
arise if we really isolate ourselves from the processes of regional
cooperation and integration.
First, in this region, we know from bitter experience, the
one who comes at the top runs the risk of being opposed by all
the others. And it is not a groundless hypothesis. Secondly, groups
of problems are about to be formed that confront the interests of
Bulgaria with those of other countries in the region. It is risky
if these problems are not being solved. If we are to impose visas
on Yugoslavia and Macedonia it will be not only a problem
concerning Bulgarian cultural-historic heritage, not only a problem
deteriorating the relations with countries and peoples not deserving
such an attitude, but it will be a trade, infrastructure, political and
whatever other problem. This problem should be discussed and
solved.
The next problem is the relations with Turkey. It is not
an artificial problem. When Bulgaria was the only access to the
West for Turkey the bilateral relations were structured in one way,
and now when there is an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations
Turkey has greater space for maneuvers in its relations with
Bulgaria.
Another accent is the Bulgarian-Romanian relations and
their further structuring. These relations have never been easy. But
due to the completely just differentiation referring to visa issues
and the fact that Romanian parliamentary term will be colored in
red and brown, the relations with this country will not be easy
at all. This is also a part of the Bulgarian regional context.
The last but not least issue is the way Bulgaria will balance
its policy within the triangle EU, NATO and Russia. The Prime
Minister Kostov was right, saying that once Bulgarias visa status
is eased the country would face a definite recoil mechanism. This
reaction reflex could originate as from the region as well as from
the East. It is a real problem. The more progress Bulgaria makes
towards its integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic space the
more difficult it will be for Bulgaria to maintain its relations with
Russia. And Bulgarian politicians, government and society should
not be blamed for this. The truth is that Russia aims at keeping
its influence in the Balkans. The extent to which Bulgarian interests
coincide with Russian ones is a matter of deliberations. But
doubtlessly Russias interest does not envisage quick and easy
integration of Bulgaria in NATO and EU. From this point of view
Bulgaria has to make its choice  whether it could succeed in
integrating into the European and Euro-Atlantic space, or it will
remain in the periphery of the Commonwealth of Independent States
giving up to the eastward pressure. To those who would argue that
such a dilemma is artificial and that we could balance between
the East and the West by means of a successful foreign policy I
would reply that it could be done but only depending on the ground
position. The potential and power of ones own position is of
primary importance. If Bulgaria becomes a NATO member in 2002
the balance then between the East and the West will be another
story, much more cheerful and enthusiastic. Then Russia itself will
treat Bulgaria as a country that could be its mediator in NATO
structures, or at least would like Bulgaria to be in such a position.
Until Bulgaria is not in NATO and EU, this balance will
be hard and all the compromises on this balance between the East
and the West will frustrate the basic aims and priorities of Bulgarian
foreign policy, i.e. integration in EU and NATO.
Thank you for your attention and welcome.
IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000 IRIS Quarterly Policy Report Summer/Autumn 2000
140 141
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY FACTOR
IN THE BALKANS
Valery Rachev
Director, Department National Security and
Defence, Military Academy G. S. Rakovski
According to me, the main problem is not whether the Americans
will leave the Balkans in the hands of the Europeans, but whether
they will leave the region in our hands. Then we will have a very
serious problem.
To my regret and to the delight of all others, the military
problem in the Balkans is not the hot issue of the day. This is
my underpinning notion and I will try to address the issue of the
military factor in the light of other policies of Bulgaria, and not
the military policy of the state. In my opinion, obviously there is
a common and steady tendency towards reducing the role of the
military factor in the region in its traditional dimension, what was
typical for the last ten years.
In Yugoslavia, for example, Kosovo is a well-protected area.
I was thinking over a lot how I could define this fact in a very
simple sentence. May be this is the most accurate expression 
well-protected territory. There is no situation of a military character
that cannot be contained. Speaking namely about Kosovo, predictions
that the crisis there would erupt on the previous scale are
groundless. The existing tensions in the Presevo valley are rather
the last outburst of armed violence. They are provoked by the
aspirations of the local population to join a process, which according
to them is beneficial to their demands and they have been left out
of it. They are playing with the strategic importance of the Presevo
valley, which links Yugoslavia with the Mediterranean through
Macedonia and in fact is one of the most perspective transport
corridors. There was a certain moment, this is my personal view,
when KFOR delayed its response, waiting to be asked by the Serb
side to take vigorous measures, so that the enhanced use of military
power could assume commonly accepted character. So I do not think
that the events in Presevo can destabilize the situation again. The
very Serb army is demotivated, there arent feasible political goals,
which can be assigned to it and it does not have the same
unconditional political support as it used to have. It cannot be any
more an expansionistic force even in the context of former
Yugoslavia.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina there was an interesting
misbalance  on the territory of Republika Srpska there were
fewer, but more experienced and motivated military prepared
personnel, while the other republics armies or military forces were
just being established. Today, Republika Srpska no longer military
dominates over the other parts of the configuration.
In the security relations between Greece and Turkey, the
traditional character of the armed forces has the most visible, most
tangible and potentially more real character. In this case, however,
it is not only a matter of inertia from the past or impossibility
of each of the parties to take the first step. It is either just too
early or both sides estimate, that it is too early for them to start
radical changes in their bilateral military policy for two reasons.
The first one is that the political moment to do this is obviously
not ripe. The second one is that they run the risk, in case willingness
is demonstrated to reduce the role of the military factor in national
security policy that other negative factors would take advantage
of the situation: the Kurds in the case of Turkey and the Albanians
in the case of Greece. The relative readiness of the two sides to
change the status quo is supported by the fact that both of them
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have planned radical military reforms, which manifest two trends
similar to the both sides. The first one is aimed at reducing the
number of armed forces. The second one is modernization of their
equipment in order to meet the requirements for implementing
missions, which are not related to traditional defense goals, e.g.
missions that are more closer to crisis management than to defense.
The changes occurring in Romania are of primary interest
to me. The political situation in the country has an intricate military-
political aspect. It is related to the practice, I would not say
tradition, where the military have a strong influence on domestic
politics. I would not like to recall the past, going back to the fall
of Ceausescus regime, but in recent years, especially during the
years of President Ilieskus first term in office, the military obtained
exceptional authority in the country, their voice was heard in all
foreign and domestic policy issues. This created them the image
of an important, decisive factor in decision-making. Consequently,
during the conservative government term it seemed that this role
was related more to military expertise and advice. An indicative
case is the suppressing of the miners riot where military force was
employed. After these events, a bill on crisis management was
passed, which provides the armed forces a status, similar to the
status of the National Guard in the USA, to intervene in riots. There
was another symptomatic case. The establishment of associations,
patriotic ones  I avoid using a stronger wording  with the
participation of military, which challenged the non-partisan character
and non-involvement status of Romanian militaries in domestic
politics. In any event, even in case a bad scenario of the situation
there occurs, it does not suggest using the Romanian armed forces
in the internal affairs of the state.
I would like to say some words, in the context of our
chairmans speech, about the impact of external factors on the
military-political aspect of security in the region.
Yes, indeed in the first place the most serious problem is
whether the US military involvement in Europe, and in particular
in the Balkans, will be reconsidered. In other words, do we have
a real problem regarding the US engagement in the Balkans? I share
my personal opinion that this problem does not exist and it is not
going to appear. The analysis of everything that was said by
candidate Gores camp in relation to the US military commitments
towards Europe and about peacekeeping missions does not allow
to envision any serious change in the US policy, in case Gore is
elected. Moreover, the Pentagon recently released the document
European Strategy 2000. By this document, the current leadership
of the Department of Defense is trying to influence the policy of
the next administration in regard to the involvement of the United
States in Europe. From that point of view, the change in the status
quo and in the pattern of US involvement in Europe cannot be
expected.
There are two things to be mentioned in case Bush is elected
President. The first one is that there is a balancing moderation in
his words, especially after the initial blunders. Actually, in the end
of his campaign he upheld the argument that they (i.e. the United
States) were involved, they continue their mission, but on two new
conditions. In the first place, in regard to defense the Europeans
should increase their contribution. In the second place, in regard
to peacekeeping operations the model of simple participation
should be substituted by the achievement of concrete goals, i.e.
it has to be started with policy of involvement and continue towards
policy of achieving particular goals.
What is important for Bushs team is who is behind foreign
policy. Behind Bush are the people, which involved the United
States in the Gulf War. They are not isolationists, as the republicans
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have been dubbed. Hence, despite some of the nuances of their
statements, a change in US involvement cannot be expected.
Furthermore, the military base in Gniljane, of about 300 hectares
and well equipped, demonstrates a commitment within at least five-
year term.
In the second place, there are several things to be mentioned
in regard to the European Union and the development of the
European Security and Defense Policy. First, since April 2000, the
EU took up the command of the forces in Kosovo. More important,
the headquarters of the corps, which the next year should become
rapid reaction corps, is already acting as a General Staff concerning
land operations. This is an indicative precedent: for the first time
in the last fifty years the West violates the standard chain of
command by inserting a corps headquarters, which in practice is
not situated in the standard command institutions.
On the other hand, however, the European Union is
obviously going too far in its development of a Common Security
and Defense Policy. There are all indications that currently the
policy of France is arousing anxiety in NATO Headquarters. The
problem is that probably President Jacques Chirac is trying to
use the mandate of France, and probably the power vacuum in
the United States, to carry forward the process of building up
European defense, of European military potential far away from
NATO. This is a too ambitious goal, because it was not what
he and Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed upon in the beginning
when the process was launched. Now there is a certain need all
steps in that direction to be constantly coordinated especially in
regard to the forthcoming meeting in Nice. Also, as it was
announced recently, all attempts to reach a consensus on an
agreement, to be adopted in Nice, concerning relations with NATO
have failed. This even necessitated special talks to be held
between the Secretary General of NATO and the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom. In this aspect, the process will depend
mostly on the policy pursued by France and on the active
involvement of the UK as a balancing and regulative factor. In
this context, the position of Turkey is quite interesting. Obviously
a certain attempt will be made to moderate Turkeys stand and
one of probable scenarios is that Turkey will be granted to host
one of the commands of the European forces, which will introduce
a new element in the regional military-strategic situation.
From the viewpoint of NATO, Kosovo is of extremely
military-strategic and military-political importance. This is somehow
paradoxical conclusion, but looking at the map, especially if it
includes the Middle East and Southwestern Asia, it is evident that
from a strategic point of view the control of a protectorate, as
Kosovo is, has great military-strategic advantages.
On the other hand, the control of Kosovo is a fact: it is
unquestionable, it is accepted by the international community, while
NATO enlargement towards the Balkans is a disputable issue and
it is left to be resolved in the future. Hence, the interest of NATO
towards the Balkans is confirmed. Moreover, this is an interest of
one protectorate to another one, an interest, which does not pose
questions about national sovereignty etc, a fact that facilitates a
long-term NATO policy in the region.
The role of Russia in this situation has several levels. One
of them is strategic: it is not clear yet whether the question of
a strategic partnership between Russia and the West is still on (and
was it actually ever on?) the agenda. There are two things that
have to be taken into consideration when discussing this issue. In
the first place, the United States would like to resolve the problems
in their relations with Russia before building national anti-missile
defense. It is also obvious that Russia would like to obtain the
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largest possible share in managing European defense. I share the
opinion that as after Dayton, as well as after Rambuille, one of
the main tasks was to minimize Russian influence in Southeastern
Europe as much as possible. With the fall of Milosevic this task
was accomplished. The question is whether it was the end of the
honeymoon between the West and Russia and what will be next?
In tactical terms, what concerns us also to a greater extent, the
activities of Russia in Kosovo during the crisis were in general
irrelevant. From a military point of view this confirms the
conclusion that it will take some time for the Russian military forces
to become a real instrument of Russias foreign policy. The
strengthening and consequently the stabilization of NATOs military
presence in Kosovo and in the region as a whole has in practice
a deterring effect on Russia in areas where it does have its own
interests.
Germany, besides its leading role in the Stability Pact, after
the summit of Zagreb assumed a concrete influence on the processes
in the Western Balkans. This is a complete control of the
involvement of the Western countries in the region or at least an
institutional control, which provides the opportunity to influence
all aspects of Western policies towards the Balkans.
Last, some ideas about the projection of the military factor
on the Balkan regional politics. According to me, the complexity
of analyzing the military factor in security policy stems first of
all from the simultaneous emergence of three factors. First, we have
a successfully started process of international military cooperation.
It is may be the only one, which positively, steadily and in a
broadening perspective that have been developed in recent years.
I just want to mention that within the framework of this military
cooperation a deep change of the strategic culture of Balkan
militaries has been taking place. It is about notions, underlying the
fundamentals of mentality, about way of thinking, even about
peoples psychology of the Balkan people. It is not because I
am a service man that I think that it should be invested systematically
and assertively in international military cooperation. On the other
hand, the reforms in the military sector, unfortunately, are still in
the beginning and do not provide strong arguments to the foreign
policy; i.e. we have more intentions and more plans than tangible
results, which could be given to the foreign policy. Third, a basic
problem of policy making today is the necessity to view the military
factor not in terms of the traditional definition of the role of military
forces, the way it is written down in the Constitution, but rather
in terms of integration policy. The integration perspective, which
is getting closer, puts a question, which should be solved by national
authorities. This is the question whether we want to build up armed
forces, following the model of the EU and NATO member states,
or we want armed forces, which are situated within the realities
of the Balkans and have the ambition to join NATO and the EU
some time. I am not playing upon words. Behind these two theses,
there is particularly big difference in the way the Bulgarian armed
forces will be restructured and further developed. There is an array
of other problems, which could be discussed. In the first place,
who is going to support our military-political initiatives in the
region? If until now this was undoubtedly the United States, is
the European Union going to continue this policy, what will be
the attitude of Great Britain, which shows exceptional interest, as
within the Stability Pact, as well as on bilateral basis. I have already
mentioned Germany.
In the second place, can we manage in appropriate timing
and on the necessary level uphold our role of mutually accepted
factor in the military-political relations between Turkey and Greece?
I am referring to the context of changes, about which Mr. Ognyan
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Minchev has already spoken. And in the third place, how we are
going to fit into the European process of building Security and
Defense Policy. Are we going to be only observers, waiting to be
assigned the decisions taken, or we are going to find a formula
to join, if not the decision-making process at least shaping the
concepts and structuring of policies?
ORGANIZED CRIME:
A MAJOR SECURITY THREAT
Jovo Nikolov
Journalist, CAPITAL Weekly
Before Mr. George Soros forwards his proposal for Balkan
customs union, the organized criminal groups have actually done
it by themselves. And the trafficking in drugs clearly indicates that
there are no borders to organized crime. We can talk for hours
on this issue. I will only try to outline some basic elements of
the future development of organized crime, here in the Balkans.
It is a fact that Yugoslavia was and still is one of the main
generators of criminalization in the region. During the war in
Yugoslavia this was due to the repressive regime, the international
blockade and the necessity to import raw materials, fuel and other
goods. From this point of view, Milosevics interest was to
criminalize neighboring countries, thus maintaining as the economy
and the population as well as his military machine. In this sense,
Milosevic behaved just like the Bulgarian criminal groups in the
first years of transition. He stood both at the entrance and at
the exit of the Serbian state. I absolutely agree with Mr. Minchev,
who mentioned in his speech that one of the major threats from
criminalization of the region would be the decentralization of the
structures controlled recently by Milosevic.
According to me, if we are to imagine what the interests
of organized criminal groups will be in the Balkans and in
Yugoslavia in particular, we just have to recall how Bulgaria looked
like in the period 1991-95. There will be some differences of course.
There are five basic types of organized crime activities,
which characterize Balkan mafias. First, this is the production and
trafficking in drugs, fuel, cigarettes, arms, illegal CDs, white slaves
trade, the traffic in illegal emigrants, and the already traditional
blackmailing, car stealing and road robberies.
Currently, an intricate process is taking place that is directly
related to NATO involvement in Kosovo. This is the flourishing
of the Albanian gangs and in particular the Kosovar ones. They
are generally referred to the Albanian Mafia, despite of the
existence of different clans. The Kosovar Mafia is becoming much
stronger, which according to me, under the lit of the international
forces discovered a protected territory. Anyone who has been in
Kosovo knows that there are no state institutions, no car plates.
It is full of brothels and it is just a criminal territory, and I really
doubt that it can be put under control within the next three or four
years, despite the presence of international forces.
The other dangerous process, which is very indicative, is
that the Albanian mobs overtook drugs trafficking. Quite naturally
this is process commenced with the first wave of Albanian
immigrants to Turkey fifteen or seventeen years ago. Traditionally
illegal narcotics trafficking on the Balkan route was under the
control of Turkish-Kurdish groupings. Now the dominating factors
are Albanian clans. Just for comparison, in a report by Dr. Alexander
Politti, advisor to the Italian Ministry of Defense, Albanian clans
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hold 80% of the traffic in drugs through Hungary, which passes
through the Balkan route. For Bulgaria this percentage is about 60-
65%. The interception of drugs this year clearly demonstrates the
trends and the supremacy of the Albanian mafias in this business.
Most observers content that most of the world notorious
mafias are present in the Balkans. Cosa Nostra, the Ndrangheta
and the Russian Mafia, by tradition, as Ukrainian, Serbian,
Montenegrin ones have interests here. And what is peculiar, even
the Chinese triads are present. By the way, this phenomenon again
stems from the crisis in Yugoslavia, because Milosevic brought the
first Chinese who came to the Balkans, here on the basis of an
agreement with China.
In my opinion, these processes in Balkan organized crime
have been facilitated to a great extent by the blindly reliance
entrusted by the West to the KLA, despite the warnings of the secret
services that KLA members have been involved in trafficking in
drugs, control of prostitution, human beings trafficking.
At the moment, the problems ensues from the fact that
Kosovo is still an area lacking any institutions, no police, no
political system and these are the most favorable conditions for
criminal groups. Under the disguise of ethnic concerns an intricate
business has been started: trading in real estates left by Serb
refugees. A number of murders, which were claimed to be
ethnically motivated, were in fact based on a purely economic
interest.
I am focusing on the Albanian Mafia because it was
underrated for many years, especially in Bulgaria. But states like
France, Switzerland, the Czech Republic have already suffered its
cruelty. As an example I would like to mention that in the first
half of 1999 in Milan there were six skirmishes between Mafia
gangs  five of them were instigated by the Albanian Mafia.
After the fall of Milosevic there is one criminal state in
the region and it is called the Western Balkans. It includes Western
Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. After the fall of
Milosevic Yugoslavia will join those areas of instability. The purges
in the Serbian underground world took place at least half a year
before Milosevic was ousted. Since mid 1999 until now a number
of demonstrative murders were committed in Yugoslavia, the greater
part of them dubbed political. But the truth is that the people
who were shot dead  not only Arkan, but a number of
underground bosses, were connected to Milosevic and that is why
were killed ostentatiously for edification. This indicates that those
power decentralization policies in the criminal world, which has
been controlled by Milosevic, have started since that moment.
I personally dont see any substantial efforts on behalf of
the international community to put under some control those
processes. The fact that the armed forces in Kosovo behave more
and more like police forces fighting arms trafficking, shows that
this will be a major problem of the Balkans, even in the light of
Bulgarias aspiration to enter the Schengen space with a fresh face
or to be the outer border of the Schengen zone. This is particularly
the reason that organized crime would not like to see stability in
the Balkans, but rather the opposite.
Organized crime is interested in the pouring of money
by Western states in the region, but not in stability because
otherwise they will be driven out. Having ones own territory close
to the heart of Europe is much better from the viewpoint of all
national mafias. And they are in fact international, because the
integration processes between them have started long time ago.
There isnt even a conflict on ethnic basis, in the sense that the
Albanian gangs trade in quite a normal manner with Serbian or
Montenegrin or Croatian gangs. The interest there is much more
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clearly manifested and defined.
There is another peculiarity. The transportation corridors,
which are of primary interest for the Balkan states, are almost seized
by organized crime. The routes of these corridors are clearly
determined and each of the mafias (as we call them, although this
is not the exact term) claims its own definite zones of interests.
I expect a very serious development of the Balkans and
we will have the whole picture after three or four years. I expect
also a new outburst of conflicts. In fact, according to me, the major
threat to Balkan stability will be organized crime and its interests
here.
IS ETHNIC CONFLICT GOING
TO DISAPPEAR?
Marin Lessenski
Program Director, Institute for Regional
and International Studies
Is the democratization wave in the region going to bring
about the disappearance of ethnic conflict as a basic characteristic
of the Balkans, respectively halting the process of disintegration
of states, as a principle precondition for stabilization? The answer
is may be not. As recently Veton Surroi (the publisher of Koha
Ditore Daily) said: Even if Mother Tereza were to be elected
president of Yugoslavia, the Kosovar Albanians do not want to live
in this state.
Achieving minimum of security: stopping violence, as the
existence of a formal democracy: free elections and multiparty
system, etc, does not seem to yield the desired results. Conflicts
are being transferred to another dimension, but ethnicity seems to
be the dominant force in shaping particular policies.
Two issues emerge when discussing this problem area. The
first one, speaking in general, is: do the existing norms of
international order provide a clear-cut answer to the question of
accommodating ethnically based differences with the framework
of existing states? In the perspective of security issues, this is
actually the dilemma how to prevent the process of Balkanization
(facing it again); that is to provide guarantees that fragmentation
of existing states and violent change of borders will not occur.
The second issue relates to the relevance of the existing
models of ethnic conflict regulation. In the light of the last events
in the Balkans this refers to the impact of democratization as
a mechanism for resolving ethnically based conflicts.
The existing international normative framework is
contradictory. The principle of inviolability of borders, which
underlies the basis of the European system, is formulated by the
so-called Helsinki principles of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. On the other hand, the United Nations
Charter stipulates for the principle of self-determination. (Article
1(2) and 55) and the right of the people to freely determine their
political, economic and cultural status.
The conclusion from the last decades (since the end of
the Cold War or the 1960s) is that stability of borders was due
rather to geopolitical deliberations, than to applying the international
order norms. The disintegration processes of Titos Yugoslavia
confirmed the fact that the antimony between self-determination
and inviolability of borders cannot be resolved in a normative
debate. The conclusion from the establishment and recognition
of new states on the remnants of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is that the existing borders between the different
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republics were recognized and not the existing national (or ethnic)
boundaries.
The two cases of international intervention  in Bosnia
and Kosovo, demonstrate two different strategies of the West
towards the Balkans. In the first case, the objective was to preserve
the existing borders of the republic  the new, internationally
recognized state. In the second case, de facto, prerequisites for
secession of an integral part (a province) from Republic of Serbia
were created.
In the perspective of realities on the ground, the application
of the principle of self-determination established several risks to
security: spill-over or domino effect; process of Balkanization,
i.e. fragmentation of states into small, hostile to each other entities;
trapped minorities, what is the case with Serbs in Kosovo; threats
to the democratic processes  instrumental use of ethnic grievances
by ethnic elites, aimed at secession from the host state; creation
of small, nonviable units, which need constant external guardianship
and aid.
The current conflict resolution strategy of the international
community is based on democratization. In the long-term, this
is the most sensible policy, but the experience from recent events
indicates that the processes are much more complex.
After the elections in the Balkans  in Yugoslavia, Kosovo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that democratization policies
 free elections and election of pro-democratic parties, does not
guarantee that ethnic tensions will be reduced or state disintegration
processes will cease.
What happened during and after the elections in
Yugoslavia? The Kosovar Albanians and the authorities in
Montenegro ignored the presidential elections. Kostunica himself
objected the local elections in the (still formally) Serbian
province. The Serb population in Kosovo did not take part in
the elections. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the nationalist parties
of Serbs and Croats won the votes and the Bosnian Muslim
counterparts preserved a solid support. One of the serious
objections to the Dayton Agreement has been that it
institutionalized ethnic division and gave power to the three
ethnic communities, including political representation, excluding
in principle other communities.
The events from the last two months suggest that
democratization policies instead of overcoming bring about
strengthening of ethnic divisions. Hence, there is a process of
territorialization of politics in the words of Jaques Rupnik and
it seems inevitable that consolidation of democracy will be
accomplished in territorial-political units, formed on the basis of
ethnic or national denominators.
The admissible options for conflict resolution could be
change of borders: secession/separation or self-determination. In
the latter, the conundrum who are the people and in what territorial
unit? has to be resolved. Not less difficult to consider is the
dilemma between granting collective or individual rights. There are
claims that group rights often bring about violation of individual
rights, as the minority encapsulates itself and the state cannot
intervene as mediator  blocking of the state as was the case
with former Yugoslavia.
The canton model employs the principle of subsidiarity
and the units are formed on ethnic principle. Non-violent
approaches to ethnic conflict resolutions vary, but before
considering them, a clear definition of the problem should be
made: is it intolerance on behalf of the states or there is upsurge
(i.e. instrumental use of grievances) on behalf of the minority
population.
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The basic questions facing Bulgarian position are the
following. In what cases and what are the limits to independence
aspirations in the neighboring countries, taking into account the
timing of the processes? A general answer suggests that as a basis
for developing relations in the region, a firm stand against unsound
demands and violent change of existing borders should be maintained.
The protectorate forms of governance (Bosnia and Kosovo)
should be retained until there are enough proofs that 1) there are
guarantees for individual rights of the citizens; 2) functioning
institutions have been established, not only of democratic
representation, but also of a state, which is able to implement
political decisions taken. This will be also a guarantee, that the
creation of a criminal state, which would generate criminality
and insecurity, will be prevented.
EU PLANS FOR THE WESTERN
BALKANS AND BULGARIAN POLICY
Nickolay Mladenov
Director, The European Institute
I would like to talk about an initiative, which I hope would not
follow the destiny of the Royaumont process. I would talk about
the EU initiatives related to Southeastern Europe and the Western
Balkans in particular. First, I will draw your attention to the West
Balkans Association and Stabilization Process. Second, I will
explain its importance for Bulgaria. Third, I will speak about the
priorities of Bulgaria.
PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT.
STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS
OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
PANEL II:
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All initiatives related to the Southeast European region are
difficult to be implemented because of its non-homogeneous character.
There are at least five types of states and state-like formations in
the Balkans. Analyzing them from the EU perspective these are:
Greece, which is EU member state; Bulgaria, Slovenia and Romania,
which are negotiating for EU accession; Turkey, which also applies
for EU membership, but does not hold negotiations; Macedonia,
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Croatia and Albania, or the so-called Western
Balkans, take part in the EU Association and Stabilization Process.
There are some division within this group of states  Macedonia
has just concluded the negotiations for signing the EU Association
and Stabilization Treaty; Croatia is on its way to start such
negotiations; Albania and Bosnia will also start negotiations in near
future. Kosovo, a state-like formation, has no clear status and future.
From this perspective, it is quite difficult to formulate an integrated
external policy to be applied to all these extremely heterogeneous
states with quite heterogeneous development perspectives.
In order to find a basis of its regional policy, the EU starts
the so-called Association and Stabilization Process for the countries
from the Western Balkans. The process is the first EU attempt to
formulate an integrated policy towards the Western Balkans  a
policy that would underline political and economic cooperation as
well as the EU mechanisms for providing support for the ongoing
reforms within those countries.
It is asserted that the process offers to the countries from
the Western Balkans the European perspective  a quite unclear
and flexible notion, which, on one side, has to reassure the
Western Balkans that one day they will be able to become EU
member states, and on the other side, to reassure the EU member
states that, in fact, European perspective does not mean anything
concrete. The EU proposes Association and Stabilization Treaties
to be signed between the EU member states and the countries
from the Western Balkans. These treaties include at least five
elements, which underline the development of the cooperation
among those states and the EU as well as the cooperation among
them within the framework of the region.
There is a requirement in the treaties noting that the states
have to cooperate for resolving problems of common interest and
for establishing a free trade area. They have to cooperate with the
neighboring countries that have structured relations with EU 
these are Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Thus, the
treaties establish a general framework of the EU support for the
ongoing reforms in these countries.
Drawing some lessons from the Association Agreements
with Central European countries, Brussels has included in the
Association and Stabilization Agreements with the Western Balkans
countries a new requirement for granting funds at different phases
of the process. In order to assess a phase of the process as
practically implemented, the country should have created certain
practices, should have adopted specific legislation, harmonized with
the one of the common market and of the EU in general. That
is why, the EU strategy towards the Western Balkans is more
complex and more difficult to implement than the EU policy
towards Central Europe.
If we look at the trade chapter of the treaties, it becomes
clear that they have a more liberal regime than the regime that
was offered to the Central European countries. This regime permits
a longer period of local industries protection and a quicker
liberalization of the European markets for them. All this is in a
very conditional mode as the only one country that has already
signed such agreement is Macedonia. There will be different
modifications of the agreement for the different countries.
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Put under strong pressure, the Commission took a historic
decision endorsed by the member states in the summer of 2000.
The decision postulates unilateral liberalization of the EU trade with
respect to the Western Balkans. In the present, about 99% of the
Western Balkans trades with the EU are already liberalized.
There was a serious pressure against this decision in Europe
because it sets a precedent that can be wrongly interpreted by the
EU applicant countries. Central European countries that are now
holding membership negotiations have a strong interest in the field
of industry and agriculture and could set more requirements in their
talks with Brussels. Some difficulties could also appear within the
WTO negotiations because a precedent has been created concerning
the Western Balkans. A lot of member states: initially France, then
also Spain, Portugal and Italy to some extent, did not accept such
decision because it provides trade liberalization for the Western
Balkans countries in fields of crucial importance for them.
Decisions upholders maintained that there was no problem
in adopting it because the EU import from the Western Balkans
accounts for less than 1%. These countries are not able to seriously
overleap this 1% and to threaten EU producers, no matter how
intensive is the liberalization.
To a great extent, the decision was also of crucial importance
for Bulgaria because of its extremely straight and proper stand.
Bulgaria supported those preferences declaring its ambition to play
the role of a source of stability and development in the Western
Balkans.
Why is this EU policy so important for Bulgaria? Firstly,
under its EU association status and its EU accession negotiations,
Bulgaria has no right to free trade agreement with countries, which
have not such agreement with the European Union. Hence, the
negotiations between Bulgaria and EU on Foreign Affairs Chapter
were slowed. The parties concerned expected the final agreement
between EU and Macedonia for defining the specific requirement
for transitional periods regarding Bulgarias agreement with
Macedonia. In general, the establishment of a similar framework
of the relations between the Western Balkans and the EU is
important for the process of trade liberalization between the Western
Balkans and the other countries in the region.
Second, the highly acclaimed European perspective permits
our country to develop its relations with the Western Balkans in
the light of Bulgarias accession to the EU. In the course of the
visa debates Chief Negotiator Kisyov as well as Prime Minister
Kostov emphasized that Bulgaria would not impose visa requirements
on the countries with European perspective. At present, such
countries are Romania and Macedonia.
Which are the challenges of the Association and
Stabilization Process? On the first place, this is again the
European perspective. None of the provisions of the treaty
between EU and Macedonia lay the legal ground for Macedonia
considering itself an applicant for EU membership. It was already
pointed out that the EU has to provide Western Balkans with
clearly formulated European perspective, which would support
economic and political reforms and the pro-Western oriented
political elites in these countries. Such perspective would bring
about more security and stability not only in the Western Balkans
but also in Southeastern Europe as a whole. Unfortunately, all
this has not happened yet. However, if the Western Balkans
countries succeed in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, EU
membership will become a real perspective for them all.
Secondly, a lot of people estimated the process as an attempt
for restoring Yugoslavia from Zagreb to Tirana, including Albania
and excluding Slovenia. This perception is provoked by the great
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attention paid to the regional cooperation within the Western
Balkans in the fields of trade, reforms in general and solution of
different problems resulting from the wars in the last decade. This
perception was quite strong in Croatia, where the new government
felt itself as closed in a wrong conceptual framework regarding
the EU. Croatia insists on being integral part of the applicant states,
rather than part of the so called problem states from the Western
Balkans. This fact postponed the beginning of the negotiations
between EU and Croatia.
The process does not create a radically new framework for
the establishment of lasting stability in the Western Balkans. It does
not offer any custom or monetary union perspective or any essential
guarantees for fast economic development of the region. For the
present, such guarantees are impossible because the region is quite
heterogeneous, the EU member states are also quite different and
hence, it is very difficult for them to reach an agreement on a
common policy. That is why, all the results achieved till now are
a significant success.
Looking at this part of the process, which is related to the
trade issues, one can find some elements that still have not been
carried out. At the same time, their implementation would contribute
to a faster and more effective integration of the Western Balkans
into the pan-European free trade area. The European Institute in
Sofia together with the Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels
elaborated in the summer of 2000 a special report entitled A
Comprehensive Trade Policy Plan for the Western Balkans. The
report assesses three different stages in the process of Western
Balkans integration into the pan-European zone. First, this will be
achieved through asymmetric trade liberalization between the
Balkan countries and the EU zone (what has already happened).
Second, through liberalization of trade within the Western Balkans
region as well as between this region and the Central European
states by integrating the first group in CEFTA. Third, through the
establishment of a free trade area in the Western Balkans, EFTA
and Turkey. In this context, these proposals seem much more
realistic and applicable at this stage than the establishment of
Balkan customs union.
What does all this mean for Bulgaria? As it was already
mentioned, the main foreign policy priority of Bulgaria is the EU
and NATO integration. In this context, if EU does not possess any
underlying principles and framework defining its relations with the
Western Balkans, it would be very difficult for Bulgaria on its way
to the EU to benefit from the development of its relations with
this region or from the support it provides to these countries. On
the other side, without a serious EU institutionalized commitment
to the Western Balkans development, fighting organized crime and
terrorism could not be effective.
The fact that the Association and Stabilization Process
consists of different stages, where funds granting depends on the
implementation of certain requirements, is also a specific guarantee
for the effective realization of the reforms in the Western Balkan
countries. Recently, IMF worked out a report entitled The
Importance of EU Membership Perspective for the Economic
Reforms in the Applicant Countries. This document reports that
the European perspective has played the role of a special guarantee
for the development of reform ideas and movements in Central
Europe and has also stimulated the change, which they so eagerly
needed on their way to the EU. The report, however, concluded
that if one day EU says to Russia: Welcome to the EU, the result
would be just the opposite. Such invitation would bring to the
bottom all reformists in the country. In order to be a genuine
stimulus for the realization of reforms, the European perspective
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has to be a real one. In Russia it is not a real perspective and
that is why it can not be a stimulus. In the Western Balkans,
however, if the European perspective is well formulated, it could
incite the necessary reforms. From this perspective, the economic
and social development in the next few years is of key importance
for the reformation processes in the Western Balkans countries. As
a SEE country holding EU accession negotiations Bulgaria could
be a good example. Bulgaria has shown what kind of results can
be achieved when there is a well formulated will for reforms,
political consensus concerning the major priorities, and a realistic
European perspective. The establishment of the Association and
Stabilization Process creates the conditions necessary for the
development of such regional policy that will help our countries
in their way to the European Union.
THE STABILITY PACT FOR SEE:
JUST ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVE FOR THE REGION
OR SOMETHING MORE?
Antonina Arbova
Program Coordinator, Institute for Regional
and International Studies
During the last eighteen months the Stability Pact was quite a lot
discussed and assessed from the perspective of different view points
and in the light of different interests. Various evaluations were given
and even extreme opinions were expressed  as positive ones as
well as ones that totally ignored the significance of the initiative.
This text makes no claim to use original approach in
analyzing the Stability Pact meaning and principles. It would rather
outline some of the major mistakes made in the implementation
of the Stability Pact as an initiative aiming at intensifying
democratic processes in Southeastern Europe, fostering economic
development and stimulating the cooperation between the countries
in the region.
      * * *
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched
on June 10, 1999 to create conditions for lasting peace and stability
in the Balkans. It was designed as a long-term strategy to promote
economic stabilization and integration of the Balkans to the rest
of Europe. The initiative provoked high expectations and caused
great enthusiasm among the population in the region. Eighteen
months later, the Western countries estimate the development of
the initiative as controversial and not so successful; local
disappointment and pessimism are the prevailing moods among the
population in Southeastern Europe. What is the reason for that?
It was the Kosovo crisis that made the international
community fundamentally change its policy towards the SEE
region. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, it was the first time when
the West has applied an integrated political approach aimed at
resolving the existing problems in the Balkans. As a peacemaking
political initiative with the necessary flexible structure, the Stability
Pact was seen as a significant contributing factor to regional
stability and security, as a mechanism for the accumulation and
implementation of strategies for the overall stabilization and
development of the region. Moreover, the Stability Pact pretended
to be the first long-term policy of conflict prevention that addresses
the looming conflicts before they erupt  a policy that replaced
the prevailing perception of conflict management.
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Gradually, the initially set priorities have been replaced by
a vision, which describes the Stability Pact primarily as an initial
donor program. Eighteen months after the Stability Pacts strategy
was adopted, it is found that there is no serious progress in the
practical implementation of the initiatives goals and the accorded
projects. Moreover, a strong discrepancy between the practical
effects and the initial high expectations and hopes can be found.
In fact, the international community has missed to seriously assess
the reasons that underlined the failure of the previous ambitious
international initiatives aiming also at the stabilization and
development of the South Eastern Europe. Among these international
projects for the region are:
First, it was the Southeastern European Cooperation Initiative
(SECI) initiated by the United States and launched on December
6, 1996. It aimed to enhance regional stability, encourage regional
cooperation and facilitate the SEE access to European integration.
SECI was designed as a free forum for discussion of common
regional economic and environmental problems calling for concerted
action1. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey
participate in the initiative and Montenegro is an observer. Despite
the initial ambitious purposes, that are identical to the Stability Pact
objectives, SECI has not produced any practical results that could
significantly contribute to their achievement. The initiated projects
within the initiative are mainly focused on combating transborder
crime, infrastructure improvement of main transportation corridors,
facilitation of international road transport among others.
South Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI) announced by
President Clinton in 1995 is another important regional initiative.
It has been designed to help Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia
further develop and integrate their transportation infrastructure
along the east-west corridor that connects them. An overall aim
of the initiative was to use the specific experience of regional
cooperation on transport infrastructure development in fostering
more general regional cooperation and economic integration.2 So
far, the major practical result of SBDI implementation was the East-
West Corridor Economic Feasibility Study  feasibility study on
the east-west corridor between Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania.
Royaumont Initiative is an EU initiative launched in 1995.
It focused on enhancing Stability and Good Neighborliness in SEE.
The initiative is concentrated mainly on strengthening civil society
structure, the establishment of effective channels of communication
across national boundaries, on bilateral and multilateral level, and
on promoting cross border understanding, long-lasting stability and
peace, in general3. Similarly to the SECI development, however,
the Royaumont Initiative progress is now associated with the
funding of separate projects (in the NGO sector mainly), rather
than with some achievement of the initially set major priorities.
All these regional initiatives committed one and the same
error  they missed to develop a general integrated strategy for
the stabilization and development of the region, to which the
separate projects to be submitted. The Stability Pact has also chosen
a wrong line of realization and development of its objectives. In
this context, the following mistakes could be outlined:
The first major mistake was that some Western politicians
used to refer to the Stability Pact as a Marshall Plan for the Balkans.
Comparing both initiatives, however, they missed to take into
1 See http://www.unece.org/seci
2 See http://www.tda.gov/region/sbdi.html
3 See http://www.royaumont.org
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consideration a very important detail: the major aim of the Marshall
Plan was to create an appropriate environment necessary for the
development of an economic activity, for rebuilding political
confidence and strengthening the cooperation among the Western
European countries, i.e. the major aim was the establishment of
adequate and effective democratic institutions.
In the Balkans, this misperception of the Stability Pact
created over-optimistic hopes and expectations. There was a general
belief that this political initiative would be a kind of a charity fund
pouring money into the region. A strong conviction was created
that the Pact would not only support the implementation of some
strategic aims and priorities of the Balkan countries but would also
provide an immediate financial aid for the reforms conducted in
different public spheres.
Just a few months after its announcement, however, it
became clear that the Stability Pact is in fact a document outlining
principles and norms of dialogue and cooperation among the Balkan
countries. From a methodological point of view, it does not contain
any clear strategy and practical guidelines of concerted efforts to
reform and modernize the region. The Regional Funding Conference
in Brussels proved that the initial expectations for influx of money
and aid would not happen. First, most of the funds were then
allocated as various forms of credit and loans. Second, a serious
gap appeared between the initially set goals of the fundraisers and
the interests and priorities of the donor countries and organizations
by directing most of the money to the second Working Table along
infrastructure projects: more than 81% of the funds were allocated
to the Second Working Table; more than 63% of the funds were
directed just to infrastructure projects.
Instead of developing integrated strategy for the stabilization
and development of the region, the major and maybe the only one
practical result of the Stability Pact till now is the collection of
a certain amount of money allocated to different physical
infrastructure projects. Not enough funds were directed to build
stable and working institutions and effective and functional public
administration. Thus, the first mistake was the lack of a stable
institutional framework capable to guarantee the effective utilization
and appropriation of the allocated funds, and the lack of clear
procedures and mechanisms for control over the distribution and
spending of aid funds, doom to failure the whole initiative. There
will be no stability in SEE unless an effective institutional system
is capable to resist organized crime and clan economics, to prevent
inter-communal clashes, to guarantee and enforce human rights.
The second major mistake  the international community
has found in the Milosevic regime and the non-participation of
Yugoslavia in the Stability Pact a good excuse for delaying the
initiation of the major projects of crucial importance for the entire
region.  In the last 18 months, the Pact missed to support practically
the establishment of effective institutions, to sustain the economic
development of the Balkans as well as to elaborate adequate and
realistic strategies in the fields of security and stability of
Southeastern Europe. So far, the Stability Pact is associated mainly
with a bad organization, bureaucratic approach, low effectiveness
and a lack of coordination between the international institutions.
The only one practical outcome of the numerous meetings and
sessions is the collection of all so far available projects related to
the region of SEE as well as the establishment of some contacts
at state and expert level.
The third major mistake was that proclaiming Milosevic
regime as a main source of instability and insecurity in the region,
the international community  the Stability Pact, respectively 
focused all their efforts basically on ousting Milosevic from power
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and missed to define the major challenges and problems of the
region entering the political agenda just after the changes in
Belgrade. These problems that are to be solved are as follows:
n To take measures against the possible submission of the
Serb economy by powerful mafia structures trying to redistribute
the spheres of influence after the fall of Milosevic. It is of extreme
importance this process to be put under control. Otherwise, the
negative effects could easily spill over into Serbia neighboring
countries provoking further criminalization of the entire region.
n To prevent further enlargement of the Albanian mafia
structures in Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania, which are
based and rely on strong clan solidarity and loyalties. These criminal
networks dominate international channels for illegal trafficking in
drugs, weapons, and people, providing them enormous profit.
n To remove the still existing premises for new inter-ethnic
conflicts in the Balkans. So far, the Stability pact has failed to
create adequate stimuli for settling the territorial problems creating
the impression that the redrawing of the Balkan map has not been
concluded yet. The initiative does not give any clear vision or
strategy for practical regional cooperation aimed at avoiding future
conflicts.
Despite all these mistakes and shortcomings, there are some
positive tendencies that have to be pointed out. In general, the
Stability Pact provides a good chance to start an open and
productive dialogue, to develop multilateral cooperation in SEE and
also to join the efforts and the potential of different countries to
curb negative trends and developments. In this view, it is of
common interest to the countries in the region to adopt the already
established framework as well as to participate in the implementation
of different initiatives for regional cooperation. Moreover, the
inclusion of Serbia into the reconstruction process and the existing
development schemes will inevitably lead to a more stable regional
approach in the stabilization and modernization of the entire region.
The last ten years of violence, ethnic conflicts, reform
failures, and unsuccessful international initiatives for the SEE have
proved that coordinated and consolidated actions on regional level
to improve negative practices and tendencies in all major areas of
reform could bring about greater impact and change than any
isolated local effort. That is why, all parties concerned have to unite
their efforts to bring the initiative back to its initial principles and
goals and to look for its optimal dimensions. Public debate has
to be initiated aimed at achieving a consensus and the establishment
of a clear political vision for the future  a vision that is able
to coalesce around itself the countries from the region as well as
the international community.
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BULGARIA AND THE BULGARIAN
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE NEW
ENVIRONMENT OF THE BALKANS
Plamen Ralchev
Program Coordinator, Institute for Regional
and International Studies
The Bulgarian economic interest imperatively should be
examined within the perspective of development. The economic
development however is still being a fiction mainly because of the
considerable loss in competitive advantages in the world economy
due to the social, political and economic transformations commenced
in 1990s.
The crisis and the disintegration processes in former
Yugoslavia as well as the imposed international embargo had an
extra negative impact on the new orientation and specialization of
the Bulgarian economy.
An additional impediment turned out to be the criminalization
of the economies in the region.
On the background of its limited economic capabilities Bulgaria
is facing a tough challenge  to develop itself. If we assume that
in the past surviving has been one of the implicit aims of the economy
the development is the imperative of nowadays. The prospects for the
development of the Bulgarian economy are obscure and it is because
of their deficiency that they should be analyzed accurately and
implemented effectively, in view of the future in particular.
After lifting the international embargo against Yugoslavia
the impediments to the Bulgarian economy came down. The point
however is what the gains could be.
Rethinking the new situation it is substantial to define the
contents of the Bulgarian economic interests and the dimensions
where their implementation could be projected.
In terms of contents, the Bulgarian economic interests could
be considered mainly in the context of new technologies,
communications, transit of energy resources and export of electricity.
These are some of the very few sectors where the country could
achieve competitive advantages.
The progress of information technologies and information
society enables the economic development overcoming the limits
of resource insufficiency and utilizing such competitive advantages
as highly qualified working force.
In the sphere of communications the interests of Bulgaria
require modernization of infrastructure, issuing a license for a
second GSM operator and the privatization of the monopolist state-
owned Bulgarian Telecommunication Company BTC by a strategic
investor.
Transiting the energy resources, Bulgaria is connected with
two of the projects for building an oil pipeline through the region.
Two out of the three contesting routes pass through Bulgaria.
Besides that, the Russian Company Lukoil, which owns the Burgas
Refinery Neftochim as well as refineries in Romania and Montenegro,
is also interested in refineries in Serbia and Croatia.
The export of electricity remains a strategic priority for
Bulgaria. In view of the closure of the first two reactors of
Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station the issue of building a new nuclear
power station in Belene became popular.
How does economic development refer to regional
cooperation and European integration?
As a matter of dimensions, Bulgarian economic interests
could be projected both at regional and EU level.
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During the recent years several EU countries (Germany,
Belgium, Italy, Greece) emerged as leading foreign trade partners
of Bulgaria. The pending issue however is how competitive
Bulgarian economy is and whether it could cope with the
pressure of the exacting demand of the European market,
provided that in the country factors for stimulating competitiveness
are still lacking.
The second dimension of the Bulgarian economic interests
is the regional one. In the course of previous years the economic
performance of Bulgaria in the region was quite poor. Of course,
it was partly predetermined by the circumstances in Yugoslavia and
the international embargo in particular, which caused direct as well
as indirect damages, breeding up the black and  gray economy
in the region.
It is unwise and irrational for Bulgaria to pursue
incoherent policies towards the region and towards the EU.
Greece, for instance, deals quite well in accordance with its EU
membership by pursuing active regional policy including economic
expansion. The Greek economic interests have been expanding
consistently in the Balkans  in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The Greek presence could
be considered strategic as far as it holds shares in key sectors,
such as telecommunications, banking, food processing, and the
heavy and chemical industries.
The interests of other countries are also presented in the
Balkans and in Bulgaria particularly. In this category countries
which are major foreign investors in Bulgarian economy and
important trade partners of Bulgaria could be pointed out.
Analyzing 1999 and 2000 data, we witness a coincidence
of major foreign investors in Bulgaria and its leading trade
partners. The aftermath is that there is a rising communication
and exchange between these countries and Bulgaria. Germany,
Greece, Belgium and Italy are in the group of the first four
investors in Bulgaria as well as in the group of the first four
trading partners.
As far as Bulgaria does not possess enough resources
to pursue its economic interests it is necessary to seek the
crossing points of Bulgarian economic interests and the interests
of the partner countries. It is an option to broaden up the
economic perimeter accessible for Bulgaria. In these terms some
aspects of the Greek economic expansion in the Balkans could
be utilized for the purpose of developing Bulgarian economy.
It is especially important in such areas as telecommunications,
banking and energy sector.
Searching similarities or common benefits of Bulgarian
and Greek economic interests should envisage extending regional
economic cooperation  towards Serbia, strengthening
cooperation with Macedonia, which is far beyond the expected
results. First results of the concluded agreement for free trade
area are expected not earlier than 2002  2003.
Analyzing Bulgarian economic interests one can not
ignore the role of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States, which are the leading importers in Bulgaria, according
to data from January to August 2000. In this context it should
be noted that the transit route for Caspian oil through the region
is to be chosen soon. This fact has a lot in common with
Bulgarian economic interests because two of the project routes
pass through Bulgaria (Bourgas  Alexandroupolis and Bourgas
 Vlora).
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in the
realities of modern interdependence the accord of economic
interests and achieving a kind of coherence between the interests
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of weaker and the interests of stronger subjects of international
relations is a prerequisite for development. One of the possible
approaches to this end is modelling the forms of regional
economic cooperation and European integration in search of the
optimum balance for Bulgaria.
